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I. Developments
A. IRC § 170(h)
1. IRC § 170(h) (attached as Appendix A), which authorizes a federal charitable
income tax deduction for the donation of a conservation easement meeting
specific requirements, was enacted in 1980.
2. Treasury Regulations interpreting § 170(h) (attached as Appendix B) were
issued in 1986.1
3. The Treasury Regulations are based, in large part, on the Senate Report
describing § 170(h) (referred to as legislative history).2
B. Washington Post Articles
In May 2003, the Washington Post published a series of articles questioning some of the
practices of The Nature Conservancy.3 In December of that same year, the Washington
Post published a follow-up article describing allegedly abusive conservation easement
donation transactions involving “wildly exaggerated” easement appraisals and
developers who received “shocking” tax deductions for donating conservation
easements encumbering golf course fairways or otherwise undevelopable land.4
In December 2004, the Washington Post published a second series of articles alleging
abuses in the facade easement donation context.5 The articles described a surge in
facade easement donations that coincided with the emergence of for-profit facilitators
and nonprofit organizations that have "taken in millions of dollars for processing
paperwork and monitoring the easements." The articles also noted that facade
easements often merely duplicate restrictions already imposed by local law and fail to
decrease the value of the buildings they encumber, making the tax deductions based on
a 10% to 15% reduction in the value of the properties unwarranted. One promoter
reportedly told property owners they would receive tax breaks for a drop in their
property values, but stressed that there would be no actual decline; that "[i]t's a paper
concept."6
1

Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14.
S. Rep. No. 96-1007 (1980).
3
See David B. Ottaway & Joe Stephens, Nonprofit Land Bank Amasses Billions, WASH. POST, May 4, 2003, at A1; Joe
Stephens & David B. Ottaway, How a Bid to Save a Species Came to Grief, WASH. POST, May 5, 2003, at A1; Joe
Stephens & David B. Ottaway, Nonprofit Sells Scenic Acreage to Allies at a Loss; Buyers Gain Tax Breaks with Few
Curbs on Land Use, WASH. POST, May 6, 2003, at A1.
4
Joe Stephens & David B. Ottaway, Developers Find Payoff in Preservation, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2003, at A1.
5
See Joe Stephens, For Owners of Upscale Homes, Loophole Pays; Pledging to Retain the Facade Affords a Charitable
Deduction, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2004, at A1 [Loophole Pays]; Joe Stephens, Local Laws Already Bar Alterations;
Intervention by Trusts Is Rare for Preservation, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2004, at A15; Joe Stephens, Tax Break Turns Into
Big Business, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 2004, at A1.
6
See Loophole Pays, supra note 5.
2
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C. IRS Notice 2004-41
In June 2004, the IRS issued Notice 2004-41 stating that the IRS is aware that taxpayers
who transfer conservation easements to charitable organizations or make payments to
charitable organizations in connection with a purchase of real property from the
organization may be improperly claiming charitable deductions under § 170.7 The Notice
warned that the IRS intends to disallow improper deductions and impose penalties and
excise taxes on taxpayers, promoters, and appraisers involved in such transactions.
D. 2005 Joint Committee on Taxation Report
In January 2005, the Joint Committee on Taxation issued a report to Congress
recommending, among other things, that
1. the federal charitable income tax deduction offered to conservation easement
donors be eliminated with respect to easements encumbering property on which
the donor maintains a personal residence,
2. the deduction be substantially reduced in all other cases, and
3. new standards be imposed on appraisers and appraisals with regard to the
valuation of easements.8
E. Proposal to Penalize Charities that Remove or Fail to Enforce Easements
In March 2005, the Joint Committee on Taxation published a Description of Revenue
Provisions Contained in the President’s Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Proposal, one of which
was to impose significant penalties on any charity that removes or fails to enforce a
conservation easement, or transfers such an easement without ensuring that the
conservation purposes will be protected in perpetuity.9 The proposal was intended to
address the concern that charitable contributions of conservation easements, which are
required to be in perpetuity, are being removed, or are being transferred without
securing the conservation purpose.

7

IRS Notice 2004-41 is available at http://www.irs.gov/irb/2004-28_IRB/ar09.html.
See Options to Improve Tax Compliance and Reform Tax Expenditures, prepared by the JCT, JCS-2-05, 281 (Jan. 27,
2005), available at http://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=showdown&id=1524.
9
See Description of Revenue Provisions Contained in the President’s Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Proposal, prepared by
the JCT, JCS-3-05, 239–41 (March 2005), available at
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=1523.
8
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F. 2005 Senate Finance Committee Report
In June 2005, the Senate Finance Committee held a hearing on the federal tax incentives
available with respect to conservation easement donations. In connection with that
hearing, the Senate Finance Committee issued a report in which it recommended
numerous reforms, including:
1. revocation of the tax-exempt status of conservation organizations that
regularly and continuously fail to monitor the conservation easements they hold
(or the suspension of the ability of such organizations to accept tax-deductible
contributions),
2. implementation of an accreditation program for conservation organizations
acquiring easements,
3. limiting charitable contribution deductions for certain small easement
donations and providing the IRS with the authority to pre-approve deductions
for such donations, and
4. IRS issuance of guidance regarding how a conservation organization can
establish that it is appropriately monitoring the easements it holds.10
The Senate Finance Committee report also expresses concern regarding amendments to
conservation easements. The report explains that “[m]odifications to an easement held
by a conservation organization may diminish or negate the intended conservation
benefits, and violate the present law requirements that a conservation restriction
remain in perpetuity.”11 The report notes that modifications made to correct ministerial
or administrative errors are permitted under present federal tax law.12 But the report
expresses concern with regard to “trade-off” amendments, which both negatively
impact and further the conservation purpose of an easement, but on balance are
arguably either neutral with respect to or enhance such purpose.13 The report provides,
as an example, an amendment to an easement that would permit the owner of the
encumbered land to construct a larger home in exchange for restrictions further limiting
the use of the land for agricultural purposes.14 The report explains that trade-off
amendments “may be difficult to measure from a conservation perspective,” and that
the “weighing of increases and decreases [in conservation benefits] is difficult to
perform by [the holder] and to assess by the IRS.”15

10

See Report of Staff Investigation of The Nature Conservancy (Volume I), U.S. Senate Committee on Finance,
Executive Summary 10-11 (June 2005), available under “Library,” then “Committee Prints” at
http://finance.senate.gov/.
11
Id., Executive Summary 9.
12
Id., Executive Summary 9, n. 20.
13
See id. at Pt. II 5.
14
See id.
15
Id.
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G. 2005 IRS Testimony Before Senate Finance Committee
In his testimony before the Senate Finance Committee in June 2005, then IRS
Commissioner of the Tax-Exempt and Government Entities Division, Steven T. Miller,
discussed the steps the IRS was taking to enforce the law in this area. Such steps
included
1. modifications to IRS Forms 1023, 990, and 8283,
2. the formation of a special cross-functional team to “attack all aspects of the
problem of conservation easements,” and
3. increased audits of easement donors.16
H. Pension Protection Act of 2006
To combat abuses, the Pension Protection Act of 2006,17 among other things,
1. revised the rules in § 170(h) with respect to contributions of façade
easements,
2. provided statutory definitions of the terms “qualified appraiser” and “qualified
appraisal” in IRC § 170(f)(11), and
3. lowered the thresholds for accuracy-related penalties and made the gross
valuation misstatement penalty with regard to charitable contributions a strict
liability penalty (see Part III.A below).
At the same time, the Pension Protection Act increased the tax benefits offered to
conservation easement donors for donations made in 2006 and 2007 by making the
percentage limitations on the resulting charitable deductions more favorable.18 These
enhanced incentives were repeatedly temporarily extended and then made permanent
in 2015 (see Part I.U below).
I. DOJ Suit Against Trust For Architectural Easements
In June 2011, the Department of Justice filed a lawsuit against the Trust for Architectural
Easements (“TAE”).19 The lawsuit alleged, among other things, that TAE made false and
fraudulent statements to prospective donors about the tax benefits available for
donating façade easements, steered donors to appraisers who had been coached by it
to go along with its questionable practices, helped donors to claim deductions before
donations were final, and allowed donors to terminate easements they had already

16

The testimony is available at http://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/hearing/?id=e821cece-d9eb-1c66-4b9eb4a6602a54f4.
17
Pub. L. No. 109–280, 120 Stat. 780.
18
For an explanation of these changes, see Technical Explanation Of H.R. 4, The "Pension Protection Act Of 2006,"
prepared by the JCT, JCX-38-06 (August 3, 2006), available at
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=select&id=20.
19
Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief, U.S. v. McClain, Civ. No. 11-1087 (U.S. Dist. Ct. D.C. June 14,
2011). TAE was formerly known as the National Architectural Trust or “NAT.”
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granted.20 In July 2011, a U.S. District Court Judge issued a permanent injunction against
TAE settling the case.21 The injunction permanently prohibits TAE from engaging in what
the federal government said were abusive and illegal practices. The injunction bars TAE
from, among other things:
1. representing to prospective donors and others that the IRS has established a
“safe harbor” for the value of a donated façade easement equal to 10 to 15% of
the subject building’s value,
2. participating in the appraisal process for a conservation easement in any
regard, including recommending or referring donors to an appraiser or TAE’s
preferred list of appraisers,
3. accepting easements that lack a conservation purpose or do not satisfy the
“protected in perpetuity” requirement of § 170(h), and
4. requesting fees or cash donations tied to a percentage of the estimated value
of the easement or the deduction to be claimed with regard to the easement’s
donation.
TAE was also ordered to pay an independent monitor for two years to ensure that it
complied with the injunction. The injunction did not preclude the IRS from assessing
penalties against TAE for violations of the Internal Revenue Code. The injunction also did
not address whether TAE was entitled to retain its tax-exempt status.22
J. IRS Conservation Easement Audit Techniques Guide
The IRS has issued a Conservation Easement Audit Techniques Guide.23 The Guide
provides that it is not an official pronouncement of the law or the position of the IRS,
and it cannot be used, cited, or relied upon as such. The Guide nonetheless provides a
summary of many of the requirements that must be met to be eligible for a federal
charitable income tax deduction for the donation of a conservation easement under
§ 170(h). The Guide also alerts readers to issues that may be considered and raised on
audit. The IRS has informally indicated that the Guide will be periodically updated to
reflect case law and other developments.

20

Id. See also Janet Novack, Feds Sue Trust Over Historic Easement Tax Breaks, Taxing Matters, FORBES, June 16, 2011.
Stipulated Order of Permanent Injunction, U.S. v. McClain, Civ. No. 11-1087 (U.S. Dist. Ct. D.C. July, 15, 2011) (TAE
agreed to the settlement without admitting any wrongdoing).
22
Id. See also D.C. Federal Court Bars Company from Promoting Alleged Tax Scheme Involving Improper Easements on
Historic
Buildings,
Department
of
Justice
Press
Release
(July
18,
2011),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/July/11-tax-933.html; Joe Stephens, Judge bars D.C. charity from promoting
‘façade easement’ tax deductions, WASH. POST, July 19, 2011.
23
See http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Conservation-Easement-Audit-TechniquesGuide [hereinafter IRS CE Audit Techniques Guide].
21
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K. IRS Form 990
IRC § 501(c)(3) organizations—as most land trusts are—must file an IRS Form 990
(Return of Organization Exempt From Income Tax) each year.24 Schedule D to IRS Form
990 requires a charitable organization holding a conservation easement to provide
certain information, including:
1. the total number of conservation easements held at the end of the year;
2. the total acreage restricted by such easements;
3. the number of easements modified, transferred, released, or extinguished, by
the organization during the taxable year;
4. whether the organization has a written policy regarding the monitoring and
enforcement of easements;
5. the total number of hours devoted to monitoring, enforcing, and inspecting
conservation easements during the tax year; and
6. the expenses incurred during the tax year to monitor, inspect, and enforce
easements.
For each easement modified, transferred, released, or extinguished, in whole or in part,
the organization must explain the changes in a Supplemental Statement to Schedule D.
The Instructions for Schedule D explain:
1. an easement is released, extinguished, or terminated when, among other
things, all or part of the property subject to the easement is removed from the
protection of the easement in exchange for cash or the protection of some other
property,
2. the use of synonyms does not avoid the application of the reporting
requirement (e.g., calling an action a “swap” or a “boundary line adjustment”
does not mean the action is not also a modification, transfer, or extinguishment),
and
3. “[t]ax exemption may be undermined by the modification, transfer, release,
extinguishment, or termination of an easement.”25
L. Administration’s Fiscal Year 2013 Revenue Proposals
In February 2012, the Treasury Department published General Explanations of the
Administration’s Fiscal Year 2013 Revenue Proposals. These proposals included a
proposal to eliminate the charitable deduction for contributions of conservation
easements on golf courses.26

24

IRS Form 990 is available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/Form-990,-Return-of-Organization-Exempt-From-Income-Tax-.
Instructions for Schedule D (Form 990) are available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/Form-990,-Return-of-OrganizationExempt-From-Income-Tax-.
26
See General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2013 Revenue Proposals, Treas. Dep’t 140 (February
2012),
available
at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-ExplanationsFY2013.pdf.
25
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M. IRS General Information Letter on Swaps
In a March 2012 Information Letter, the IRS advised that conservation easements that
are subject to swaps other than in the very limited situation of a swap that meets the
extinguishment and proceeds requirements of Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(6)
are not deductible.27 A “swap” is defined as the removal of some or all of the originally
protected property from the terms of the original deed of conservation easement in
exchange for either the protection of some other property or the payment of cash.
N. IRS General Information Letter on Extinguishment
In a September 2012 Information Letter, the IRS advised that, while state law may
provide a means for extinguishing a conservation easement for state law purposes, the
requirements of § 170(h) and the Treasury Regulations, including Treasury Regulation
§1.170A-14(g)(6) (the judicial extinguishment and division of proceeds regulation), must
nevertheless be satisfied for a contribution to be deductible for federal income tax
purposes.28
O. DOJ Suit Against Façade Easement Appraiser
In January 2013, the United States filed a complaint in District Court against an appraiser
and the company he owned with his wife.29 The complaint alleged, among other things,
that the appraiser had appraised more than ninety conservation easements for
purposes of the deduction under § 170(h) and had repeatedly and continually made
material and substantive errors, distorted data, and provided misinformation and
unsupported personal opinions in the appraisals to significantly inflate the value of the
easements for federal deduction purposes. The complaint also alleged that the
appraiser attempted to obstruct IRS enforcement efforts by claiming not to have any
work files for his appraisal reports, which professional standards require that an
appraiser maintain. “This sort of abuse of a high-dollar charitable contribution
deduction,” stated the complaint, “inspires contempt for the system of honest,
voluntary income tax reporting.”
In February 2013, the District Court issued an Agreed Order of Permanent Injunction
that, among other things, (i) barred the appraiser (who was 70 years old and had
retired) and the company from preparing any kind of appraisal report or otherwise
participating in the appraisal process for any property relating to federal taxes and (ii)
ordered the appraiser and the company to provide to counsel for the United States a list
27

Information Letter from Karin Goldsmith Gross, Senior Technician Reviewer, IRS (March 5, 2012), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/12-0017.pdf.
28
Information Letter from Karin Goldsmith Gross, Senior Technician Reviewer, IRS (Sept. 18, 2012), available at
http://bit.ly/1VMfimR.
29
Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief, U.S. v. Ehrmann et al., Civ. No. 1:13-cv-214 (N.D. Ohio, Jan.
30, 2013).
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of clients for whom they prepared appraisal reports for tax purposes on or since
November 1, 2009.30
P. Administration’s Fiscal Year 2014 Revenue Proposals
In April 2013, the Treasury Department published General Explanations of the
Administration’s Fiscal Year 2014 Revenue Proposals, one of which was the same
proposal to eliminate the deduction for contributions of conservation easements on golf
courses that was included in the Administration’s 2013 proposals.31 A second proposal
called for (i) disallowing the deduction for the value of a façade easement associated
with forgone upward development above a historic building and (ii) requiring that
contributions of façade easements on buildings listed in the National Register comply
with Internal Revenue Code rules applicable to façade easements on buildings located in
a registered historic district. The Treasury Department explained, in part:
The value of [a façade] easement may be zero if it does not restrict future
development more than the restrictions already imposed on the building, for
example, by local zoning or historic preservation authorities. Some taxpayers,
however, have taken large deductions for contributions of easements restricting
the upward development of historic urban buildings even though such
development was already restricted by local authorities. Because of the difficulty
of determining the value of the contributed easement, it is difficult and costly for
the Internal Revenue Service to challenge deductions for historic preservation
easements. To prevent abuses, no deduction should be allowed for the value
associated with forgone upward development above an historic building.
Q. IRS Chief Counsel Advice on Conservation Easement Valuation
In August 2012, the IRS Office of Chief Counsel published helpful guidance on valuing
conservation easements in accordance with some of the more technical requirements of
Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(i). 32 The Chief Counsel Advice specifically
addresses the "contiguous parcel" and "enhancement" rules, and provides twelve
examples illustrating the application of those rules.

30

Agreed Order of Permanent Injunction, U.S. v. Ehrmann, Civ. No. 1:13-cv-00214-DAP (N.D. Ohio Feb. 12, 2013) (the
appraiser and company agreed to the settlement without admitting any wrongdoing). See also Ohio Federal Court
Bars Appraiser of Historic-Preservation Easements, Department of Justice Press Release (Feb. 13, 2013), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/February/13-tax-192.html.
31
See General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2014 Revenue Proposals, Treas. Dep’t 161-162 (April
2013),
available
at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-ExplanationsFY2014.pdf.
32
IRS Chief Counsel Advice 201334039 (released Aug. 23, 2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irswd/1334039.pdf. See also IRS on Conservation Easement Valuation, at
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/nonprofit/2014/09/irs-on-conservation-easement-appraisals.html.
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R. Administration’s Fiscal Year 2015 Revenue Proposals
In March 2014, the Treasury Department published General Explanations of the
Administration’s Fiscal Year 2015 Revenue Proposals.33 In addition to eliminating the
deduction for contributions of conservation easements on golf courses and restricting
the deduction and harmonizing the rules for contributions of façade easements (both of
which were part of the Administration’s 2014 proposals), the Administration’s 2015
proposals also called for making permanent the enhanced incentives for conservation
easement donations that had expired on December 31, 2013.
S. IRS Bars Appraisers from Valuing Easements for Five Years
In March 2014, the IRS issued a press release announcing that its Office of Professional
Responsibility (OPR) had entered into a settlement agreement with a group of
appraisers from the same firm accused of aiding in the understatement of federal tax
liabilities by overvaluing facade easements for charitable donation purposes.34 To value
the facade easements, the appraisers had simply multiplied the “before” value of the
property by a fixed percentage, generally 15%.
Under the settlement agreement, the appraisers admitted to violating relevant sections
of Circular 230. According to Karen L. Hawkins, Director of OPR:
Appraisers need to understand that they are subject to Circular 230, and must
exercise due diligence in the preparation of documents relating to federal tax
matters. Taxpayers expect advice rendered with competence and diligence that
goes beyond the mere mechanical application of a rule of thumb based on
conjecture and unsupported conclusions.
The appraisers agreed to a five-year suspension of valuing facade easements and
undertaking any appraisal services that could subject them to penalties under the
Internal Revenue Code. The appraisers also agreed to abide by all applicable provisions
of Circular 230.

33

See General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2015 Revenue Proposals, Treas. Dep’t 193-196 (March
2014),
available
at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-ExplanationsFY2015.pdf.
34
IRS, IRS Bars Appraisers from Valuing Facade Easements for Federal Tax Purposes for Five Years, IR-2014-31 (March
19, 2014), available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/IRS-Bars-Appraisers-from-Valuing-Facade-Easements-forFederal-Tax-Purposes-for-Five-Years.
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T. Administration’s Fiscal Year 2016 Revenue Proposals
In February 2015, the Treasury Department published General Explanations of the
Administration’s Fiscal Year 2016 Revenue Proposals.35 As in the Administration’s 2014
and 2015 proposals, the 2016 proposals called for (i) eliminating the deduction for
contributions of conservation easements on golf courses and (ii) restricting the
deduction and harmonizing the rules for contributions of the two types of façade
easements. The Administration’s 2016 proposals also included two new conservation
easement-related proposals.
First, the Administration proposed to make permanent the enhanced incentives for
conservation easement donations that expired on December 31, 2014. However,
because of concerns regarding abuse, the Administration also proposed a number of
reforms to § 170(h), including:
• requiring all conservation easements to further a clearly delineated Federal or
authorized state or tribal governmental policy and yield a significant public
benefit;
• requiring donors to provide detailed information about the conservation
purposes and public benefit of contributed easements;
• requiring donees to meet minimum standards, attest to the accuracy of donor
representations to the IRS, and electronically report information about donated
easements, and
• subjecting donees to loss of “eligible donee” status and donees and their
managers to penalties for overvalued easements or easements that do not
further eligible conservation purposes.
The Administration also proposed to pilot a new tax credit for conservation easement
donations “as an alternative” to the § 170(h) deduction. A Federal interagency board
would allocate $100 million of credits to “expert” donees that would then allocate the
credits to donors. The proposal called for a report to Congress from the Secretaries of
the Treasury, Agriculture, and the Interior on the relative merits of the credit versus the
deduction.
U. Enhanced Incentives Made Permanent Without Modifications
On December 18, 2015, President Obama signed into law the Protecting Americans from
Tax Hikes Act of 2015 (the PATH Act).36 Before the PATH Act, as a general rule, a
property owner could claim the deduction generated by an easement donation to the
35

See General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2016 Revenue Proposals, Treas. Dep’t 188-192 (Feb.
2015),
available
at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-ExplanationsFY2016.pdf.
36
See Technical Explanation of the Protecting Americans From Tax Hikes Act of 2015, prepared by the JCT, JCX-144-15
(Dec. 17, 2015), available at
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4861.
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extent of 30% of the property owner’s adjusted gross income (AGI) in each of the year
of the donation and the following five years. Based on changes made in 2006, which
were temporary and repeatedly extended temporarily, easement donors were
permitted to claim the resulting deduction to the extent of 50% of the donor’s AGI in
the year of the donation and the following 15 years, or, for qualifying farmer and
rancher donations, 100% of the donor’s AGI for the 16-year period. The PATH Act made
these favorable rules for easement donations permanent. In addition, beginning in
2016, the Act allows an Alaska Native Corporation donating a conservation easement
with respect to certain lands to claim the resulting deduction to the extent of 100% of
taxable income in the year of the donation and the following 15 years. Accordingly,
farmers, ranchers, and Alaska Native Corporations that make qualifying easement
donations could potentially avoid paying any income tax for up to 16 years.
The PATH Act made the enhanced incentives permanent without implementing any
reforms proposed by the Treasury or others to curb abuses.37
V. Administration’s Fiscal Year 2017 Revenue Proposals
In February 2016, the Treasury Department published General Explanations of the
Administration’s Fiscal Year 2017 Revenue Proposals.38 The 2017 proposals repeated the
2016 reform proposals regarding conservation and façade easements, and also made
clear that the Treasury is proposing to replace the § 170(h) deduction with a tax credit
program.39
W. Broad IRS Summons Served on Appraiser and CPA
In April 2016, a U.S. District Judge for the Northern District of Georgia granted the IRS’s
petition to enforce a summons served on an appraiser.40 In the summons, the IRS
requested: (i) all of the appraiser’s marketing documents for the valuation of
conservation easements; (ii) all documents reflecting the customers for whom the
appraiser prepared or approved conservation or historic easement appraisals during the
37

See, e.g., Roger Colinvaux, Conservation Easements: Design Flaws, Enforcement Challenges, and Reform, 2013 UTAH
LAW REVIEW 755, available at http://bit.ly/29K2Ual; Wendy C. Gerzog, Alms to the Rich: The Façade Easement
Deduction, 34 VA. TAX REV. 229 (2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2447975;
Daniel Halperin, Incentives for Conservation Easements: The Charitable Deduction or a Better Way, 74 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 29 (2011), available at http://bit.ly/29wYOS3; Nancy A. McLaughlin, Conservation Easements and the Valuation
Conundrum, 19 FLA. TAX REV. 225 (2016), available at http://bit.ly/29pyA0y; Nancy A. McLaughlin, Extinguishing and
Amending Tax-Deductible Conservation Easements: Protecting the Federal Investment After Carpenter, Simmons, and
Kaufman, 13 FLA. TAX REV. 217 (2012), available at http://bit.ly/29x01Zq; Jeff Pidot, REINVENTING CONSERVATION EASEMENTS:
A CRITICAL EXAMINATION AND IDEAS FOR REFORM (LINCOLN INSTITUTE OF LAND POLICY 2005), http://bit.ly/29FWoPx.
38
See General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2017 Revenue Proposals, available at
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2017.pdf.
39
See id. At 213-216 (“If the [tax credit pilot program] is successful, replacement of the deduction with a conservation
easement credit of $475 million annually, indexed for inflation, is estimated to be budget neutral”).
40
U.S. v. Clower, 2016 WL 3144048 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 29, 2016), adopting Judge’s Report and Recommendation in U.S. v.
Clower, 2016 WL 3129451 (N.D. Ga. March 22, 2016).
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period beginning January 1, 2010, through the present, (iii) all appraisal work files for
such appraisals; (iv) copies of all 8283 Forms that were signed, reviewed, approved, or
executed by the appraiser; and (v) all correspondence, including e-mails, related to
conservation or historic easement appraisals noted in item (ii). The District Judge found
that the summons had a legitimate purpose (to determine whether the appraiser had
improperly appraised conservation easements), the summons was not overbroad, and
the IRS was not acting in bad faith.
In June 2016, a U.S. District Judge for the Northern District of Georgia granted the IRS’s
petition to enforce a summons served on a certified public accountant.41 The CPA had
prepared or filed approximately eight to ten conservation-easement partnership federal
tax returns for each of the years 2010, 2011, and 2012; participated as an investor in at
least one conservation-easement partnership; and formed at least one conservationeasement partnership, serving as the tax-matters partner. Among other things, the IRS
was seeking client files, tax returns, and supporting documentation for federal tax
returns prepared by the CPA for tax years 2010-2012 that were either conservationeasement partnership returns or federal income-tax returns where the client claimed a
charitable deduction arising from a conservation easement. Quoting the Eleventh
Circuit, which was quoting the Supreme Court, the judge explained, in part, that:
“[T]he Government depends upon the good faith and integrity of each potential
taxpayer to disclose honestly all information relevant to tax liability.... The
purpose of ... [a summons] is not to accuse, but to inquire. Although such
investigations unquestionably involve some invasion of privacy, they are
essential to our self-reporting system, and the alternatives could well involve far
less agreeable invasions of house, business, and records.”
X. Treasury’s 2016-2017 Priority Guidance Plan
The Treasury’s 2016–2017 Priority Guidance Plan contains 281 projects that are
priorities for allocation of the resources of its offices from July 2016 through June
2017.42 The plan represents projects the Treasury intends to work on actively during the
plan year and does not place any deadline on completion of projects. One of the listed
projects is “[g]uidance under §170 regarding charitable contributions of conservation
easements.”

41

U.S. v. Greenberger, 2016 WL 3912060 (N.D. Ga. June 21, 2016), adopting Judge’s Report and Recommendation in
U.S. v. Greenberger, 2016 WL 391206 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 11, 2016).
42
Department of the Treasury, 2016–2017 Priority Guidance Plan, available at https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/20162017_pgp_initial.pdf.
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Y. Deduction Statistics
The following chart indicates estimates of the number of easement donations reported
on individual income tax returns in the year designated and the average donation
amount per return.43
Year
2003

Number Donations44
2,407 (L & F)

2004

3,365 (L & F)

§487,785

2005
2005

2,307 (L)
1,132 (F)

$830,481
$299,080

2006
2006

3,529 (L)
1,145 (F)

$437,895
$231,572

2007
2007

2,405 (L)
242 (F)

$875,891
$974,779

2008
2008

3,158 (L)
1,396 (F)

$380,541
$ 32,462

2009
2009

2,102 (L)
103 (F)

$483,522
$477,225

2010

3,241 (L & F)

$261,027

2011

2,202 (L & F)

$383,179

2012

1,238 (L & F)

$872,250

Avg. Donation Amount Per Return
$684,733

Z. Case Law
Appendix C lists the cases involving challenges to deductions claimed with respect to
easement donations as of October 4, 2016. The cases are referred to in this outline by
case name and numerical designation only (e.g., Belk III, Carpenter I, Palmer Ranch II).
Appendix H includes blog posts discussing the more recent cases and other select
developments. The blog posts include live links to the cases and other source materials.
43

See Pearson Liddell & Janette Wilson, Individual Noncash Contributions, 2012, Stat. of Income Bull., Spring 2015, at
1; Pearson Liddell & Janette Wilson, Individual Noncash Contributions, 2011, Stat. of Income Bull., Spring 2014, at
111; Pearson Liddell & Janette Wilson, Individual Noncash Contributions, 2010, Stat. of Income Bull., Winter 2013, at
64; Pearson Liddell & Janette Wilson, Individual Noncash Contributions, 2009, Stat. of Income Bull., Spring 2012, at 63;
Pearson Liddell & Janette Wilson, Individual Noncash Contributions, 2008, Stat. of Income Bull., Winter 2011, at 77;
Pearson Liddell & Janette Wilson, Individual Noncash Contributions, 2007, Stat. of Income Bull., Spring 2010, at 53;
Pearson Liddell & Janette Wilson, Individual Noncash Contributions, 2006, Stat. of Income Bull., Summer 2009, at 68;
Janette Wilson, Individual Noncash Contributions, 2005, Stat. of Income Bull., Spring 2008, at 69; Janette Wilson &
Michael Strudler, Individual Noncash Contributions, 2004, Stat. of Income Bull., Spring 2007, at 78; Janette Wilson &
Michael Strudler, Individual Noncash Contributions, 2003, Stat. of Income Bull., Spring 2008, at 69 (2003 was the first
year detailed information was collected from individual income tax returns with noncash charitable contributions
greater than $500 and the statistics are based on a sample of individual income tax returns).
44
“L” refers to conservation easements encumbering land and “F” refers to façade easements. In some years the
statistics for the two types of easements were combined in the Statistics of Income Bulletin.
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II. Filing a Tax Return Package to Minimize Risk of Audit
•
•
•
•
•
•

Correctly Drafted Conservation Easement
IRS Form 8283 & Supplemental Statement
Qualified Appraisal
Contemporaneous Written Acknowledgment
Compelling and Timely Baseline Documentation
Correct and Timely Lender Agreement (if applicable)

A. Correctly Drafted Conservation Easement Deed
1. Copy of Final Conservation Easement Deed. A copy of the correctly drafted
and recorded conservation easement deed should be either (i) filed with IRS
Form 8283, section B (the appraisal summary) or (ii) if the easement is valued at
more than $500,000, included in the qualified appraisal filed with IRS Form 8283.
a. Best practice is to either (i) file the date stamped copy of the recorded
easement deed with the Form 8283 or (ii) have the appraiser include the
date stamped copy of the recorded easement deed in the appraisal. It is
imperative that the appraiser values the restrictions as they appear in the
final recorded easement deed rather than in an earlier draft.
b. As noted in the discussion of IRS Form 8283 in Part II.B below, the IRS
has informally suggested that a copy of the qualified appraisal be
included in the package filed with the income tax return on which a
deduction for the easement donation is first claimed even if the
appraised value of the easement is $500,000 or less.
Façade easements on buildings in registered historic districts are subject to
special rules. The taxpayer must include with the taxpayer’s return for the year
of the contribution, in addition to the Form 8283: (i) a qualified appraisal, (ii)
photos of the entire exterior of the building, and (iii) a description of all
restrictions on the development of the building.45 A date stamped copy of the
recorded easement deed should be included with these items. If the deduction
claimed is more than $10,000, it will be allowed only if the taxpayer also includes
a $500 filing fee.46
2. Extensive Recitals. The conservation easement deed should include extensive
recitals clearly indicating the conservation or historic values of the property
worthy of protection.

45
46

See IRC § 170(h)(4)(B)(iii).
See IRC § 170(f)(13); IRS Form 8283-V, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8283v.pdf.
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3. “Exclusively for Conservation Purposes.” To be eligible for a deduction, the
donation of a conservation easement must, among other things, be a
contribution made “exclusively” for one of more of the four “conservation
purposes” enumerated in § 170(h).47 The contribution will not be treated as
made exclusively for conservation purposes unless the conservation purpose is
“protected in perpetuity.”48 Satisfying the “protected in perpetuity” requirement
requires satisfying all of the following requirements:49
a. the eligible donee requirement,50
b. the restriction on transfer requirement,51
c. the no inconsistent uses requirement, 52
d. the general enforceable in perpetuity requirement, 53
e. the mortgage subordination requirement,54
f. the mineral extraction restrictions requirement,55
g. the baseline documentation, donee notice, donee access, and donee
enforcement requirements,56 and
h. the extinguishment and division of proceeds requirements.57
Analysis by the IRS and the courts of satisfaction of the “exclusively for
conservation purposes” requirement generally has not been systematic, making
the cases somewhat difficult to categorize. Areas of focus have included whether
the purpose is “protected in perpetuity” despite reserved rights or inconsistent
uses, satisfaction of the conservation purposes test generally, whether the
extinguishment and division of proceeds requirements were satisfied, and
whether the mortgage subordination requirement was satisfied.

47

IRC § 170(h)(4); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d). The four conservation purposes are protection of habitat, protection of
open space, historic preservation, and preservation of land for outdoor recreation by or education of the general
public. Id. § 170(h)(4)(A).
48
IRC § 170(h)(1)(C), (5)(A).
49
See IRC § 170(h)(5)(B) (addressing surface mining); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(e)(1) (“To meet the requirements of this
section, a donation must be exclusively for conservation purposes. See paragraphs (c)(1) and (g)(1) through (g)(6)(ii)
of this section.”). In addition, in explaining the “protected in perpetuity” requirement, the Senate Finance Committee
provided instructions that were incorporated into the regulations as the restriction on transfer and no inconsistent
use requirements of regulation sections 1.170A-14(c)(2) and -14(e)(2). See S. Rep. No. 96-1007, 1980-2 C.B.
50
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(c)(1).
51
Id. § 1.170A-14(c)(2).
52
Id. § 1.170A-14(e)(2), (3).
53
Id. § 1.170A-14(g)(1).
54
Id. § 1.170A-14(g)(2) (applicable only if the property is subject to a mortgage at the time of the donation).
55
IRC § 170(h)(5)(B); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(4).
56
Id. § 1.170A-14(g)(5)(i) and (ii). These requirements are applicable only if the “donor reserves rights the exercise of
which may impair the conservation interests associated with the property.” However, that will almost always be the
case. Moreover, it is common practice and recommended that these requirements be satisfied with regard to every
conservation easement donation because they help to ensure the holder will have the information as well as the
notice, access, and enforcement rights needed to properly enforce the easement.
57
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(i) and (ii).
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4. Reserved Rights. In two cases, Glass and Butler, the IRS argued unsuccessfully
that, at full exercise of all reserved rights, the conservation purposes of the
easements would not be protected in perpetuity.
a. Glass. In Glass, the 6th Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s holding that
two conservation easements protecting small portions of a ten-acre
parcel located along the shoreline of Lake Michigan satisfied the
“exclusively” for habitat protection “conservation purposes”
requirement. The IRS argued, among other things, that the easements
failed to satisfy this requirement because (i) the protected properties
were too small, (ii) the taxpayers reserved too many rights in the
easements, and (iii) there were no limits on building on neighboring
properties. The 6th Circuit rejected those arguments, finding that (i)
neither § 170(h) nor the Treasury Regulations require that the subject
property be a minimum size,58 (ii) although the easements reserved
various use rights to the taxpayers, both also contained an overarching
restriction prohibiting “[a]ny activity on or use of the Property that is
inconsistent with the purpose of this Conservation Easement,” and
provided that the easement “shall be liberally construed in favor of the
purpose of [the easement, the land trust holder, and the state
conservation easement enabling statute],” and (iii) neither § 170(h) nor
the Treasury Regulations require consideration of neighboring property
owners’ building rights when assessing the deductibility of a conservation
easement. The taxpayers in Glass also provided credible testimony at trial
indicating that exercise of the reserved rights would not be inconsistent
with the habitat protection conservation purposes of the conservation
easements, while the IRS failed to provide any evidence to the contrary.
See also Part II.A.5.b below.
The 6th Circuit concluded that the habitat protection conservation
purpose of the easements was “protected in perpetuity” because the
requirements of Treasury Regulation 1.170A-14(c)(1), -14(e)(2) and (3),
and -14g(1) through (6) were satisfied.
b. Butler. In Butler, the IRS asserted that the rights retained by the
landowners in the conservation easement deeds meant that the habitat
and open space protection conservation purposes of the easements were
not “protected in perpetuity.” The Tax Court disagreed, finding that the
habitat protection conservation purpose test would still be satisfied even
if the properties were developed to the fullest extent permitted by the

58

For a critique of the 6th Circuit’s holding on this point, see Jonathan M. Burke, A Critical Analysis of Glass v.
Commissioner: Why Size Should Matter for Conservation Easements, 61 TAX LAWYER 599 (2008).
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easement deeds.59 However, the holding in Butler should not be viewed
as a green light for retaining extensive development and use rights in a
conservation easement deed for a number of reasons.
•

The burden of proof regarding satisfaction of the conservation
purposes test, which normally falls on the taxpayer, had shifted to
the IRS.

•

The parties disagreed about whether the conservation easement
deeds restricted the location of the building sites. The donors
argued that the deeds incorporated the baseline documentation
by reference, and the baseline included a map stipulating the
placement of the building sites in locations consistent with the
preservation of the conservation purposes. The court found that,
under Georgia law, reference in the recorded deeds to the
baseline effectively made the baseline (including the map) part of
the recorded deeds, and the restrictions on the location of the
lots in the map were therefore binding.

•

The donors offered some (albeit “sparse”) evidence in the form of
testimony of environmental consultants to support their
contention that the reserved rights were not inconsistent with the
conservation purposes of the easements and, as in Glass, the IRS
failed to introduce any evidence to the contrary.

•

After Butler was decided, the IRS informally indicated that in
future cases it intends to hire its own environmental experts to
testify as to whether the conservation purpose of an easement
would be preserved upon full exercise of all reserved rights. As
discussed in Part II.A.5.e. below, the IRS hired its own
environmental expert in Atkinson and, as a result, was able to
establish that the easements at issue did not satisfy habitat
protection conservation purpose test due, in part, to the reserved
rights in the deeds.

c. Overarching Restriction. To prevent uses inconsistent with the
conservation purposes of the donation, a conservation easement should
(1) specifically reserve to the grantor (and the grantor’s successors) only
those rights that, even if fully exercised, would allow the conservation
purpose of the easement to be accomplished, (2) specifically prohibit
activities that are inconsistent with the conservation purpose of the
59

Because the court found that the easements satisfied the habitat protection conservation purposes test it did not
address the open space conservation purposes test.
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easement (such as subdivision, mining, and industrial uses), and (3)
because it is impossible at the time of conveyance to specify in the deed
every conceivable variation of use, activity, or practice that in the future
might have an adverse impact on the conservation purpose of the
easement, include an overarching restriction prohibiting any activities
that are inconsistent with the conservation purpose of the easement or
the perpetual protection of the property’s conservation values. The
overarching restriction is necessary to prevent the present or a future
landowner from claiming that she has the right to do anything not
specifically prohibited by the easement even if it would be inconsistent
with the purpose of the easement or continued protection of the
property’s conservation values.60
d. Liberal Construction Provision. A conservation easement should also
include a clause stating that the parties to the easement (and their
successors) affirmatively agree and intend that, notwithstanding any
general rule of construction to the contrary, the easement shall be
liberally construed in favor of permanently protecting the property’s
conservation values and carrying out the conservation purposes of the
easement.61 In the absence of such a provision, there is a danger that
ambiguous terms in the easement will be construed in favor of free use
of land and that the conservation purposes of the easement may not be
deemed “protected in perpetuity” as required by § 170(h).62
Some state conservation easement enabling statutes mandate that
conservation easements be liberally construed in favor of effecting their
conservation purposes.63 However, given that statutes are subject to
60

See Glass; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200836014.
See, e.g., BYERS & PONTE, THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK 376, 466-67 (2d ed. 2005).
62
See Wetlands America Trust v. White Cloud Nine Ventures, _ S.E.2d _ (Va. 2016), 2016 WL 550339 (holding that the
common law rule of construction requiring land use restrictions to be interpreted in favor of free use of land applied
to the conservation easement at issue and the enabling statutes in Virginia do not abrogate that rule of construction).
There was a strong dissent:
Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, the common law principle of strict construction in favor of free use of
land no longer applies to conservation easements. The strict construction principle was applied under the
common law because easements in gross, including negative easements in gross, were disfavored as a
matter of public policy. Today, and for at least the last four decades, Virginia public policy strongly favors
the conservation of land and open spaces…. The oft-stated policy of the Commonwealth in favor of
conservation easements such as the type at issue here could not be a clearer rejection of the common law
strict construction principle.
See id. See also Nancy A. McLaughlin, Interpreting Conservation Easements, 29 PROB. & PROP. 30 (2015) (explaining why
conservation easements should be interpreted in favor of carrying out their public-benefiting conservation purposes
rather than in favor of free use of land), available at http://bit.ly/1KSyi2U.
63
See 32 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5055(c)(2) (“Any general rule of construction to the contrary notwithstanding, conservation
or preservation easements shall be liberally construed in favor of the grants contained therein to effect the purposes
of those easements and the policy and purpose of this act”); W. VA. CODE § 20-12-5(b) (“Notwithstanding provision of
law to the contrary, conservation and preservation easements shall be liberally construed in favor of the grants
contained therein to effect the purposes of those easements and the policy and purpose of this article”).
61
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change at any time, every conservation easement deed should
nonetheless include a liberal-construction-in-favor-of-conservationpurposes provision.
e. Reserved Development Rights. For a discussion of Treasury Regulation
requirements regarding permissible and impermissible reserved
development rights, see Part III.F. below.
5. The Conservation Purposes Test. Satisfaction of the conservation purposes
test was an issue in Turner, Glass, Herman I, RP Golf, LLC, Atkinson, and Carroll.
a. Turner. In Turner, the Tax Court held that the IRS properly disallowed
deductions claimed with respect to the donation of a conservation
easement because the donation did not satisfy either the open space or
historic preservation conservation purposes tests. Turner involved a
purported donation to Fairfax County, Virginia, of a conservation
easement encumbering a 29.3-acre parcel located in a historic overlay
district.64 The subject property is in the general vicinity of Mount Vernon,
President George Washington’s 500-acre residential estate; adjacent to
President Washington's Grist Mill; and in close proximity to the
Woodlawn Plantation, which was built in 1805 on land owned by
President Washington. In obtaining an appraisal of the easement, the
donor (an attorney whose practice concentrated on real estate
transactions) represented that 60 residences could be built on the 29.3acre parcel and that the easement reduced the number of permitted
residences to 30. In reality, however, zoning regulations already limited
development to 30 residences because slightly more than half of the
parcel (15.04 acres) was situated within a designated 100-year
floodplain.65
The Tax Court held that the easement did not satisfy the open space
conservation purpose test because it did not limit the size of the
residences that could be built on the 15 acres (either in square footage or
height) and did not contain any provisions to protect the views from the
nearby historic sites. The easement also did not satisfy the historic
preservation conservation purpose test because it did not preserve a
historic structure or historically important land area. The court explained:
Here there has been no preservation of open space. Nor [has the
donor] preserved anything that is historically unique about the
64

The donation is referred to as “purported” because Fairfax County did not sign or acknowledge the conservation
easement deed or sign the Form 8283.
65
Although the donor could have attempted to obtain approval to rezone the parcel, the court noted that obtaining
such approval would have been time-consuming and costly and success was not guaranteed.
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property or the surrounding historical areas. [The donor] simply
developed the property to its maximum yield within the
property's zoning classification.66
b. Glass. In Glass, the 6th Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s holding that
two conservation easements protecting small portions of a ten-acre
parcel located along the shoreline of Lake Michigan satisfied the habitat
protection “conservation purposes” test. The IRS argued that the
easements failed to satisfy this test because, among other things,67
threatened species had not actually been sighted living on the properties.
The 6th Circuit rejected that argument, finding that (i) the habitat
protection conservation purposes test can be satisfied if the easement
protects property that is potential habitat for rare, threatened, or
endangered species, and (ii) one of the taxpayers and the executive
director of the land trust holder credibly testified that the property was a
“famous roosting spot” for bald eagles and there were threatened plant
species on the properties.
c. Herman I. In Herman I the Tax Court sustained the IRS’s disallowance of
a $21.8 million deduction for the conveyance of a facade easement to the
National Architectural Trust. The easement encumbered 10,000
unspecified square feet of the approximately 22,000 square feet of
unused development rights (UDRs) above a certified historic structure (or
45 percent of the UDRs).68 The easement did not, however, prevent
alteration or demolition of the structure or prohibit the building of six
stories over any half (front, back, or side) of the structure. Accordingly,
the court found that the easement did not protect either the structure or
the historic significance of the underlying land and, thus, did not satisfy
the historic preservation conservation purposes test. Section 170(h) has
since been amended to expressly require that, to be deductible, a façade
easement with respect to a building in a registered historic district must
preserve the entire exterior of the building, including the space above the
building, the sides, the rear, and the front of the building.69
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See also Joe Stephens, IRS Gets ‘First Big Win’ in Push to Stem Abuse of Conservation Tool, WASH. POST A01 (June 4,
2006) (describing the transaction as a $3.1 million donation that promised not to overdevelop scenic land once
owned by George Washington and located down the road from Mount Vernon, but developers clear-cut acres of
trees on the property and erected 29 sprawling homes that preservationists today deride as ‘McMansions.’”).
67
See also discussion of reserved rights in Part II.A.4.
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The certified historic structure was an eleven-story apartment building located on Fifth Avenue in New York City
that had been designed by the late Henry Otis Chapman in 1923 in the neo-Italianate Renaissance style of
architecture.
69
See IRC § 170(h)(4)(B)(i). See also Technical Explanation Of H.R. 4, The "Pension Protection Act Of 2006," prepared
by the JCT, JCX-38-06 at 294-95 (August 3, 2006), available at
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=select&id=20.
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d. RP Golf, LLC. In RP Golf, LLC, the IRS asserted that the conservation
easement donation at issue was not made “exclusively for conservation
purposes,” in part because the Missouri conservation policy the taxpayer
referenced in the easement deed was limited to certain areas of the state
and there was no evidence that the subject property was located in such
an area on the date of the donation. The taxpayer was forced to concede
that the easement was not made pursuant to a “clearly delineated
governmental conservation policy,” and the Tax Court granted the IRS’s
motion for summary judgment on that issue.70
e. Atkinson. In Atkinson, the Tax Court denied $7.88 million of deductions
claimed with regard to the conveyance of conservation easements
encumbering land on and adjacent to golf courses located in a gated
residential community west of Southport, North Carolina. The court
determined that the easements, which were conveyed to the North
American Land Trust (NALT), did not satisfy either the habitat or open
space protection conservation purposes tests. The properties subject to
the easements consisted of noncontiguous tracts (i.e., fairways, greens,
teeing grounds, ranges, roughs, ponds, and wetland areas); residential
lots bordered most of the tracts; and a concrete golf cart path winded its
way through the tracts. The taxpayers argued that each of the subject
properties had independent conservation significance and contributed to
the ecological viability of surrounding conservation areas. The IRS
focused on the operation of the golf courses and argued that the rights
retained in the easements negated any purported conservation purpose.
Although the taxpayer generally has the burden of proving that an
asserted deficiency is incorrect, the burden of proof regarding
satisfaction of the habitat (but not open space) protection conservation
purpose test shifted to the IRS under IRC § 7491.
Unlike in Glass and Butler, in Atkinson both the taxpayers and the IRS
presented expert environmental testimony to establish their respective
positions regarding the habitat protection conservation purposes test. In
holding that the conservation easements did not satisfy this test, the Tax
Court noted, among other things, that the most significant ecological
features on the subject properties—the longleaf pine “remnants”—were
not maintained in a relatively natural state worthy of conservation and
were not protected in any event because the easements permitted
cutting and removal of the trees; very few of the ponds had a natural
edge and the few edges that existed were regularly sprayed with
70

The court found that material facts regarding the easement’s preservation of a natural habitat continued to be in
dispute and thus denied the IRS’s motion for summary judgment on that issue. The court ultimately did not rule on
that issue because it sustained the IRS’s disallowance of the deduction on the ground that the taxpayer failed to
obtain mortgage subordination agreements at the time of the easement’s donation. See Part II.F.2 below.
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pesticides; there were no natural fruits and seeds for foraging on the
properties; the properties provided no cover for animals; and animal
migration was deterred by the residential development surrounding each
of the noncontiguous tracts, the level of human activity, and the frequent
watering. In addition, the only birds the IRS’s environmental expert
observed on one of the properties were geese, which the community
attempted to “control” (i.e., eliminate) using a border collie. The court
also found that the use of pesticides and other chemicals in the operation
of the golf course injured the ecosystems on the subject properties and,
thus, violated the “no inconsistent use” requirement of Treasury
Regulation § 1.170A-14(e)(2). The court concluded that wildlife and
plants were not “most likely” to be found and did not “normally live” on
the properties subject to the easements, but declined to decide whether
operating a golf course is inherently inconsistent with the conservation
purpose of protecting relatively natural habitat.
With regard to the open space conservation purposes test, the Tax Court
noted that the taxpayers did not mention or provide any analysis of
governmental conservation policies in their briefs, and the court deemed
that argument abandoned. The taxpayers also failed to establish that
preservation of the subject properties was for the scenic enjoyment of
the general public. Since the golf courses were in a guarded gated
community and ringed by houses, the court found that the general public
did not have visual access to the properties. The taxpayers argued that
the general public had visual access because most of the population of
the Town of St. James lived within the gated community. The court,
however, did not deem the population of one town to constitute “the
general public” and dismissed that argument.71
f. Carroll. In Carroll, the Tax Court sustained the IRS’s disallowance of
deductions claimed with regard to the donation of a conservation
because the easement contained a noncompliant “proceeds” clause.72
However, the court also held that the easement satisfied the open space
conservation purpose test under IRC § 170(h)(4)(A)(iii)(II), which requires
that preservation of the property be “pursuant to a clearly delineated
Federal, State, or local governmental conservation policy” and “yield a
significant public benefit.” The easement, which encumbers a 21-acre
property located in a historic district in Maryland, was granted to the
Maryland Environmental Trust (MET) and the Land Preservation Trust
(LPT), as joint holders. MET is a quasi-public entity that the Maryland
legislature established in 1967 to conserve the environment; it is both a
71

For media coverage of the case, see Richard Rubin, IRS Tees Off on Golf Courses’ Green Tax Claims, WALL STREET
JOURNAL (Jan. 14, 2016), at http://www.wsj.com/articles/irs-tees-off-on-golf-courses-green-tax-claims-1451959008.
72
See Part II.A.13.
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unit of the Maryland Department of Natural Resources and governed by a
board of trustees. LPT is a charitable conservation organization.
In interpreting the governmental conservation policy requirement,
Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(d)(4)(iii)(B) provides that
Acceptance of an easement by an agency of the Federal
Government or by an agency of a state or local government (or by
a commission, authority, or similar body duly constituted by the
state or local government and acting on behalf of the state or
local government) tends to establish the requisite clearly
delineated governmental policy, although such acceptance,
without more, is not sufficient. The more rigorous the review
process by the governmental agency, the more the acceptance of
the easement tends to establish the requisite clearly delineated
governmental policy. For example, in a state where the legislature
has established an Environmental Trust to accept gifts to the state
which meet certain conservation purposes and to submit the gifts
to a review that requires the approval of the state’s highest
officials, acceptance of a gift by the Trust tends to establish the
requisite clearly delineated governmental policy. However, if the
Trust merely accepts such gifts without a review process, the
requisite clearly delineated governmental policy is not
established.
In finding that the easement in Carroll satisfied the open space
conservation purpose test, the Tax Court explained that the
thoroughness of MET’s easement-review process, combined with the fact
that Maryland’s highest officials (the Governor, the Comptroller, and the
Treasurer of Maryland) approved the easement, established that the
easement preserves open space pursuant to a clearly delineated
governmental conservation policy. The Tax Court also determined that
preservation of the 21-acre property yielded a significant public benefit
because (i) the property was in a highly desirable area under
development pressure, (ii) the property was subject to a restrictive type
of zoning established to foster and protect agricultural lands in certain
areas, (iii) the valley in which the property was located was specifically
designated in the County’s Master Plan as an agricultural preservation
area, and (iv) four properties adjacent to the property were encumbered
by conservation easements held by MET or a state agency.
6. Extinguishment Requires Judicial Proceeding. The conservation easement
deed should include provisions satisfying the restriction on transfer,
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extinguishment, division of proceeds requirements of Treasury Regulation §§
1.170A-14(c)(2) and -14(g)(6). See Part II.A.11 below for sample provisions.
a. Carpenter I. In Carpenter I, the Tax Court held that conservation
easements extinguishable by mutual agreement of the parties, even if
subject to a standard such as “impossibility,” fail as a matter of law to
satisfy the judicial extinguishment requirements in Treasury Regulation §
1.170A– 14(g)(6)(i).
(i) In support of its holding, the Tax Court explained:
Extinguishment by mutual consent of the parties does not
guarantee that the conservation purpose of the donated
property will continue to be protected in perpetuity. As at
least one commentator has noted, the “restrictions [in a
deed] are supposed to be perpetual in the first place, and
the decision to terminate them should not be [made]
solely by interested parties. With the decision-making
process pushed into a court of law, the legal tension
created by such judicial review will generally tend to
create a fair result.” Small, Federal Tax Law of
Conservation Easements 16–4 (1986).
The court referenced this passage again in reaffirming and
supplementing its opinion in Carpenter II.
(ii) With regard to federal and state law interaction, the court in
Carpenter I explained:
To determine whether the conservation easement deeds
comply with requirements for the … deduction under
Federal tax law, we must look to State law to determine
the effect of the deeds. State law determines the nature of
the property rights, and Federal law determines the
appropriate tax treatment of those rights.73
(iii) The court in Carpenter I also held that the “so-remote-as-tobe- negligible” standard of Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(3)
does not modify the extinguishment requirements of Treasury
Regulation § 1.170A–14(g)(6)(i). Accordingly, failure to comply
with the extinguishment requirements cannot be cured by a
73

See also Patel v. Comm’r, 138 T.C. 395 (2012) (State law determines only which sticks are in a person’s bundle. . . .
Once property rights are determined under State law, as announced by the highest court of the State, the tax
consequences are decided under Federal law).
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showing that the possibility of extinguishment is so remote as to
be negligible.
b. Carpenter II. In Carpenter II, the Tax Court confirmed that
“extinguishment by judicial proceedings is mandatory.” The court
specifically rejected the taxpayers’ arguments that the Treasury
Regulations contemplate alternatives to judicial extinguishment and the
judicial proceeding requirement is “merely a safe harbor.”
(i) In Carpenter II, the Tax Court also rejected the taxpayers’
argument that the 1st Circuit’s decision in Kaufman III was an
intervening change in the law that required the court to
reconsider its holding in Carpenter I. The court explained that, not
only is Kaufman III not binding in the 10th Circuit (to which
Carpenter would have been appealed), Kaufman III addressed
legal issues different from those present in Carpenter.74 The court
also noted that it does not read Kaufman III as sanctioning
“putting into the hands of the parties to a conservation
agreement the authority to determine when to extinguish the
conservation easement so long as the donee organization gets its
shares of the proceeds of a subsequent sale.”
c. Mitchell II. In Mitchell II, the Tax Court similarly rejected the argument
that Kaufman III was an intervening change in the law requiring it to
reconsider its holding in Mitchell I.75 The court explained that, not only is
Kaufman III not binding in the 10th Circuit (to which Mitchell was
appealed and affirmed), Kaufman III addressed legal issues different from
those present in Mitchell.76 The court reiterated that Treasury Regulation
1.170A-14(g)(6) is not "merely ... a safe harbor,” and the specific
provisions of Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(1) through (g)(6) "are
mandatory and may not be ignored." The court further rejected the
taxpayer’s argument that the court should "draw a general rule" with
respect to the in-perpetuity requirement of § 170(h)(5)(A) and Treasury
Regulation § 1.170A-14(g) from the analysis in Kaufman III. The taxpayer
asserted: “The regulation emphasizes perpetuating an easement’s
purpose as opposed to the conservation easement itself. The proceeds
are protected which is the goal of the law.” The Tax Court disagreed,
74

Kaufman III involved interpretation of Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(1) (the “general enforceable in
perpetuity” requirement) and Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii) (the “division of proceeds” requirement).
Carpenter, on the other hand, involved interpretation of Treasury Regulation § 1.170A- 14(g)(6)(i) (the
“extinguishment” requirement)).
75
In Mitchell I the Tax Court sustained the IRS’s disallowance of a deduction for an easement donation because the
taxpayer failed to obtain a mortgage subordination agreement at the time of the gift.
76
Mitchell involved interpretation of Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(2) (the “mortgage subordination”
requirement).
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stating: “Nowhere in Kaufman III did the Court of Appeals for the 1st
Circuit state a general rule that protecting the proceeds from an
extinguishment of a conservation easement would satisfy the inperpetuity requirements of section § 1.170A-14(g) ... generally.” In other
words, the court held that § 170(h) requires perpetuation of the
conservation easement itself, not conservation purposes generally.
d. The holdings in Carpenter I and II and Mitchell II are consistent with:
(i) IRS General Information Letter on extinguishment,77 and
(ii) the Land Trust Alliance’s 2007 amendment report, which
instructs:
If the conservation easement was the subject of a
federal income tax deduction, then Internal Revenue
Code Section 170(h) and the Treasury Regulations
Section 1.170A-14 apply…. The easement must be
transferable only to another government entity or
qualified charitable organization that agrees to
continue to enforce the easement. The easement can
only be extinguished by the holder through a judicial
proceeding, upon a finding that continued use of the
encumbered land for conservation purposes has
become “impossible or impractical,” and with the
payment to the holder of a share of proceeds from a
subsequent sale or development of the land to be used
for similar conservation purposes. To the extent an
amendment amounts to an extinguishment, the land
trust must satisfy these requirements.78
e. The time for appeal of Carpenter has run. Mitchell was appealed to the
10th Circuit, which affirmed the Tax Court (see Part II.F.2 below).
7. Swaps Are Prohibited.
a. Belk. In Belk III, the 4th Circuit affirmed the Tax Court in holding that a
conservation easement that authorizes the parties to agree to
“substitutions” or “swaps” (i.e., to remove some or all of the original
protected land from the easement, or unencumber that land, in
exchange for the protection of similar contiguous land upon the approval
of the donee land trust) is not eligible for a deduction. The 4th Circuit
77
78

See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
Land Tr. Alliance, Amending Conservation Easements: Evolving Practices and Legal Principles 24 (2007).
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explained that such an easement is not “a restriction (granted in
perpetuity) on the use which may be made of the real property” as
required under § 170(h)(2)(C). The 4th Circuit agreed with the Tax Court
that, to be eligible for a deduction under § 170(h), a donor must grant an
easement with regard to a “single, immutable” or “defined and static”
parcel.
(i) The Easement. The easement at issue in Belk encumbers a 184acre semi-private golf course located in a high-end residential
development near Charlotte, North Carolina. The Belks donated
the easement to the Smoky Mountain National Land Trust and
claimed a $10.5 million deduction. 79 The easement deed
authorizes the landowner to remove land from the easement in
exchange for adding an equal or greater amount of contiguous
land, provided that, in the opinion of the grantee:
• the substitute property is of the same or better ecological
stability,
• the substitution will have no adverse effect on the
conservation purposes of the easement, and
• the fair market value of the “easement interest” placed on
the substitute land will be at least equal to or greater than
the fair market value of the “easement interest”
extinguished with regard to the land removed from the
easement.
(ii) Single Narrow Exception to Perpetuity. In affirming the Tax
Court’s holding that the Belks were not eligible for a deduction,
the 4th Circuit explained that the “Treasury Regulations offer a
single—and exceedingly narrow—exception to the requirement
that a conservation easement impose a perpetual use
restriction”—i.e.:
[if a] subsequent unexpected change in the conditions
surrounding the property … make[s] impossible or impractical
the continued use of the property for conservation purposes,
the conservation purpose can nonetheless be treated as
protected in perpetuity if the restrictions are extinguished by
judicial proceeding and all of the donee’s proceeds … from a
subsequent sale or exchange of the property are used by the
donee organization in a manner consistent with the
conservation purposes of the original contribution. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.170A-14(g)(6)(i) (emphasis added by the court).
79

The Smoky Mountain National Land Trust has since changed its name to Southwest Regional Land Conservancy.
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“[A]bsent these ‘unexpected’ and extraordinary circumstances,”
explained the 4th Circuit, “real property placed under easement
must remain there in perpetuity in order for the donor of the
easement to claim a charitable deduction.”
(iii) Critical Requirements. The 4th Circuit explained that
permitting a deduction for the donation of the Belk easement
would enable taxpayers to bypass several requirements critical to
the statutory and regulatory schemes governing deductions for
charitable contributions.
•

For example, permitting the Belks to change the
boundaries of the easement would render “meaningless”
the requirement that an easement donor obtain a
qualified appraisal because the appraisal would no longer
be an accurate reflection of the value of the easement,
parts of which could be clawed back. “It matters not,” said
the court, “that the Easement requires that the removed
property be replaced with property of ‘equal or greater
value,’ because the purpose of the appraisal requirement
is to enable the Commissioner, not the donee or donor, to
verify the value of a donation. The Easement’s substitution
provision places the Belks beyond the reach of the
Commissioner in this regard.”

•

Similarly, the baseline documentation requirement “would
also be skirted if the borders of an easement could shift.”
“Not only does this regulation confirm that a conservation
easement must govern a defined and static parcel,”
explained the court, “it also makes clear that holding
otherwise would deprive donees of the ability to ensure
protection of conservation interests by, for instance,
examination of maps and photographs of ‘the protected
property.’”

(iv) Kaufman and Simmons Distinguishable. The Belks argued that
Kaufman III and Simmons II support the notion that § 170(h) does
not require that easement restrictions attach to a single, defined
parcel. The 4th Circuit rejected that argument, explaining that
those “out-of-circuit” cases:
plausibly stand only for the proposition that a donation will
not be rendered ineligible simply because the donee reserves
28

its right not to enforce the easement. They do not support the
Belks’ view that the grant of a conservation easement qualifies
for a charitable deduction even if the easement may be
relocated. Indeed, as we have explained, such a holding would
violate the plain meaning of § 170(h)(2)(C).80
(v) Federal Law Controls. The Belks argued that, because North
Carolina law permits parties to amend or swap easements, like a
right-of-way easement between neighbors, not permitting swaps
would render all conservation easements in North Carolina
ineligible for a deduction under § 170(h). The 4th Circuit found
this argument “unpersuasive,” explaining:
whether state property and contract law permits a
substitution in an easement is irrelevant to the question of
whether federal tax law permits a charitable deduction for the
donation of such an easement … § 170(h)(2)(C) requires that
the gift of a conservation easement on a specific parcel of land
be granted in perpetuity to qualify for a federal charitable
deduction, notwithstanding the fact that state law may permit
an easement to govern for some shorter period of time. Thus,
an easement that, like the one at hand, grants a restriction for
less than a perpetual term, may be a valid conveyance under
state law, but is still ineligible for a charitable deduction under
federal law.
With the exception of North Dakota, which limits the duration of
any easement created in the State to 99 years, it appears that the
parties to a conservation easement can include provisions in the
deed to comply with the federal tax law perpetuity requirements
and, provided the easement is drafted appropriately, those
provisions will be legally binding on both the landowner and the
holder even though they impose conditions on the transfer or
extinguishment of the easement that may be different or more
restrictive than those imposed by state law (see Part II.A.8 and 9
below).
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In Simmons II, the D.C. Circuit implicitly rejected the argument of the amici curiae (the National Trust for Historic
Preservation et al.) that land trusts should be permitted to agree with developers to extinguish perpetual easements
on some properties (to allow development) in exchange for easements on other properties. The D.C. Circuit held, in
part, that an “eligible donee” must have a “commitment to protect the conservation purposes of the donation” and
“the resources to enforce the restrictions” and that a tax-exempt organization would fail to enforce a conservation
easement “at its peril.” The D.C. Circuit also concluded that the donated easements at issue in Simmons II “will
prevent in perpetuity any changes to the properties inconsistent with conservation purposes.”
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(vi) Savings Clause Did Not Save Deduction. The substitution
provision in the Belk conservation easement provided that
substitutions become final when they are reflected in a formal
recorded “amendment.” The amendment provision in the
easement provided that the land trust could not agree to any
amendment that would result in the easement failing to qualify
for a deduction under § 170(h).81 The Belks referred to this latter
provision as a “savings clause.” They argued that, if the 4th Circuit
found that the substitution provision violated the requirements of
§ 170(h), the savings clause would render the substitution
provision inoperable, thus making the easement eligible for the
deduction. In other words, the Belks argued that the savings
clause would operate to negate a right clearly articulated in the
easement (the right to substitute property), but only if triggered
by an adverse determination by the court.
The 4th Circuit dismissed this argument, noting that the Belks
were asking the court to employ the savings clause to rewrite the
easement in response to the court’s holding, which the court was
unwilling to do. The court refused to condone such “trifling with
the judicial process.” The court also explained that holding for the
Belks “would dramatically hamper the Commissioner’s
enforcement power. If every taxpayer could rely on a savings
clause to void, after the fact, a disqualifying deduction …
enforcement of the Internal Revenue Code would grind to a halt.”
The 4th Circuit also rejected the Belks’ “last-ditch” argument—
that the savings clause was designed “to accommodate evolving …
interpretation of Section 170(h)”—explaining
the statutory language of § 170(h)(2)(C) has not “evolved”
since the provision was enacted in 1980…. The simple truth is
this: the Easement was never consistent with § 170(h), a fact
that brings with it adverse tax consequences. The Belks cannot
now simply reform the Easement because they do not wish to
suffer those consequences.
81

Article VIII of the Belk easement deed provided as follows with regard to amendments:
Owner and Trust recognize that circumstances could arise which would justify the modification of certain of
the restrictions contained in this Conservation Easement. To this end, Trust and the legal owner or owners
of the Conservation Area at the time of amendment shall mutually have the right, in their sole discretion, to
agree to amendments to this Conservation Easement which are not inconsistent with the Conservation
Values or the purposes of this instrument; provided, however, that Trust shall have no right or power to
agree to any amendments hereto that would result in this Conservation Easement failing to qualify as a
valid conservation agreement under the “Act,” as the same may be hereafter amended, or as a qualified
conservation contribution under Section 170(h) of the Internal Revenue Code and applicable regulations.
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b. Balsam Mountain. In Balsam Mountain, the Tax Court held that a
conservation easement that authorized the parties, for a period of up to
five years, to remove up to 5% of the land from the easement in
exchange for protecting a similar amount of contiguous land was not
eligible for a deduction under IRC § 170(h).
(i) The Easement. The easement at issue in Balsam Mountain,
which was granted to the North American Land Trust (NALT) on 22
acres in North Carolina, allowed the landowner to, for five years
following the donation, make alterations to the boundaries of the
area protected by the easement, subject to the following
conditions:
• the total amount of land protected by the easement could
not be reduced,
• land added to the easement had to be contiguous to the
originally protected land,
• land added to the easement had to, in NALT’s reasonable
judgment, make an equal or greater contribution to the
easement’s conservation purpose,
• the “location and reconfiguration of a boundary” could
not, in NALT’s judgment, result in any material adverse
effect on the easement’s conservation purposes, and
• no more than 5% of the originally protected land could be
removed from the easement as a result of such
alterations.
(ii) Belk Not Distinguishable. Based on Belk, the Tax Court held
that the Balsam Mountain easement was not “a restriction
(granted in perpetuity) on the use which may be made of the real
property” as required by 170(h)(2)(C) and, thus, was not eligible
for a deduction. The donor argued that Belk was distinguishable
because the Belk easement allowed for the substitution of all of
the land originally protected by the easement, while the Balsam
Mountain easement allowed for the substitution of only 5% of the
originally protected land. The Tax Court was not persuaded. While
the court agreed that the Belk and Balsam Mountain easements
were different, it said “the difference does not matter.” For five
years following the donation, the donor, with the approval of
NALT, could change the boundaries of the area protected by the
easement (i.e., extinguish the original easement in part without
satisfying the judicial extinguishment, impossibility or
impracticality, or proceeds requirements). Accordingly, the
easement was not an interest in an identifiable, specific piece of
real property and, thus, was not deductible.
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c. Bosque Canyon Ranch. In Bosque Canyon Ranch, the Tax Court denied
deductions claimed by partnerships for the donation of conservation
easements because, among other things, the easements permitted 47
unencumbered 5-acre homesites to be moved around the subject
properties with the holder’s (NALT’s) approval, which would result in
unencumbering acreage previously subject to the easements. Specifically,
the easements permitted the homesite parcel owners and NALT to
mutually agree to modify the boundaries of the homesite parcels,
provided:
• in NALT’s “reasonable judgment,” the modification would not
result in any material adverse effect on the conservation purposes
of the easements,
• the size of the Homesite parcels would not be increased,
• the exterior boundaries of the property subject to the easements
would not be modified, and
• the overall amount of property subject to the easements would
not be decreased.
The “boundary modifications” to the homesites could cause property
that was protected by the easements at the time of their donation to
subsequently lose that protection without satisfaction of the judicial
proceeding and other requirements in Treasury Regulation § 1.170A14(g)(6). Accordingly, citing the 4th Circuit’s opinion in Belk III, the Tax
Court held that the easements were not "restrictions (granted in
perpetuity) on the use which may be made of the real property" as
required under IRC § 170(h)(2)(C).
d. The holdings in Belk, Balsam Mountain, and Bosque Canyon Ranch are
consistent with:
(i) Carpenter I and II, in which the Tax Court held that
extinguishment of a tax-deductible easement requires a judicial
proceeding. Removing land from a conservation easement,
whether in connection with a swap or otherwise, constitutes an
extinguishment of the easement with regard to the removed land.
It allows the removed land to be used for previously prohibited
purposes, such as development, thus permitting the conservation
values of the removed land, which had previously been protected
in perpetuity, to be destroyed.
(ii) Congress’s admonition in the legislative history “that
provisions allowing deductions for conservation easements should
be directed at the preservation of unique or otherwise significant
land areas or structures,” as well as the detailed threshold
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conservation purpose and other qualification and valuation
requirements that must be met to be eligible for a deduction
under § 170(h),82
(iii) IRS General Information Letter regarding swaps,83 and
(iv) Instructions for Schedule D of the Form 990, which (i) explain
that an easement is released, extinguished, or terminated “when
all or part of the property subject to the easement is removed
from the protection of the easement in exchange for the
protection of some other property or cash to be used to protect
some other property,” and (ii) require nonprofits to annually
report their conservation easement transfer, modification, and
termination activities.84
8. State Law Can Render Conservation Easements Nondeductible. In Wachter,
the Tax Court held that North Dakota law, which limits the duration of
easements created after July 1, 1977, to a maximum of 99 years, precludes
conservation easement donors in the state from qualifying for a deduction under
§ 170(h) because easements in North Dakota cannot be granted “in perpetuity.”
a. Federal Law Controls. The Tax Court in Wachter reiterated the
fundamental principle that, while state law determines the nature of
property rights, it is federal law that determines the federal tax
treatment of those rights. Wachter confirmed that state law can render
all conservation easement donations in a state ineligible for the federal
deduction if state law prevents conservation easements from complying
with federal requirements.
Some states have considered making changes to their state codes that
could render conservation easements in the state ineligible for federal
tax incentives.85 Potential easement donors and their advisors should be
aware of this issue.
b. Termination in 99 Years Not So Remote as to be Negligible. The
taxpayers in Wachter argued that North Dakota’s 99-year limitation
should be considered the equivalent of a remote future event that does
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S. Rep. No. 96-1007, 1980-2 C.B. 599, at 603.
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
84
See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
85
See, e.g., Keeping the Perpetual in Perpetual Conservation Easements,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/nonprofit/2015/12/keeping-the-perpetual-in-perpetual-conservationeasements.html.
83
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not prevent an easement from being considered perpetual. They cited
Treasury Regulation § 1.170A–14(g)(3), which provides, in part, that a
deduction shall not be disallowed ... merely because the interest
which passes to, or is vested in, the donee organization may be
defeated by the performance of some act or the happening of
some event, if on the date of the gift it appears that the possibility
that such act or event will occur is so remote as to be negligible.
The Tax Court in Wachter noted that the courts have construed the soremote- as-to-be-negligible standard to mean
'a chance which persons generally would disregard as so highly
improbable that it might be ignored with reasonable safety in
undertaking a serious business transaction' or 'a chance which
every dictate of reason would justify an intelligent person in
disregarding as so highly improbable and remote as to be lacking
in reason and substance.'
The Tax Court explained that the term “remote” refers to the likelihood
of the event that could defeat the donee’s interest in the gift. It then
explained that the likelihood of the event in Wachter that could defeat
the donee’s interest in the charitable gifts of the conservation
easements—expiration of the easements after 99 years—was not
“remote.” On the date of the donation of the easements, the court
explained, it was not only possible, it was inevitable that the donee
would be divested of its interests in the easements by operation of North
Dakota law. Accordingly, the easements were not restrictions granted “in
perpetuity” and, thus, were not deductible under § 170(h).
9. Interaction Between Federal and State Law. Numerous courts have
addressed the interaction between federal and state law in the conservation
easement context. As noted in the discussions of Carpenter I and Wachter above,
while state law determines the nature of the property rights in an easement, it is
federal law that determines the tax treatment of those rights. Thus, in
determining whether an easement complies with federal tax law requirements,
one must look to the terms of the deed and applicable state law to determine
how a particular easement may, for example, be transferred or extinguished,
and then ask whether the easement, so configured, satisfies federal tax law
requirements.
a. In Belk III, the 4th Circuit held that § 170(h) “requires that the gift of a
conservation easement on a specific parcel of land be granted in
perpetuity to qualify for a federal charitable deduction, notwithstanding
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the fact that state law may permit an easement to govern for some
shorter period of time.” Thus, while an easement that grants restrictions
for less than a perpetual term, like the easement at issue in Belk, may be
a valid conveyance under state law, it will be ineligible for a deduction
under federal law.
b. With the exception of North Dakota, which limits the duration of any
easement created in the State to 99 years, it appears that the parties to a
conservation easement can include provisions in the deed to comply with
the federal tax law perpetuity requirements and, provided the easement
is drafted appropriately, those provisions will be enforceable under state
law even though they impose conditions on the transfer or
extinguishment of the easement that are different or more restrictive
than those imposed by state law. As the Tax Court noted in Wachter,
“[b]oth parties allege that the State law at issue here is unique because
[North Dakota] is the only State that has a law that provides for a
maximum duration that may not be overcome by agreement.”
c. In Carpenter I, the Tax Court held that the conservation easements at
issue were restricted charitable gifts, or “contributions conditioned on
the use of the gift in accordance with the donor’s precise directions and
limitations.” Restricted gift status means that the property owner and the
holder of the easement (and their successors) will be bound by the terms
of the deed under state law, including the restriction on transfer,
extinguishment, division of proceeds, and other provisions included in
the deed to satisfy federal tax law requirements. In other words, if the
easement is drafted appropriately, the provisions included in the deed to
satisfy federal tax law requirements should be binding on both parties
under state law even though the state enabling statute may contain
different or less restrictive provisions addressing transfer or
extinguishment.
d. To help ensure that all future parties, the IRS, and the courts
understand that the conservation easement was conveyed in whole or in
part as a restricted charitable gift and is intended to be binding on the
property owner and the holder of the easement (and their successors), it
is suggested that consideration be given to including a provision like the
following in the easement:
The grantor desires to preserve and protect forever the
conservation values of the property for the benefit of this
generation and all generations to come. To that end the Grantor
conveys this easement as an irrevocable charitable gift to be held
in trust for the benefit of the public and administered and
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enforced in accordance with the terms and for the purposes
specified herein in perpetuity. The grantee has agreed to accept
the gift of this easement upon the condition and affirmative
understanding that the intentions of the grantor regarding future
use and preservation of the property as expressed herein shall
forever be honored and defended. The grantor and grantee
further acknowledge and agree that the terms of this restricted
charitable gift shall be binding upon each of them and their
respective successors in interest in perpetuity, and such terms
must be complied with notwithstanding and in addition to any
applicable provisions of state law.
10. Benefits of Restricted Gift Status. In addition to helping to ensure that the
parties to the easement and their successors will be bound by the easement
terms, including the restriction on transfer, extinguishment, division of proceeds,
and other provisions included in the deed to satisfy federal tax law
requirements, restricted gift status may also have the following benefits:
a. restricted charitable gifts are highly favored by the courts, and courts
might interpret charitable gifts of conservation easements in favor of
accomplishing their charitable conservation purposes, rather than in
favor of the free use of land,86
b. restricted gifts may be excluded from the bankruptcy estates of donee
charitable corporations and transferred intact to new charitable
holders,87
c. actions to recover conservation easements that have been improperly
transferred, released, modified, or terminated may not be barred by
laches or the statute of limitations,88
86

See, e.g., Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. 539, 550, 556 (1867) (“gifts to charitable uses are highly favored, and will be
most liberally construed in order to accomplish the intent and purpose of the donor”.... “If the words of a charitable
bequest are ambiguous or contradictory, they are to be so construed as to support the charity, if possible.”); Board of
Trustees of Univ. of N. C. v. Unknown Heirs, 319 S.E.2d 239, 242 (N.C. 1984) (“It is a well recognized principle that gifts
and trusts for charities are highly favored by the courts. Thus, the donor’s intentions are effectuated by the most
liberal rules of construction permitted.”). See also Nancy A. McLaughlin, Interpreting Conservation Easements, 29
PROB. & PROP. 30 (2015) (arguing that conservation easements should be interpreted in favor of accomplishing their
conservation purposes rather than free use of land). But see note 62 and accompanying text (cautioning that a
conservation easement should include clause stating that the parties to the easement (and their successors) intend
that, notwithstanding any general rule of construction to the contrary, the easement shall be liberally construed in
favor of permanently protecting the property’s conservation values and carrying out the conservation purpose of the
easement).
87
See Evelyn Brody, The Charity in Bankruptcy and Ghosts of Donors Past, Present, and Future, 29 SETON HALL LEG. J.
471 (2005) (“the courts will try to identify those charitable assets that are restricted in such a manner that they
survive the bankruptcy proceeding”).
88
See, e.g., Tauber v. Commonwealth, 499 S.E.2d. 839, 845 (Va. 1998) (laches may not be pled successfully as a
defense in an equitable proceeding to bar the state attorney general from asserting a claim on behalf of the public to
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d. conservation easements should not be extinguished pursuant to the
doctrine of merger if the government or nonprofit holder acquires title to
the subject land because the required “unity of ownership” generally will
not be present (i.e., the two estates would be “in the same person at the
same time,” but they generally would not be held “in the same right”),89
e. attempts by state legislatures to terminate or otherwise weaken or
undermine existing conservation easements may be found
unconstitutional on a number of grounds, including the prohibition on
impairment of private contracts,90 and
f. the state attorney general may serve as a back-up enforcer of
conservation easements.91
11. Sample Restriction on Transfer and Extinguishment Provisions. A conservation
easement deed should include transfer and extinguishment provisions that comply with
Treasury Regulation requirements. The following are sample provisions.92
Article [x]. Transfer and Extinguishment
a. Restriction on Transfer.93 Grantee can transfer this Easement, whether
or not for consideration, only if (a) (i) as a condition of the transfer,
Grantee requires that the conservation purposes of this Easement will
continue to be carried out, (ii) the transferee, at the time of the transfer,
insure that charitable assets are distributed in accord with the charitable purposes to which they should have been
devoted); Trustees of Andover Theological Seminary v. Visitors of Theological Inst. in Phillips Acad. in Andover, 148
N.E. 900, 918 (Mass. 1925) (“Generally it is true that no length of time of diversion from the plain provisions of a
charitable foundation will prevent its restoration to its true purpose”).
89
See Nancy A. McLaughlin, Conservation Easements and The Doctrine of Merger, 74 DUKE J. L. & CONTEMP. PROBS 279
(2011). See also VA Attorney General advisory opinion (Aug. 13, 2012) (opining that conservation easements in
Virginia are not extinguished by application of the common law doctrine of merger), available at
http://ag.virginia.gov/Opinions%20and%20Legal%20Resources/Opinions/2012opns/11-140%20Rust.pdf.
90
See Nancy A. McLaughlin & W. William Weeks, In Defense of Conservation Easements: A Response to The End of
Perpetuity, 9 WYO. L. REV. 1, 88-91 (2009) (gathering the relevant authorities).
91
See, e.g., Lyme Land Conservation Trust, Inc. v. Planter, 2013 WL 3625348 (Superior Ct. of Connecticut, May 29,
2013) (unpublished); Kimberly Drelich, After Lengthy Dispute, Court Finds in Favor of Lyme Land Conservation Trust,
THE DAY, Mar. 14, 2015, at A1, available at http://www.theday.com/article/20150314/NWS01/303149962
(Connecticut attorney general assisted a land trust in successfully enforcing a conservation easement on behalf the
public). At least six state enabling statutes expressly grant the attorney general enforcement rights. CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 47-42c (2012); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/4 (2012); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 478(1)(D) (2012); MISS. CODE ANN. §
89-19-7(1) (2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-39-3(f)(4) (2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1013 (2012). For a discussion of the
attorney general’s common law and statutory rights to enforce charitable gifts and trusts on behalf of the public, see
rd
CHESTER, BOGERT & BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 411 (3 ed. 2005).
92
These sample provisions are drafted to track the Treasury Regulation requirements. However, neither the IRS nor
the courts have blessed these sample provisions. Readers are responsible for obtaining legal advice from their own
legal counsel.
93
See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(c)(2). The cross-reference in the last sentence of this regulation to (g)(5)(ii) is incorrect
and should be to (g)(6)(ii); the Treasury failed to update the cross-references when it finalized the proposed
regulations in 1986. Grantee should be defined in the easement to include all successors and assigns.
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is both a “qualified organization” under IRC § 170(h)(3) and eligible to
receive this Easement under [citation to State X conservation easement
enabling statute], and (iii) the transferee has the commitment to protect
the conservation purposes of this Easement and the resources to
enforce, and agrees to enforce, this Easement; or (b) the transfer
complies with the extinguishment requirements in [this Article]. Any
attempted transfer by Grantee of all or a portion of this Easement
contrary to this paragraph shall be invalid but shall not operate to
extinguish this Easement. Any subsequent transfer of this Easement shall
also be subject to the provisions of this paragraph.
b. Extinguishment; Proceeds.94
(1) Grantor and Grantee agree that the donation of this Easement
creates a property right that immediately vests in Grantee.
Grantor and Grantee further agree that this property right has a
fair market value that is at least equal to the proportionate value
that this Easement, at the time of the gift, bore to the value of the
Property as a whole (unencumbered by this Easement) at that
time, and such minimum proportionate value of Grantee’s
property right, expressed as a percentage (the “Minimum
Percentage”), shall remain constant.
(2) This Easement can be extinguished in whole or in part
(whether through release, termination, abandonment, swap,
exchange, or otherwise) only (i) in a judicial proceeding in a court
of competent jurisdiction, (ii) upon a finding by the court that a
subsequent unexpected change in the conditions surrounding the
Property has made impossible or impractical continued use of the
Property (or the portion thereof to be removed from this
Easement) for conservation purposes, and (iii) with a payment of
proceeds to Grantee as described in the following [subparagraph],
which proceeds must be used by Grantee in a manner consistent
with the conservation purposes of this Easement.
(3) In the event of an extinguishment, Grantee shall be entitled to
a share of the proceeds from a subsequent sale, exchange, lease,
or involuntary conversion of the affected property equal to the
greater of: (i) the Minimum Percentage of such proceeds or (ii)
the Extinguishment Percentage of such proceeds, with
“Extinguishment Percentage” defined as the proportionate value
that this Easement, immediately before and ignoring the
94

See id. § 1.170A-14(g)(6).
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extinguishment, bore to the value of the Property as a whole
(unencumbered by this Easement) at that time, expressed as a
percentage.
(4) Any attempted extinguishment of all or a portion of this
Easement contrary to this paragraph shall be invalid
c. Supplement to State Law. The provisions of this Article shall survive any
transfer and any partial or full extinguishment of this Easement and shall
apply notwithstanding, and in addition to, any provisions relating to
transfer or extinguishment under state law.
12. “Greater of” Proceeds Formula. The “greater of” proceeds formula in
paragraph b.(3) of the sample extinguishment provision above complies with
federal tax law requirements because the holder will always receive at least the
Treasury Regulation’s required minimum proportionate (or floor) share of
proceeds. The “greater of” formula also (i) ensures that the holder will receive
the appreciation (if any) in the value of easement to be used “in a manner
consistent with the conservation purposes of the original contribution” (i.e., to
replace lost conservation or historic values) and (ii) eliminates the property
owner’s perverse incentive to seek extinguishment to benefit from any
appreciation in the value of the easement (i.e., the “spread” between the
Minimum Percentage and the Extinguishment Percentage), which may be
significant.
While the “greater of” formula may create an incentive for the easement holder
to seek extinguishment, holders have a fiduciary obligation to administer and
enforce conservation easements consistent with their terms and purposes;
“eligible donees” must have a commitment to protect the conservation purposes
of the donation and the resources to enforce the restrictions; 95 and
extinguishment is permitted only in a judicial proceeding and upon a court’s
finding that a subsequent unexpected change in the conditions surrounding the
property has made impossible or impractical the continued use of the property
for conservation purposes.96
13. Noncompliant “Proceeds” Clause. In Carroll, the Tax Court sustained the
IRS’s disallowance of approximately $650,000 of carryover deductions claimed
with regard to the donation of a conservation easement because the easement
contained a noncompliant “proceeds” clause. The court explained that the
minimum proportionate share of proceeds that must be payable to the holder
following extinguishment is equal to the percentage determined by (i) the fair
95
96

Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(c)(1).
See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6); Belk III; Carpenter II.
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market value of the conservation easement on the date of the gift (the
numerator) over (ii) the fair market value of the property as a whole on the date
of the gift (the denominator). For example, if the fair market value of an
easement on the date of the gift was $300,000, and the fair market value of the
property as a whole on the date of the gift was $1,000,000, the easement
represented 30% of the value of the property on the date of the gift, and the
holder must be entitled to at least 30% of the proceeds following the easement’s
extinguishment.
In Carroll, the conservation easement deed limited the numerator of the formula
noted above to "the deduction for federal income tax purposes allowable" by
reason of the donation. The court explained that, if the IRS were to disallow the
deduction for reasons other than valuation and the easement were later
extinguished in a judicial proceeding, the numerator would be zero and the
holder of the easement would not receive the minimum proportionate share of
proceeds as is required. The court also noted that deductions are denied for
many reasons unrelated to valuation, and, in fact, the IRS made numerous
arguments for disallowance of the taxpayers’ claimed deductions in Carroll that
were not based on valuation.
Although not mentioned by the court, mandating that the holder receive at least
a minimum proportionate share of proceeds even if the donor’s deduction is
disallowed is appropriate from a policy perspective. Regardless of whether
donors’ deductions are allowed or disallowed, charitable gifts of easements are
irrevocable and holders have an ongoing obligation to monitor and enforce the
easements on behalf of the public. Given the investment that will be made by
the public in monitoring and enforcement, the value attributable to the
easements should not be permitted to revert to the donors (or the donors’
successors in interest) upon extinguishment. Rather, such value should remain in
the charitable sector and be used to replace lost conservation values, as Treasury
Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(6) requires. In addition, as in many of the cases, the
IRS challenged the claimed deduction in Carroll on numerous grounds (including
overvaluation and lack of a completed gift of the easement due to application of
Maryland’s Uniform Transfers to Minors Act). Accordingly, even if the court had
found that the proceeds clause passed muster, the deduction may have been
disallowed on other grounds.
The Tax Court distinguished its holding in Carroll from the 1st Circuit’s holding in
Kaufman. In Kaufman, the 1st Circuit held that the donors of a facade easement
had satisfied the proceeds requirement because the easement deed correctly
stated the proceeds formula and the donee organization had an absolute right as
against the donors for its share of proceeds upon extinguishment. In Carroll, in
contrast, the donee organizations would not be entitled to any proceeds in
certain circumstances based on the formula included in the easement deed.
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Consistent with the 1st Circuit’s reasoning in Kaufman, failing to guarantee that
the donees would be entitled to at least the required minimum proportionate
share of proceeds upon extinguishment, and providing a potential windfall to the
donor or the donor’s successors as a result, was fatal to the deduction.
The Tax Court found that the donors’ deductions were not saved by the last
sentence in Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii), which provides an
exception to the requirement that the holder must receive at least a minimum
proportionate share of proceeds upon extinguishment if “state law provides that
the donor is entitled to the full proceeds from the conversion without regard to
the terms of the [easement].” Maryland has an unusual provision in its state
code. Pursuant to this provision, if land subject to an easement held by Maryland
Environmental Trust (MET) is condemned, damages must be awarded “to the fee
owner ... and shall be the fair market value of the land or interest in it, computed
as though the easement ... did not exist.” This presumably means the holder
would receive nothing unless the parties agreed that the fee owner would give a
portion of the proceeds to the holder. The Carroll easement had been granted to
MET and a local land trust as co-holders. The Tax Court held that the state code
provision above did not save the deduction because (i) the provision applies only
to easements held by MET and, thus, the proceeds formula in the deed still
violated the proceeds requirement with regard to the local land trust, and (ii) the
provision applies only to condemnations and, thus, the proceeds formula in the
deed still violated the proceeds requirement with regard to judicial
extinguishments not based on condemnation.
The Tax Court also dismissed the taxpayers’ argument that noncompliance with
the proceeds requirement should be forgiven because the probability of
extinguishment of the easement was “so remote as to be negligible.” Citing
Kaufman III, the Tax Court explained that easement donors cannot satisfy the
requirements of the extinguishment regulation by merely establishing that the
possibility of a change in conditions triggering judicial extinguishment is
unexpected. To accept such an argument, explained the Tax Court, would nullify
the requirements because the extinguishment regulation, by its terms, applies
only to “unexpected” conditions.
The Tax Court further explained that, the taxpayers “could have avoided this
adverse outcome by strictly following the proportionality formula set forth in the
regulation.” In addition, in finding that the taxpayers were liable for accuracyrelated penalties, the court noted:
[The taxpayers] offered no evidence which would explain why the terms
of the conservation easement varied from the requirements of [Treasury
Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(6)], nor do they clarify why Dr. Carroll failed to
seek competent advice from a tax attorney or other adviser to ensure the
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conservation easement’s compliance with pertinent regulations. In the
light of Dr. Carroll’s high level of sophistication and experience with
conservation easements, we conclude that [the taxpayers] have not
demonstrated that they acted with reasonable cause and in good faith in
not seeking competent tax advice regarding the conservation easement.
There are a number of takeaways from Carroll.
•

Conservation easement donations generally involve high-dollar
deductions and the requirements of § 170(h) and the regulations are
numerous and complex. Accordingly, prospective easement donors
should hire experienced tax counsel to assist them with their donations.
If they do not, they run the risk of not only having their deductions
denied, but also being subject to penalties for failure to seek tax advice.
Too often easement donors are either unrepresented by legal counsel, or
represented by legal counsel with little or no tax expertise.

•

Donors of conservation easements should not rely on a donee
organization or its template or model easement to satisfy the
requirements for the deduction. The risks of noncompliance (audit,
litigation, denial of deductions, and interest and penalties) fall solely on
the shoulders of the donor, and it is the responsibility of the donor and
the donor’s tax counsel to ensure that all requirements are satisfied.
Most donees are careful to instruct donors that they cannot and do not
provide legal advice, and donors need to take that warning to heart.

•

The amount of litigation in this context could be significantly reduced if
the IRS developed safe harbor or “sample” conservation easement
provisions to satisfy the key perpetuity requirements of § 170(h). While
many provisions of an easement must be tailored to the specific property
and situation, many of the perpetuity requirements, including those
addressing judicial extinguishment and proceeds, could be satisfied with
provisions that generally should not vary from easement to easement.
Safe harbor provisions would facilitate both donor compliance and IRS
review, and would help to ensure that the public investment in
easements and their conservation purposes is actually “protected in
perpetuity” as Congress intended. Moreover, developing sample
provisions would not be a novel approach to facilitating compliance and
curbing abuse. The Treasury developed sample trust provisions with
annotations in the charitable remainder trust and charitable lead trust
contexts and those provisions, which are widely used, have greatly
facilitated compliance and reduced abuses.
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14. Reimbursement of Funders on Extinguishment. Irby analyzed Treasury
Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii) (the division of proceeds portion of the
extinguishment regulation) as applied to conservation easements conveyed in
bargain sale transactions. The conservation easements in Irby had been
conveyed to a land trust, but three government entities had supplied funding to
pay approximately 75% of the value of the easements to the landowners, and
the landowners made charitable gifts of the remaining 25%. The easements
provide that the grantee (the land trust) is entitled to Treasury Regulation
§ 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii)’s mandated minimum proportionate share of proceeds
following extinguishment, but must pay 75% of those proceeds to the
government entities to reimburse them for their contributions to the purchase
price of the easements, which would leave the grantee with only 25% of the
proceeds.
a. The IRS argued that the reimbursement obligation meant that the
grantee was not actually entitled to the mandated minimum
proportionate share of proceeds following extinguishment—i.e., that its
entitlement was merely “superficial.” The Tax Court disagreed. The court
explained that, unlike the situation where a lender holding an
outstanding mortgage on the property is given priority to proceeds upon
extinguishment (which furthers the taxpayer’s interests because the
proceeds will be used to pay down the taxpayer’s debt), there was no risk
that the taxpayers in Irby could reap a similar windfall upon
extinguishment because the proceeds payable by the grantee to the
governmental entities, each of which has a conservation mission, would
be used by such entities “in a manner consistent with the original
conservation purposes of the contribution” (as explained in the next
paragraph). Thus, the court found that the easement deeds met the
requirements of division of proceeds regulation.
b. The Tax Court noted that the IRS’s concerns in Irby more properly
seemed to address the question of whether all of the extinguishment
proceeds would be used by the grantee “in a manner consistent with the
conservation purposes of the original contribution” as required by
Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(i). The court determined that they
would. It explained that all three government entities “were established
to assist the conservation of open land” and are “legally obligated to
fulfill their conservation purpose.” In addition, the court stated that it
appeared that the reimbursements would enhance the ability of the
government entities “to conserve and protect more land, since the
reimbursed funds would be used to do just that.” Accordingly, the court
found that the reimbursement provision in Irby did not violate the
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requirements of either the extinguishment or division of proceeds
regulations.97
c. The Tax Court issued stipulated decisions in Irby in December 2013
ordering the taxpayers to pay agreed upon deficiencies in income tax for
taxable years 2003 and 2004, but no penalties were imposed.
B. Qualified Appraisal and IRS Form 8283 (Appraisal Summary)
1. Short History.
a. In 1984, as part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (DEFRA),98
Congress required taxpayers claiming deductions for noncash charitable
contributions in excess of $5,000 to obtain a qualified appraisal prepared
by a qualified appraiser99 and attach an appraisal summary to the return
on which the deduction is first claimed for the property contributed.
DEFRA also directed the Secretary of the Treasury to prescribe
regulations implementing the statutory requirements. Pursuant to this
legislative mandate, the IRS and the Treasury Department promulgated
Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-13(c) (attached as Appendix D), which
provides that no deduction shall be allowed for a noncash contribution in
excess of $5,000 unless the taxpayer
(i) obtains a qualified appraisal prepared by a qualified appraiser
and
(ii) attaches a fully completed appraisal summary (IRS Form 8283)
to the tax return on which the taxpayer first claims a deduction
for the contribution.
b. In 2004, Congress added § 170(f)(11) to the Internal Revenue Code
effective for contributions made after June 3, 2004 (§ 170(f)(11), as
amended, is attached as Appendix E).100 Section 170(f)(11) provides,
among other things, that
97

Some have argued that the court reached the correct result in Irby, but for the wrong reason. Treasury Regulation
§ 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii) could be viewed as applying only to the portion of the proceeds attributable to the contribution
component of a bargain sale transaction, and not to the portion of the proceeds attributable to the sales component
of the transaction. Allowing the funders to be reimbursed for the funds they contributed to the purchase price should
thus not run afoul of the proceeds requirement, although the priority of the payments might be an issue.
98
Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 691 (1984).
99
DEFRA § 155(a). Congress defined the term “qualified appraisal” to mean an appraisal prepared by a qualified
appraiser that includes, among other information: (1) a description of the property appraised, (2) the fair market
value of the property on the contribution date and the specific basis for valuation, (3) a statement that the appraisal
was prepared for income tax purposes, (4) the qualifications of the appraiser, and (5) any additional information the
Secretary may prescribe by regulation. Id. § 155(a)(4).
100
See § 883 of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418.
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(i) in the case of contributions of property for which a deduction
of more than $5,000 is claimed, the taxpayer must obtain a
qualified appraisal and attach to the return for the taxable year in
which such contribution is made such information regarding such
property and such appraisal as the Secretary may require (i.e., the
Form 8283, appraisal summary),101 and
(ii) in the case of contributions of property for which a deduction
of more than $500,000 is claimed, the taxpayer must attach the
full qualified appraisal to the return (i.e., the entire qualified
appraisal must be filed with the Form 8283).102
c. In 2006, Congress amended § 170(f)(11) to add statutory definitions of
the terms “qualified appraiser” and “qualified appraisal.”103
d. Later in 2006, the IRS issued Notice 2006-96,104 which, among other
things, provides transitional guidance regarding § 170(f)(11)(E)’s
definitions of qualified appraisal and qualified appraiser.
e. In 2008, the IRS and the Treasury Department issued proposed
regulations implementing the substantiation and reporting rules.105 Until
these regulations are finalized and effective, the transitional guidance in
IRS Notice 2006-96 applies.
f. As the foregoing indicates, the qualified appraisal, qualified appraiser,
and appraisal summary requirements are both statutory and regulatory
requirements.
2. Form 8283, Section B. Despite the 1st Circuit’s holding in Kaufman III, donors
should correctly and completely fill out Form 8283 and attach a Supplemental
Statement as described below and not rely on substantial compliance.106
101

IRC § 170(f)(11)(C).
Id. § 170(f)(11)(D).
103
IRC § 170(f)(11)(E). See § 1219 of the Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–280, 120 Stat. 780. For an
explanation of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 changes, see Technical Explanation Of H.R. 4, The "Pension
Protection Act Of 2006," prepared by the JCT, JCX-38-06 (August 3, 2006), available at
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=select&id=20.
104
IRS Notice 2006-96 is available at http://www.irs.gov/irb/2006-46_IRB/ar13.html.
105
See Substantiation and Reporting Requirements for Cash and Noncash Charitable Contribution Deductions, 73
Federal Register 45908 (proposed August 7, 2008).
106
In Kaufman III, the 1st Circuit held that failure to include the date, manner of acquisition, and cost or other basis of
the property contributed on the Form 8283 was not fatal to the deduction. However, in Costello the Tax Court held
that the Form 8283 did not comply or substantially comply with Treasury Regulation requirements because it was not
signed by the donee and it failed to disclose the consideration the taxpayers received in exchange for the purported
donation. In Ney, the Tax Court similarly held that the Form 8283 did not comply or substantially comply with
Treasury Regulation requirements because it was not signed by an appraiser or the donee, it did not list the date of
acquisition of the properties, and it did not state that the contributions were made as part of bargain sales or indicate
102
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a. Appendix F contains examples of correctly filled-out sections of the
Form 8283 relating to conservation easements in various circumstances.
b. The donee and the individual appraiser or appraisers (if more than
one) must all sign the Form 8283.107
c. DEFRA specifically requires taxpayers to include on the return on which
a deduction is first claimed such information as may be prescribed by
Treasury Regulations, including the cost basis and acquisition date of the
donated property. 108 The Treasury Regulations implement this
requirement by providing that the appraisal summary must include,
among other things (i) the manner and date of acquisition of the property
by the donor and (ii) the cost or other basis of the property.109 The
Treasury Regulations also provide that, if a taxpayer has reasonable cause
for being unable to provide the foregoing information, an appropriate
explanation should be attached to the appraisal summary. The taxpayer's
deduction will not be disallowed simply because of the inability—for
reasonable cause—to provide these items of information.110
d. The Instructions for Form 8283111 state, with regard to Section B, Part I,
Line 5, Columns (d) through (f) (addressing date acquired, how acquired,
and basis): “If you have reasonable cause for not providing the
information in columns (d), (e), or (f), attach an explanation so your
deduction will not automatically be disallowed” (emphasis added).
3. Supplemental Statement. The Instructions for Form 8283 require the donor to
attach a supplemental statement to the form.
a. The supplemental statement must:
(i) identify the conservation purposes furthered by the donation,
(ii) show, if before and after valuation is used, the fair market
value of the underlying property before and after the gift,
(iii) state whether the donation was made in order to get a permit
or other approval from a local or other governing authority and
whether the donation was required by a contract (i.e., was there a
quid pro quo), and
(iv) if the donor or a related person has any interest in other
property nearby, describe that interest.
the compensation received in exchange. See also Seventeen Seventy Sherman Street (“failure to properly disclose a
bargain sale [on a Form 8283] may foreclose a claimed charitable contribution deduction in its entirety”).
107
See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(c)(5)(iii).
108
DEFRA § 155(a)(1)(C).
109
See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(c)(4)(ii)(D) and (E).
110
See id. § 1.170A-13(c)(4)(iv)(C)(1).
111
Instructions for Form 8283 are available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i8283.pdf.
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b. The Supplemental Statement should be comprehensive and detailed
(numerous pages long). An example of a supplemental statement is
attached as Appendix G.
4. Special Rules for Façade Easement Donations. For the donation of a façade
easement on a building in a registered historic district, in addition to the Form
8283 and Supplemental Statement, the taxpayer must include with the
taxpayer’s return for the year of the contribution: (a) a qualified appraisal, (b)
photos of the entire exterior of the building, (c) a description of all restrictions
on the development of the building, and (d) if the deduction claimed is more
than $10,000, a $500 filing fee.112
In Gemperle, the Tax Court sustained the IRS’s disallowance of deductions
claimed with regard to a 2007 donation of a façade easement because the
taxpayers, a married couple who represented themselves in Tax Court, failed to
include a qualified appraisal of the easement with the return they filed for the
year of the contribution. The Tax Court also found the Gemperles liable for 20%
penalties for “disregard of rules or regulations” under IRC § 6662(a) and (b)(1).
The court explained that the requirement that the full qualified appraisal be
included with the tax return filed for the year of the contribution is stated not
only in the Internal Revenue Code but also in the instructions for the IRS Form
8283, and the taxpayers “were at least careless, if not reckless, in ignoring the
warning that an appraisal was required.” The Gemperles were alternatively liable
for 40% strict liability penalties under IRC § 6662(h) for making gross valuation
misstatements on their 2007 and 2008 returns with regard to the easement.
C. Qualified Appraisal Requirements
1. General Requirements.113
a. Strict Compliance Recommended. Donors should strictly comply with
all statutory and regulatory qualified appraisal requirements. While in
some cases the courts have been willing to forgive failures to strictly
comply with some of the requirements,114 in the following cases failures
112

See IRC §§ 170(h)(4)(B)(iii) and 170(f)(13). See also IRS Form 8283-V, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/f8283v.pdf.
113
See IRC § 170(f)(11) (attached as Appendix E); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(c) (attached as Appendix D); IRS Notice
2006-96, available at http://www.irs.gov/irb/2006-46_IRB/ar13.html.
114
In Zarlengo, the Tax Court held that the taxpayer complied or substantially complied with the various qualified
appraisal requirements even though, among other things, the appraisal was “premature” (i.e., prepared more than
sixty days prior to the date of the contribution). In Irby, the Tax Court held that an appraisal report’s discussion of the
purpose of the appraisal (i.e., to value an easement for purposes of § 170(h)) was sufficient to satisfy Treasury
Regulation § 1.170A–13(c)(3)(ii)(G)’s requirement that the appraisal contain “[a] statement that the appraisal was
prepared for income tax purposes.” In Simmons II, Scheidelman II, and Friedberg II, the courts held that the appraisals
obtained to substantiate façade easement donations sufficiently detailed the “method used” and “basis” of valuation
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to strictly comply led to a complete disallowance of the claimed
deductions.
(i) Lord. In Lord, the Tax Court sustained the disallowance of a
deduction for the donation of a conservation easement because
the taxpayer’s appraisal (which did not include the easement
contribution date, the date the appraisal was performed, or the
appraised fair market value of the easement on the contribution
date) was not a qualified appraisal. The doctrine of substantial
compliance was not applicable because significant information
was omitted.
(ii) Costello. In Costello, landowners conveyed a conservation
easement permanently prohibiting development of their 73-acre
farm to Howard County, Maryland, in exchange for the right to
sell 16 development rights to a developer for $2.5 million. The
developer was able to use those rights to increase density on
parcels located in a “receiving area” of the County (i.e., the
exchange was pursuant to the County’s transfer of development
rights program). Seven months later, the landowners hired an
appraiser to appraise their property before and after a
“hypothetical” sale of development rights. The appraiser was
unaware of the existing conservation easement and assumed the
property could be developed into a 25-lot subdivision. He
estimated the value of the hypothetical development rights to be
$5.5 million and the taxpayers filed a tax return claiming a
charitable income tax deduction of that amount. Howard County
refused to sign an IRS Form 8283 as the “donee” because it
questioned whether the conveyance of the easement constituted
a charitable donation.
The IRS disallowed the claimed deduction on a number of
grounds, including that the taxpayers failed to obtain a “qualified
appraisal.” The Tax Court sustained the disallowance, finding,
among other things, that the taxpayer’s appraisal failed to include
the following three elements required for a qualified appraisal: (a)
the appraisal did not contain an accurate description of the
contributed property (i.e., the appraiser didn’t describe or purport
to value the conservation easement because the appraiser was
unaware of its existence), (b) the appraisal did not contain the
date of the contribution (unsurprising given that the appraiser
for purposes of Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-13(c)(3)(ii)(J) and (K). Provision of the basis of valuation is also required
by DEFRA §155(a)(4)(B).
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was unaware of the easement conveyance), and (c) the appraisal
did not contain the salient terms of any of the agreements
relating to the contributed property (again, unsurprising given
that the appraiser was unaware that the landowners had agreed
to grant the easement to the County in exchange for the right to
sell development rights for $2.5 million).
After filing their initial income tax return and claiming a $5.5
million deduction, the landowners apparently had second
thoughts. They had their appraiser prepare an addendum to his
appraisal that took into account their sale of development rights
to the developer for $2.5 million, and they filed an amended
income tax return claiming a deduction of only $3 million.
However, the appraiser’s addendum was not prepared within the
required time period for a qualified appraisal (i.e., no more than
60 days before the gift and no later than the due date (including
extensions) of the return on which a deduction is first claimed).115
The Tax Court held that the untimely addendum did not convert
the original appraisal into a qualified appraisal. The court also
held that the appraisal did not “substantially comply” with the
reporting requirements because it omitted numerous categories
of important information and appraised the wrong asset.
The Tax Court further explained that, pursuant to IRC
§ 170(f)(11)(A)(ii)(II) (see Appendix E), “[e]ven absent strict or
substantial compliance with the ‘qualified appraisal’ and reporting
requirements, a deduction will not be denied if the failure to meet
those requirements is due to ‘reasonable cause and not to willful
neglect.’” The burden of proving reasonable cause is on the
taxpayer, however, and the court held that, given the magnitude
of the omissions from the appraisal and the Form 8283,
particularly the failure to disclose the prior sale of development
rights for $2.5 million, the taxpayers could not show that their
failures were due to reasonable cause.
(iii) Mecox. In Mecox, the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York sustained the IRS’s complete disallowance of
a deduction claimed with regard to the donation of a façade
easement because (i) the easement was found not to have been
contributed until the year it was recorded, which was the year
following the year in which the taxpayer claimed the deduction
and (ii) the appraisal was untimely (i.e., the appraisal was made
115

See Treas. Reg. 1.170A-13(c)(3)(i)(A) (attached as Appendix D).
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more than 60 days prior to the date of the contribution116). See
Part III.C.2 below for a more detailed discussion of Mecox.
b. Collective Defects. After the 2nd Circuit’s holding in Scheidelman II
(discussed immediately below), the Tax Court in Rothman II reconsidered
its earlier opinion and concluded that the Rothman appraisal met the
“method used” and “basis” of valuation requirements of the Treasury
Regulations. However, the Tax Court noted that Treasury Regulation
§ 1.170A-13, the qualified appraisal regulation (attached as Appendix D),
imposes 15 distinct requirements and the appraisal in Rothman failed to
satisfy 8 of the 15 requirements. Because of the “collective defects,” the
court reconfirmed its holding that the appraisal was not qualified. The
Tax Court in Rothman II further noted that, because the qualified
appraisal regulation was promulgated under an express delegation of
congressional authority and has been found to be valid, the U.S. Supreme
Court instructs that courts respect the lines the Secretary of the Treasury
has drawn therein as a valid exercise of rulemaking authority. Whether
the donor in Rothman qualified for the “reasonable cause” exception for
not having a qualified appraisal under § 170(f)(11)(A)(ii)(II) was an issue
that remained to be tried, but the case settled.
c. Qualified Appraisals That Are Not Credible. In a number of façade
easement cases the courts held that the appraisals met the minimal
requirements of a qualified appraisal but did not provide credible
evidence of value.
(i) Scheidelman. In Scheidelman II, the 2nd Circuit explained
[f]or the purpose of gauging compliance with the reporting
requirement, it is irrelevant that the IRS believes the
method employed [a mechanical application of a
percentage diminution] was sloppy or inaccurate, or
haphazardly applied—it remains a method, and [the
appraiser] described it. The regulation requires only that
the appraiser identify the valuation method “used”; it does
not require that the method adopted be reliable.
However, the 2nd Circuit went on to explain that its conclusion
that the appraisal met the minimal requirements of a qualified
appraisal mandated neither that the Tax Court find the appraisal
persuasive nor that Scheidelman be entitled to any deduction for
the donated façade easement, and it remanded to the Tax Court.
116

Id.
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In Scheidelman III, the Tax Court held that, although the
taxpayers’ appraisal was a qualified appraisal: (a) the taxpayers
did not provide sufficient credible evidence to meet their burden
of establishing entitlement to the claimed charitable contribution
deduction and (b) the preponderance of the evidence supported
the IRS's position that the façade easement had no value.
In Scheidelman IV the 2nd Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s holding
that the easement had no value. 117 In support of its holding, the
2nd Circuit quoted the IRS’s valuation expert, who explained that
“in highly desirable, sophisticated home markets like historic
brownstone Brooklyn, the imposition of an easement, such as the
one granted ... does not materially affect the value of the subject
property.” The 2nd Circuit also found persuasive the fact that the
donee had assured one of Scheidelman's mortgagors that
[a]s a practical matter, the easement does not add any
new restrictions on the use of the property because the
historic preservation laws of the City of New York already
require a specific historic review of any proposed changes
to the exterior of this property.
(ii) Kaufman. In Kaufman III, the 1st Circuit vacated the Tax
Court’s opinions in Kaufman I and Kaufman II in part and
remanded to the Tax Court on the issue of valuation. The 1st
Circuit explained that the Kaufmans had expressed concern to the
donee—the National Architectural Trust (NAT)—about the high
appraised value of the façade easement they were donating
because it implied a substantial reduction in the resale value of
their home, which was located in Boston’s South End Historic
District. “In an effort to reassure them, a [NAT] representative
told the Kaufmans that experience showed that such easements
did not reduce resale value.” “This,” said the 1st Circuit, “could
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In Evans, Dunlap, Foster, Scheidelman, Kaufman, Chandler, and Reisner, façade easements on residential
properties were found to have no value (in Reisner the parties so stipulated). However, courts have determined that
façade easements reduce the value of the properties they encumber, albeit by less than the taxpayers’ claimed, in
some cases. In Simmons I, Zarlengo, and Gorra, the Tax Court held that façade easements reduced the value of the
subject residential properties by 5%, 3.5%, and 2%, respectively. In Seventeen Seventy Sherman Street, the IRS argued
that a façade easement had no effect on the value of a historic shrine because of already existing local historic
preservation restrictions. The Tax Court disagreed, holding that the easement was more protective of the shrine than
local law. In Whitehouse Hotel, after two appeals, the 5th Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s holding that a façade
easement encumbering the historic Maison Blanche building (which is located in the French Quarter in New Orleans
and is now used as a Ritz Carlton hotel) reduced the value of the building by 14.9%. For a comprehensive discussion of
the valuation case law, see Nancy A. McLaughlin, Conservation Easements and the Valuation Conundrum, 19 FLA. TAX
REV. 225 (2016), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2704576.
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easily be the IRS's opening argument in a valuation trial.”118 And
so it apparently was.
In Kaufman IV, on remand from the 1st Circuit, the Tax Court
sustained the IRS’s complete disallowance of the deductions
claimed with regard to the façade easement donation on the
ground that the easement had no value. Although the Tax Court
assumed the Kaufman’s appraisal was a “qualified appraisal,” the
court gave no weight to the appraisal’s estimate of value because
it found the appraiser’s method (application of a standard
diminution percentage to the value of the property before the
easement's donation) to be unreliable and his analysis
unpersuasive. The Tax Court found the IRS’s valuation expert, who
determined that the value of the easement was zero, to be more
persuasive. The IRS’s expert opined, among other things, that the
typical buyer would find the restrictions in the façade easement
no more burdensome than local historic preservation restrictions
and, even if the façade easement were more restrictive, it would
not necessarily reduce the value of the property because
homeowners in historic districts place premium value on the
assurance that the neighborhood surrounding their homes will
remain unchanged over time.
•

In Kaufman IV the Tax Court also sustained the IRS
imposition of accuracy-related penalties. The indefatigable
Kaufmans appealed that holding to the 1st Circuit. In
Kaufman V (discussed in Part III.A.1 below), the 1st Circuit
affirmed, noting that the Tax Court did not clearly err
when it found that the Kaufmans were liable for penalties
for claiming a deduction for the donation of “a worthless
historic preservation easement on their home.”

(iii) Chandler. In Chandler, the Tax Court sustained the IRS’s
complete disallowance of deductions claimed with regard to two
façade easement donations. As in Kaufman, the properties were
located in Boston’s South End Historic District and the easements
were donated to NAT. Relying on its analysis in Kaufman IV, the
court explained that, although there were minor differences (in
scope, monitoring, and enforcement) between the easement
restrictions and the restrictions already imposed by local law,
those differences do not affect property values because a typical
118

The 1st Circuit also noted “Section 170(h) does not allow taxpayers to obtain six-figure deductions for gifts of
lesser or no value.”
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buyer would perceive no difference between the two sets of
restrictions. The court did not find the taxpayer’s appraisal, which
asserted a 16% diminution in the value of the properties, to be
credible. The appraiser who prepared the appraisal has been
barred from preparing any kind of appraisal report or otherwise
participating in the appraisal process for any property relating to
federal taxes.119
d. Importance of Good Appraisals. Donors should not rely on appraisals
that do not strictly comply with the qualified appraisal requirements or
use questionable valuation methods or bases. While failures to strictly
comply with the rules have been forgiven in some cases, in other cases
they have resulted in complete disallowance of the claimed deductions.
Moreover, even though an appraisal might be found to be a qualified
appraisal, if it is poorly written, employs questionable methods or bases,
or is otherwise unconvincing, it may nonetheless trigger an audit and, if
litigated, the donor may be found to have failed to provide sufficient
credible evidence of value.120 In situations where a donation has already
been made and satisfaction of the qualified appraisal requirements is an
issue on audit or in litigation, however, the decisions in Simmons II,
Scheidelman II, Friedberg II, Irby, and Zarlengo may be helpful.
e. IRC § 170(f)(11). Most of the cases that have been decided to date
involved donations made before (i) the effective date of § 170(f)(11)
(June 4, 2004), (ii) enactment of the Pension Protection Act of 2006,
which amended § 170(f)(11) to add statutory definitions of the terms
“qualified appraiser” and “qualified appraisal,” and (iii) the IRS’s issuance
of Notice 2006-96, which, among other things, provides transitional
guidance regarding § 170(f)(11)(E)’s definitions of qualified appraisal and
qualified appraiser. We can expect to see discussion of the statutory
requirements in § 170(f)(11) in future cases.121
2. Conservation Easement-Specific Valuation Rules. Donors should also strictly
comply with the conservation easement-specific valuation rules in Treasury
Regulation § 1.170A-14(h)(3), including the “contiguous parcel” and
“enhancement” rules.
a. Pursuant to the contiguous parcel rule,122 the amount of the deduction
in the case of a conservation easement covering a portion of contiguous
119

See Part I.O above.
For the IRS’s view of appraisals, see Nonprofit Law Professors Blog, IRS on Conservation Easement Appraisals, at
http://bit.ly/1UqHbTl.
121
See supra notes 100-104 and accompanying text (discussing these statutory requirements).
122
The contiguous parcel rule is found in the fourth sentence of Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(i).
120
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property owned by the donor and the donor's “family” is the difference
between the fair market value of the entire contiguous parcel before and
after the granting of the easement.
b. Pursuant to the enhancement rule,123 if the granting of a conservation
easement has the effect of increasing the value of any other property
owned by the donor or a “related person,” the amount of the deduction
must be reduced by the amount of the increase in the value of the other
property, whether or not such property is contiguous.
c. IRS Office of Chief Counsel Advice 201334039 (CCA) provides helpful
guidance on the application of the contiguous parcel and enhancement
rules.124
(i) The CCA discusses the meaning of the term “family” for
purposes of the contiguous parcel rule, the meaning of the term
“related person” for purposes of the enhancement rule, and rules
relating to constructive ownership and entity classification and
their impact on both the contiguous parcel and enhancement
rules. The CCA provides twelve examples of the application of
these rules to various situations involving property owned by
individuals and entities (LLCs, partnerships, and corporations).
(ii) The CCA also explains in a footnote that, for purposes of the
contiguous parcel rule, whether the entire contiguous parcel is
valued as one large property or as separate properties depends
on the highest and best use of the entire contiguous parcel.125
3. File Qualified Appraisal with Income Tax Return. Consistent with the IRS’s
informal suggestion, a copy of the qualified appraisal should be included in the
package filed with the income tax return on which a deduction for the easement
donation is first claimed even if the appraised value of the easement is $500,000
or less. If possible, the qualified appraisal should include a copy of the recorded
(date stamped) conservation easement deed. In all cases, the appraiser should
have valued the restrictions as they appear in the recorded easement deed
rather than in an earlier draft.
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The enhancement rule is found in the fifth sentence of Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(i).
IRS Chief Counsel Advice 201334039 (released Aug. 23, 2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irswd/1334039.pdf.
125
See Nonprofit Law Professors Blog, IRS on Conservation Easement Appraisals, at http://bit.ly/1UqHbTl (discussing
this issue).
124
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D. Contemporaneous Written Acknowledgment
1. No deduction is allowed for a charitable contribution of $250 or more unless
the taxpayer substantiates the contribution with a contemporaneous written
acknowledgment (CWA) obtained from the donee.126
2. A CWA must include the following information:
a. the amount of cash and a description (but not value) of any property
other than cash contributed,
b. whether the donee provided any goods or services in consideration, in
whole or in part, for the contributed property, and
c. if goods and services were provided, a description and good faith
estimate of the value of such goods or services.127
3. A CWA will be contemporaneous only if the taxpayer obtains it on or before
the earlier of
a. the date on which the taxpayer files a return for the taxable year in
which the contribution was made, or
b. the due date (including extensions) for the filing of such return.128
4. Failure of a donor to obtain a CWA cannot be cured by having the donee file a
Form 990 or any other form containing the required information.129
5. In Schrimsher and French, the Tax Court held that the conservation easement
deed could not serve as a CWA. See also Bruzewicz (letter identifying cash
contributions relating to façade easement donation was not a CWA; doctrine of
substantial compliance inapplicable) and Didonato (settlement agreement was
not a CWA). In Simmons I,130 Averyt, and RP Golf, LLC, however, the Tax Court
held that the conservation easement deed could serve as a CWA. And in Irby, the
Tax Court held that documents associated with the bargain sale of two
easements collectively constituted a CWA. In French, which is the most recent
case addressing this issue, the Tax Court distinguished Averyt and RP Golf, LLC,
and explained that a conservation easement deed can satisfy the “goods and
services” component of the CWA requirement in two ways: (i) the deed contains
a statement as to whether the donee provided goods or services for the
126

IRC § 170(f)(8)(A). While not a conservation easement donation case, Van Dusen v. Comm’r, 136 T.C. 515, available
at http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/InOpHistoric/VanDusen.TC.WPD.pdf, contains a detailed discussion of the CWA
requirement.
127
IRC § 170(f)(8)(B).
128
Id. § 170(f)(8)(C).
129
See IRS Chief Counsel Advice 201120022 (May 20, 2011), available at
http://www.us.kpmg.com/microsite/taxnewsflash/Exempt/2011/CCA201120022.pdf.
130
In Simmons I, Tax Court Judge Goeke stated that the easement deed could serve as a CWA. However, the donee in
Simmons had provided the donor with a separate letter that complied with the statutory CWA requirements, so it is
not clear why the Judge addressed the issue. The judge did not fully discuss whether or how the easement deed
satisfied the statutory CWA requirements.
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contribution or, (ii) if the deed does not contain such an explicit statement, the
deed as a whole contains sufficient information to allow the IRS to determine
whether taxpayers received consideration in exchange for the contribution.
Given the different holdings in the cases, donors should not rely on a
conservation easement deed or other documentation to serve as the CWA.
Rather, donors should always obtain a separate CWA from the donee.
6. Some government entities accepting conservation easement donations refuse
to provide donors with a CWA. Donors and their counsel should discuss this issue
early on with a prospective government holder. To address this issue and, in
general, to serve as both a good “safety valve” and a reminder to the parties,
some practitioners include a statement in the easement deed that (i) no goods
or services were provided in consideration for the easement (if that is the case)
and (ii) the donee agrees to provide the donor with the CWA required by IRC §
170(f)(8).
7. To justify the seeming harshness of the rule that failure to comply with the
CWA requirement is fatal to a claimed deduction, the Tax Court in French cited
Addis v. Commissioner, 374 F.3d 881, 887 (9th Cir. 2004), in which the 9th Circuit
explained that “[t]he deterrence value of section 170(f)(8)’s total denial of a
deduction comports with the effective administration of a self-assessment and
self- reporting system.”
E. Compelling and Timely Baseline Documentation
1. The regulations require that the donor make available to the donee, prior to
the time the donation is made, documentation sufficient to establish the
condition of the property at the time of the gift (“baseline documentation”).131
a. The baseline documentation must describe in detail the subject
property and its open space, habitat, scenic, historic, and other
conservation values. In addition, if the easement deed contains
restrictions with regard to a particular natural resource to be protected,
such as water quality or air quality, then the condition of that resource at
or near the time of the gift must also be established in the baseline
documentation.132
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See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(5)(i). Although this requirement is applicable only if the “donor reserves rights the
exercise of which may impair the conservation interests associated with the property,” that will almost always be the
case. Moreover, it is common practice and recommended that this requirement be satisfied with regard to every
conservation easement donation because it helps to ensure the holder will have the information needed to properly
enforce the easement.
132
Id. § 1.170A-14(g)(5)(i)(D).
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b. The baseline documentation must be accompanied by a statement
signed by the donor and a representative of the donee clearly referencing
the documentation and in substance stating: "This natural resources
inventory is an accurate representation of [the protected property] at the
time of the transfer" (referred to hereinafter as a “certification”).133
•

In some cases, the parties have drafted the certification to
provide that the parties agree the inventory (or baseline) may be
supplemented in the future (e.g., where the baseline is prepared
when the property is covered with snow). This has caused
problems on audit. The baseline must be fully completed prior to
the time the donation is made.

•

Assuming the baseline is timely completed, easement drafters
may want to include language in the easement deed confirming
that the baseline is complete and the parties agree that it is an
accurate representation of the protected property at the time of
the donation.

c. The baseline documentation should be detailed and compelling; it is
the donor’s best opportunity (as part of the tax filing) to persuade the IRS
that the property has important conservation or historic values worthy of
preservation. In some instances, easement donees are hiring qualified
consultants to put together comprehensive and extensive baseline
reports. Note that the Treasury Regulations actually put the burden of
delivery of the baseline on the donor (see E.1. above).
d. The baseline documentation is also critical for enforcement purposes;
it provides evidence of the condition of the property, including any
improvements, on the date of the donation. The Treasury Regulations
explain that the purpose of the baseline is to “protect the conservation
interests associated with the property, which although protected in
perpetuity by the easement, could be adversely affected by the exercise
of the reserved rights.”134 The baseline is thus essential to ensuring that
the conservation purpose of the easement is “protected in perpetuity,”
and failure to timely prepare a fully completed baseline could be fatal to
the deduction.
2. In Bosque Canyon Ranch, the Tax Court sustained the IRS’s disallowance of
deductions claimed for the donation of conservation easements to the North
American Land Trust (NALT). Among other failures to comply with § 170(h) and
133
134

Id.
Id. § 1.170A-14(g)(5)(i).
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the Treasury Regulations, the baseline documentation NALT prepared with
regard to the easements was not executed properly and was “unreliable,
incomplete, and insufficient to establish the condition of the relevant property
on the date the respective easements were granted.” The documentation was
also untimely, parts having been prepared well before and parts having been
prepared well after the date of the donations. The court noted that, in
“rambling, incoherent testimony,” NALT’s president “failed to clarify these
glaring inconsistencies.” The court also found meritless and rejected the
taxpayers’ argument that they had substantially complied with the baseline
documentation requirement.
The court further found that the taxpayers were not eligible for the reasonable
cause exception to the gross valuation misstatement penalty because they did
not act reasonably or in good faith with respect to the baseline documentation
requirement. The court noted that the taxpayers’ representative failed to
effectively supervise or review NALT’s “slipshod” preparation of the baseline
documentation and thereby failed to satisfy the taxpayers’ responsibility relating
to preparation of the documentation. Any reliance on NALT by taxpayers was
therefore unreasonable, said the court.
3. The IRS routinely asks for the baseline documentation on audit and has
informally recommended that easement donors include a copy of the baseline
documentation in the package filed with the income tax return on which a
deduction for the easement donation is first claimed. The baseline
documentation should be filed along with the tax return if it is a good, thorough,
and compelling report.
F. Correct and Timely Lender Agreement (if applicable)
1. Full Subordination is Advisable. In Kaufman III, the 1st Circuit vacated the Tax
Court’s holding in Kaufman I and Kaufman II that priority language in a lender
agreement impermissibly limited the operation of the “proceeds” clause
included in a facade easement to satisfy the requirements of Treasury Regulation
§ 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii).135 The lender agreement in Kaufman provided that, if the
easement were extinguished as a result of a casualty event (such as a fire or
flood) or condemnation, the bank holding an outstanding mortgage on the
property had first priority to any insurance or condemnation proceeds. The 1st
Circuit held that it was sufficient that the donee in Kaufman has a right to postextinguishment proceeds that is absolute against the owner of the burdened
property. Despite this ruling, donors should still obtain a lender agreement that
subordinates the lender’s rights to all of the rights of the holder under the
conservation easement, including the holder’s right to at least a minimum
135

Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii) contains a limited exception to the proceeds requirement with respect to
involuntary conversions if state law provides that the donor is entitled to all of the proceeds following such a
conversion.
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proportionate share of the proceeds received following extinguishment as
specified in Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii), for the following
reasons.136
a. Kaufman III is good law only in the 1st Circuit.
b. In footnote 5 of Kaufman III, the 1st Circuit noted that Treasury
Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(2) (the “mortgage subordination”
requirement) could be read broadly to require that a lender subordinate
its rights to the donee's right to post-extinguishment proceeds, which,
pursuant to Treasury Regulation § 1.170A–14(g)(6)(i), must be used to
advance conservation purposes.137 The 1st Circuit noted that it did not
pursue this issue because the IRS had “disclaimed” that broad reading of
paragraph (g)(2) in Kaufman III.
c. In Irby, decided after Kaufman III, the Tax Court noted
In cases involving a conservation easement where we determined
that the regulation's requirements were not met and thus denied
the claimed charitable contribution deduction, the grantee
organization had been prevented by the deeds themselves from
receiving the full proportionate value of the extinguishment
proceeds…. The funds diverted by the deeds were used to further
the donor taxpayer's interests. For example, in Wall, the deed of
conservation easement provided that if the property was
condemned, the grantee conservation organization would be
entitled to the easement's proportionate value, but only after any
claim of a mortgagee was satisfied. Hence, the first use of the
extinguishment proceeds was to further the donor taxpayer's
interest in repaying the mortgage on the property, with the
grantee conservation organization's receiving only a residual
136

For an example of such a “full” subordination clause, see the subordination agreement template of the Compact of
Cape Cod Conservation Trusts, which provides:
[Name and address of financial institution] ("Mortgagee"), present holder of a mortgage from, [donors]
("Mortgagor"), recorded on [date] in the [County] Registry of Deeds in Deed Book [ ] Page [ ], for
consideration paid, hereby recognizes and assents to the terms and provisions of a Conservation Restriction
running to the ___________ Conservation Trust, to be recorded herewith, and agrees to subordinate and
hold its mortgage subject to the terms and provisions of said Conservation Restriction to the same extent as
if said mortgage had been recorded subsequent to the recording of the Conservation Restriction, and the
undersigned shall, in the exercise of its rights pursuant to said instrument, recognize the terms and
provisions of the aforesaid Conservation Restriction.
137
The mortgage subordination regulation provides that no deduction will be permitted “unless the mortgagee
subordinates its rights in the property to the right of the qualified organization to enforce the conservation purposes
of the gift in perpetuity.” To enforce “the conservation purposes of the gift in perpetuity” (rather than just the original
easement) the holder must receive a share of proceeds upon extinguishment to be used “in a manner consistent with
the conservation purposes of the original contribution.” If a lender is given priority, it is possible that the holder will
receive nothing. Even if the holder is given a right as against the donor, the donor may be judgment proof.
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amount of money…. Our conclusions in those cases (i.e., denying
the deduction) reflect the purpose of the regulation.
Accordingly, it appears that the Tax Court might not follow Kaufman III in
cases that are not appealable to the 1st Circuit.
2. Mortgages Must be Subordinated at Time of Donation.
a. Mitchell. In Mitchell III, the 10th Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s
holding in Mitchell I and II that, to be eligible for a deduction for the
donation of a conservation easement under § 170(h), any outstanding
mortgages on the underlying property must be subordinated to the rights
of the holder of the easement at the time of the gift. This means the
lender agreement should be recorded at the same time as the
conservation easement.
(i) The Facts. The donor in Mitchell did not obtain a subordination
agreement from the lender holding an outstanding mortgage on
the subject property until almost two years following the date of
the donation. The IRS argued that the mortgage subordination
requirement in the Treasury Regulations is a bright-line
requirement that requires any existing mortgage to be
subordinated to the rights of the holder of the easement at the
time of the gift, irrespective of the likelihood of foreclosure or any
alternate safeguards. The IRS also asserted that subordination
must occur at the time of the gift because, without subordination,
the easement would be vulnerable to extinguishment upon
foreclosure and, thus, the conservation purpose would not be
protected in perpetuity as required under § 170(h). The 10th
Circuit agreed.
(ii) Deference to Commissioner. Citing to the U.S. Supreme Court’s
holding in Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United
States, 131 S.Ct. 704, 711 (2011), the 10th Circuit explained that,
because the Commissioner promulgated the regulations under
§ 170(h) pursuant to the authority granted to him by Congress,
the regulations are binding unless they are “arbitrary and
capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”
Where Congress has delegated to the Commissioner the power to
promulgate regulations, said the court, “we must defer to his
regulatory interpretations of the Code so long as they are
reasonable.’” Requiring existing mortgages to be subordinated to
conservation easements prevents extinguishment of the
easements in the event the landowners default on the mortgages.
60

In this way, said the 10th Circuit, the mortgage subordination
requirement is “reasonably related” to Congress’s mandate in
§ 170(h)(5)(A) that the conservation purpose of an easement be
“protected in perpetuity.”
•

The 10th Circuit also rejected the donor’s claim that the
mortgage subordination regulation is arbitrary and
capricious, and therefore unenforceable. Although
declining to consider that argument because it was raised
for the first time on appeal, the 10th Circuit noted that the
argument would fail because the regulation is “a
reasonable exercise of the Commissioner’s authority to
implement the statute.”

(iii) Subordination Must Be Timely. The donor argued that, since
the mortgage subordination regulation contains no explicit time
frame for compliance, it should be interpreted to allow for
subordination to occur at any time. The 10th Circuit rejected this
argument, noting that the regulation “expressly provides that
subordination is a prerequisite to allowing a deduction.” The 10th
Circuit further noted that, even if it were to view the regulation as
ambiguous with respect to timing, the result would be no
different because the court must defer to the Commissioner’s
reasonable interpretation on this point.
(iv) Functional Subordination Not Sufficient. The donor argued
that strict compliance with the mortgage subordination
requirement was unnecessary because the easement deed
allegedly contained sufficient safeguards to protect the
conservation purpose in perpetuity. The 10th Circuit rejected this
argument as inconsistent with the plain language of the mortgage
subordination provision. The court pointed out that the regulation
contains one narrow exception to the “unambiguous”
subordination requirement—for donations occurring prior to
1986.138 In the case of a pre-1986 donation, a taxpayer may be
entitled to a deduction without subordination if the taxpayer can
demonstrate that the conservation purpose is otherwise
protected in perpetuity. The negative implication of this express,
time-limited exception, said the court, is that no alternative to
subordination will suffice for post–1986 donations. The court thus
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The mortgage subordination requirement first appeared when the Treasury Regulations were finalized in 1986,
hence the 1986 effective date.
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declined to adopt a “functional” subordination rule for donations
occurring after 1986.
(v) Likelihood of Foreclosure Irrelevant. The donor argued that
strict compliance with the mortgage subordination requirement
was unnecessary in her case because the risk of foreclosure was
“so remote as to be negligible” (the partnership that donated the
easement apparently paid its debts on time and had sufficient
assets to satisfy in full the amounts due).139 The donor pointed to
Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(3), which provides that a
deduction will not be disallowed merely because the interest that
passes to the donee organization may be defeated by the
happening of some future event, “if on the date of the gift it
appears that the possibility that such … event will occur is so
remote as to be negligible.” She argued that this provision acts as
an exception to the mortgage subordination provision—i.e., that
because the risk of foreclosure in her case was arguably so remote
as to be negligible, failure to satisfy the mortgage subordination
requirement should be forgiven.
•

The 10th Circuit rejected this argument, holding that the
“so-remote-as-to-be-negligible” provision cannot be
reasonably read as modifying the strict mortgage
subordination requirement. In promulgating the rules,
explained the court, the Commissioner specifically
considered the risk of mortgage foreclosure to be neither
remote nor negligible, and therefore chose to target the
accompanying risk of extinguishment of the conservation
easement by strictly requiring mortgage subordination.

•

The 10th Circuit also noted that, even if the regulations
were unclear with respect to the interplay between the
mortgage subordination and remote future event
provisions, the donor would not prevail because the court
is required to defer to the Commissioner’s interpretation
to resolve any ambiguity unless it is “plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulations” or there is any other
“reason to suspect the interpretation does not reflect the
agency’s fair and considered judgment on the matter.”
“[I]t is reasonable,” said the court, “for the Commissioner
to adopt an easily-applied subordination requirement over
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A partnership of which Ms. Mitchell was a partner donated the easement. For convenience purposes, Ms. Mitchell
is referred to as the donor in this summary.
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a case-by-case, fact-specific inquiry into the financial
strength or credit history of each taxpayer.” The court
quoted a law review article in support of its holding:
The specific requirements in the Code and Treasury
Regulations establish bright-line rules that promote
efficient and equitable administration of the
federal tax incentive program. If individual
taxpayers could fail to comply with such
requirements and claim that their donations are
nonetheless deductible because the possibility of
defeat of the gift is so remote as to be negligible,
the Service and the courts would be required to
engage in an almost endless series of factual
inquiries with regard to each individual
conservation easement donation.140
b. Minnick. In Minnick III, the 9th Circuit similarly affirmed the Tax Court’s
holding in Minnick I that, to be eligible for a deduction for the donation of
a conservation easement, any outstanding mortgages on the underlying
property must be subordinated to the rights of the holder of the
easement at the time of the gift.
(i) Citing to Mitchell III, the 9th Circuit explained that the plain
language of the mortgage subordination regulation supports the
Tax Court’s interpretation. The regulation specifies that “no
deduction will be permitted … unless the mortgagee subordinates
its rights in the property.” Strictly construed, said the 9th Circuit,
that language makes clear that “subordination is a prerequisite to
allowing a deduction.” Since there was no dispute that Minnick’s
lender had not subordinated its rights in the subject property
when Minnick donated the easement at issue (despite warranties
in the easement deed to the contrary), under the plain meaning
of the regulation no deduction was permitted.
(ii) The 9th Circuit further explained that, even if the regulation
was deemed ambiguous, that would not change the outcome.
Under Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997), courts defer to the
IRS’s reasonable interpretation of its own regulations and, as
explained in Mitchell III, the IRS’s interpretation is reasonable and
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Nancy A. McLaughlin, Internal Revenue Code Section 170(h): National Perpetuity Standards for Federally Subsidized
Conservation Easements Part 1: The Standards, 45 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 473, 505–06 (2010).
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not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. The 9th
Circuit emphasized:
An easement can hardly be said to be protected ‘in
perpetuity’ if it is subject to extinguishment at essentially
any time by a mortgage holder who was not a party to,
and indeed (as here) may not even have been aware of,
the agreement between the Taxpayers and a [land] trust.
(iii) In Minnick II, an unpublished opinion issued the same day as
Minnick III, the 9th Circuit addressed the remaining issues in
Minnick, holding for the IRS on each point.
•

Like the 10th Circuit in Mitchell III, the 9th Circuit in Minnick II
held that the taxpayer’s failure to comply with the mortgage
subordination requirement could not be excused by invoking
the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible regulation; the so-remoteas-to-be-negligible provision does not override the mortgage
subordination requirement.

•

The Minnicks argued that their failure to obtain a timely
subordination agreement should be excused because there
was “verifiable evidence of original intent to enforce the
easement in perpetuity” in the easement deed, which
specifically stated that there were “no outstanding mortgages
... in the Property that have not been expressly subordinated
to the Easement.” The 9th Circuit rejected this argument,
explaining that, even if the statement in the deed evidenced
an intent to subordinate, intent is irrelevant. A mortgage must
be subordinated at the time of the gift.

•

The Minnicks argued that Idaho’s cy pres doctrine, which
“restricted the Minnicks from abandoning or otherwise
encumbering the easement,” adequately ensured that the
easement would continue in perpetuity and, thus, the
subordination requirement was satisfied. The 9th Circuit
rejected this argument, noting that the “cy pres doctrine is
inapplicable here because it has no effect on the ability of the
bank holding the unsubordinated mortgage to extinguish the
easement by foreclosure.” Cy pres would have no effect on
the ability of the bank to extinguish the easement in the event
of foreclosure because the easement had been granted to the
land trust subject to the mortgage and, thus, the bank’s rights
had priority over those of the land trust and the public.
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•

The Minnicks argued that the Tax Court improperly imposed a
20% negligence penalty on them under IRC § 6662(a). The 9th
Circuit rejected this argument, explaining that the Minnicks
did not have reasonable cause for claiming a deduction
because Mr. Minnick had a law degree and reading the
Treasury Regulations would have given him notice that
subordination may have been required.

(iv) Mr. Minnick (a former member of the U.S. House of
Representatives from Idaho) is suing his attorney for malpractice.
The Idaho Supreme Court recently ruled that the suit is not barred
by the statute of limitations.141
c. RP Golf, LLC. In RP Golf II, the Tax Court sustained the IRS’s
disallowance of a $16.4 million deduction for the donation of a
conservation easement on two private golf courses in Kansas City,
Missouri. Although the IRS challenged the claimed deduction on a
number of grounds (including failure to satisfy the conservation purposes
test, overvaluation, and the taxpayer’s lack of ownership of a portion of
the subject property), the court denied the deduction because the
taxpayer failed to obtain subordination agreements at the time of the gift
of the easement. The court considered and rejected the taxpayer’s
argument that the lenders had orally agreed to subordinate their
interests before the date of the gift, finding no evidence of a binding oral
or written agreement under state law. The court explained that, because
the easement could have been extinguished by foreclosure after the date
of the gift, the easement “was not protected in perpetuity and, therefore,
was not a qualified conservation contribution.”
d. So-Remote-As-To-Be-Negligible Unlikely to Cure Noncompliance With
Specific Requirements. Based on the holdings in Mitchell, Minnick, and
other cases,142 it seems unlikely that taxpayers will be able to excuse
141

Legal Malpractice Lawyer Blog, Minnick v. Ennis, No. 41663: Supreme Court of Idaho Remands Dismissal of Legal
Malpractice Case, http://www.legalmalpracticelawyer.com/2015/01/22/461/ (last visited April 25, 2015).
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In Mitchell III, the 10th Circuit noted that the D.C. Circuit in Simmons did not excuse the taxpayer from complying
with the mortgage subordination requirement, or excuse noncompliance with any express precondition to taking a
deduction contained in the regulations. Rather, it applied the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible provision to allow a
deduction despite the risk of noncompliance with § 1.170A–14’s more general perpetuity requirements.
Thus Simmons does not support an interpretation that the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible provision will excuse
noncompliance with the mortgage subordination provision’s plain and specific mandate that “no deduction will be
permitted ... unless” the mortgage is subordinated. The 10th Circuit also noted that Kaufman III similarly “provides
little guidance.” In Kaufman III the 1st Circuit held that a taxpayer was entitled to a deduction because the donation
satisfied the in perpetuity requirement, but it specifically declined to address whether the taxpayer had complied
with the mortgage subordination provision or to base its holding on the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible provision. In
Carpenter I, the Tax Court held that the “so-remote-as-to-be- negligible” provision does not modify Treasury
Regulation § 1.170A–14(g)(6)(i). Thus, failure to comply with the extinguishment requirements of Treasury Regulation
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noncompliance with any of the specific requirements in the Code or
Treasury Regulations by invoking the “so-remote-as-to-be-negligible”
regulation.

§ 1.170A–14(g)(6)(i) cannot be cured by a showing that the possibility of extinguishment is so remote as to be
negligible. And in Mitchell I, the Tax Court explained that the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible standard cannot be used
to avoid any of the following specific requirements: (i) Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(2)’s mortgage
subordination requirement, (ii) Treasury Regulation § 1.170A- 14(g)(6)(i)’s judicial proceeding requirement, or (iii)
Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii)’s proceeds requirement.
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III. Other Important Issues
A. IRS’s Renewed Focus on Valuation. Following the lead of the courts (see, e.g.,
Scheidelman, Kaufman, Mountanos, and Gorra), the IRS has renewed its focus on
easement valuation. In addition, as part of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (the PPA),
Congress expanded the circumstances under which penalties can be imposed for
overvaluations.
1. Penalty Provisions. Before the enactment of the PPA, a substantial valuation
misstatement (subject to a 20% penalty) existed if the value of property reported
on a tax return was two times (200%) or more of the amount determined to be
the correct value. A gross valuation misstatement (subject to a 40% penalty)
existed if the value reported on a tax return was four times (400%) or more of
the amount determined to be the correct value.143 Taxpayers could avoid these
penalties if they made the valuation misstatement in good faith and with
reasonable cause.
The PPA lowered the threshold from 200% to 150% for a substantial valuation
misstatement and from 400% to 200% for a gross valuation misstatement. The
PPA also eliminated the reasonable cause exception for gross valuation
misstatements of charitable deduction property, making that penalty a strict
liability penalty. The PPA further enacted new penalties for preparers of an
appraisal to be used to support a tax position if the appraisal results in a
substantial or gross valuation misstatement. 144 The PPA changes apply to
(i) returns filed after July 25, 2006, claiming deductions for façade easement
donations and (ii) returns filed after August 17, 2006, claiming deductions for
donations of easements encumbering land.145
Below is a sampling of court holdings regarding penalties.
a. Kaufman V. In Kaufman V, the 1st Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s
holding in Kaufman IV that the Kaufmans were liable for gross valuation
misstatement penalties for claiming a deduction “for a worthless historic
preservation easement on their home.” Because the Kaufmans’ returns
were filed before the effective date of the PPA, the gross valuation
misstatement penalty was not a strict liability penalty. However, the
Kaufmans were unable to avoid penalties by showing that they made a
good-faith investigation of the value of the easement or acted with
143

If the correct value of an easement is determined to be zero, the value claimed on the taxpayer’s return is deemed
to be 400% or more of the correct amount and, thus, a gross valuation misstatement. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662–5(g).
144
IRC § 6695A.
145
For an explanation of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA) changes, see Technical Explanation Of H.R. 4, The
"Pension Protection Act Of 2006," prepared by the JCT, JCX-38-06 (August 3, 2006), available at
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=select&id=20. See also Chandler (discussing the PPA effective dates).
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reasonable cause and in good faith. This was due, in large part, to the
following factors.
•

The Kaufmans represented in a letter to the lender holding an
outstanding mortgage on the subject property (for purposes of
obtaining a subordination agreement) that "[t]he easement
restrictions are essentially the same restrictions as those imposed by
current local ordinances that govern this property."

•

The Kaufmans used an appraiser that the donee—the National
Architectural Trust (NAT)—both recommended and taught to do
façade easement appraisals. NAT also suggested language for the
appraiser to include in his appraisals, which he incorporated "almost
verbatim" into all of his reports, regardless of the property involved.
The 1st Circuit further noted that the appraiser “at least arguably had
an incentive to calculate a high value for the easement, given that he
performed appraisals for [NAT] and [NAT] received cash donations
corresponding to a set percentage of the assessed value of the
donated easements.”

•

After receiving the appraisal indicating that the easement would
reduce the value of their home by $220,800 (or by 12%), Dr.
Kaufman, an emeritus professor of statistics at MIT, expressed
concern to NAT that the reduction in the resale value of the home
would be so large as to “overwhelm the tax savings” from the
donation. In a “smoking gun email,” NAT responded that façade
easements do not actually reduce the value of the properties they
encumber. Among other things, the email noted:
One of our directors, Steve McClain, owns fifteen or so
historic properties and has taken advantage of this tax
deduction himself. He would never have granted any
easement if he thought there would be a risk or loss of
value in his properties.

Despite the evidence indicating that the easement had no value, the
Kaufmans proceeded to claim a $220,800 deduction. The 1st Circuit
agreed with the Tax Court that “the Kaufmans should have recognized
obvious warning signs indicating that the appraisal's validity was subject
to serious question, and should have undertaken further analysis in
response.” The 1st Circuit further noted that the Tax Court did not
purport to equate “good faith investigation” with “exhaustive
investigation.” Rather, it “merely required that the Kaufmans do some
basic inquiry into the validity of an appraisal whose result was squarely
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contradicted by other available evidence glaringly in front of them.” The
Kaufmans were highly intelligent and very well educated, said the 1st
Circuit, 146 “and the Tax Court reasonably found that developments
casting doubt on the … appraisal should have alerted them that they
needed to take further steps to assess their ‘proper tax liability.’”
The 1st Circuit also noted that decisions in which the courts have
declined to impose penalties (Whitehouse, Chandler, Zarlengo, and
Scheidelman) were not inconsistent with its conclusion to impose
penalties in Kaufman V. In contrast to Kaufman, there were no “red flags”
in those other cases suggesting that the easements had no value.
b. Chandler. In Chandler, the Tax Court sustained the IRS’s complete
disallowance of deductions claimed with regard to two façade easement
donations on the same grounds as in Kaufman (i.e., the easements had
no value because the typical buyer would find the easement restrictions
no more burdensome than local historic preservation restrictions). The
taxpayers in Chandler claimed deductions with regard to the easement
donations on their 2004, 2005, and 2006 returns and, because the Tax
Court determined the easements had no value, the valuation
misstatement for each year was a gross valuation misstatement.
Chandler raised the novel issue of whether the taxpayers could assert the
reasonable cause defense for the underpayment on their 2006 return
(despite the PPA having made the gross valuation misstatement penalty a
strict liability penalty with regard to returns filed after August 17, 2006)
because the underpayment was the result of a carryover of deductions
from their 2004 return. The taxpayers argued that denying their right to
raise a reasonable cause defense with regard to their 2006 return would
amount to retroactively applying the PPA. The Tax Court disagreed,
noting that (i) the penalty statute as revised by the PPA by its plain
language applies to returns filed after a certain date and (ii) when the
taxpayers filed their 2006 return they “reaffirmed” the easement’s
grossly misstated value. For similar holdings, see Reisner and Mountanos
III.
The court in Chandler did, however, find that the taxpayers were not
liable for penalties for their 2004 and 2005 underpayments because they
underpaid with reasonable cause and in good faith. The IRS argued that
Mr. Chandler should have known the easements were overvalued
because he was well educated (he had a JD and an MBA). The Tax Court
disagreed, noting that even experienced appraisers find valuing
conservation easements difficult, and the flaws in the appraisals would
146

Mrs. Kaufman was a company president with a Ph.D. in psychology.
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not have been evident to the Chandlers. The court also distinguished
Kaufman because the Kaufmans had been assured by the donee that
their easement would not reduce the value of the property. In Chandler
there was no evidence that the taxpayers had similarly relied on
appraisals in bad faith.
c. Mountanos. In Mountanos I, the Tax Court held that the taxpayer was
not entitled to claim $3.39 million of carryover deductions for the
donation of a conservation easement because he failed to show that the
easement had any value. The statute of limitations had apparently run on
the return on which the taxpayer claimed a deduction for the year of the
donation. The court also sustained IRS’s imposition of strict liability gross
valuation misstatement penalties.
In Mountanos II, in what the Tax Court noted was “a calculated maneuver
to avoid the accuracy-related penalty,” the taxpayer asked the court to
consider the alternative grounds on which the IRS had argued for
disallowance of the deductions—namely that the taxpayer failed to
obtain a contemporaneous written acknowledgment or a qualified
appraisal. The Tax Court refused to consider these alternative grounds,
noting, in part, that the continued viability of the line of cases on which
the taxpayer relied for the proposition that an overvaluation penalty may
not be imposed when there is some other ground for disallowing a
deduction is in question after the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in U.S. v.
Woods, 134 S. Ct. 557 (2013).147 For a similar holding, see Bosque Canyon
Ranch.
In a short unpublished opinion, Mountanos III, the 9th Circuit affirmed
the Tax Court’s holdings that the taxpayer was not eligible for the
contested carryover deductions and was liable for strict liability gross
valuation misstatement penalties. Citing to Chandler, the 9th Circuit
rejected the landowner’s argument that not allowing him to raise the
reasonable cause defense for gross valuation misstatements with regard
to carryover deductions that related to a 2005 donation constituted an
improper retroactive application of the strict liability penalty.
d. Bosque Canyon Ranch. In Bosque Canyon Ranch, the Tax Court denied
$15.9 million of deductions claimed by partnerships for the donation of
conservation easements to the North American Land Trust (NALT) on two
grounds: (i) the easements permitted 47 unencumbered 5-acre
homesites to be moved around the subject properties (i.e., partial
147

In Woods, the Supreme Court held that the IRS's determination that a partnership was a sham was not
independent from a taxpayer's overstatement for purposes of the gross valuation misstatement penalty.
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extinguishments) with the holder’s approval (see Part II.A.7 above) and
(ii) the partnerships failed to provide the donee with adequate and timely
baseline documentation (see Part II.E above). The court also sustained
the IRS’s imposition of gross valuation misstatement penalties with
regard to the claimed deductions. The fact that the deductions were
disallowed for failure of the easements to qualify under IRC § 170(h)
rather than on overvaluation grounds did not matter. The Tax Court
explained that, in U.S. v. Woods, 134 S. Ct. 557 (2013), the U.S. Supreme
Court “reject[ed] the distinction between legal and factual valuation
misstatements."
Moreover, neither partnership was eligible for the reasonable cause
exception. One of the partnerships had filed its return after August 17,
2006, and, thus, the gross valuation misstatement penalty was a strict
liability penalty. In addition, even though the other partnership was
entitled to raise the reasonable cause defense (because it filed its return
before August 17, 2006), the court determined that it did not qualify for
the defense. Although the court found that the appraisal the partnership
used to substantiate its deduction was a qualified appraisal and the
partnership’s reliance on the appraisal constituted a good faith
investigation of the easement’s value, that was not good enough. The
court explained that the partnership “did not act reasonably or in good
faith with respect to the [baseline] documentation requirements.” The
baseline, which was prepared by NALT, was “insufficient, unreliable, and
incomplete.” The partnership failed to effectively supervise or review
NALT’s “slipshod preparation” of the baseline and therefore “failed to
satisfy its responsibility relating to the preparation of the
documentation.” The partnership also “failed to make any plausible
contentions sufficient to establish reasonable cause."
e. Gorra. In Gorra, the Tax Court rejected the taxpayers’ argument that
the gross valuation misstatement penalty was an “excessive fine” under
the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, noting that
such penalties are remedial in nature, not “punishments,” and are an
important tool because they enhance voluntary compliance with tax
laws.
f. Legg. In Legg, the Tax Court held that the IRS’s determination that the
Leggs were liable for strict liability 40% gross valuation misstatement
penalties was proper. The Leggs argued that the IRS examiner had not
made an “initial determination” of the 40% penalties as required by IRC
§ 6751(b)(1) because the examination report calculated the penalties
using the 20% rate and the 40% penalties were posed only as an
alternative position. The Tax Court disagreed, explaining that Congress
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enacted IRC § 6751(b) to ensure that taxpayers understand the penalties
imposed on them and the examination report sent to the Leggs clearly
explained why the Leggs were liable for the 40% penalties. Accordingly,
the IRS satisfied the procedural requirements of IRC § 6751(b) and
imposition of the 40% penalties was proper.
g. Carroll. In Carroll, the Tax Court sustained the IRS’s disallowance of
deductions claimed with regard to the donation of a conservation
easement because the easement contained a noncompliant “proceeds”
clause. The court also found that the taxpayers were liable for 20%
accuracy-related penalties and did not qualify for the reasonable cause
exception to those penalties. The court explained that one of the
taxpayers was a highly educated medical school graduate who had
previous experience with conservation easements; although the
taxpayers had hired an attorney to draft a related gift deed for the
subject property, that attorney was not a tax attorney and “d[id] not
answer tax-related questions or give tax advice;” the taxpayers offered
no evidence that would explain why the terms of the easement varied
from the proceeds requirement in the Treasury Regulation; and the
taxpayers did not explain why they failed to seek competent advice from
a tax attorney or other adviser to ensure that the easement complied
with the pertinent regulations. The court concluded that, in the light of
the high level of sophistication of one of the taxpayer's and his
experience with conservation easements, the taxpayers did not
demonstrate that they acted with reasonable cause and in good faith in
not seeking competent tax advice regarding the donation. The court
declined to impose substantial or gross valuation misstatement penalties,
however, because the IRS did not assert those penalties on a timely basis.
2. Battle of the Appraisers. When the value of a conservation easement is
challenged, the case often involves a “battle of the appraisers.”
a. Courts no longer take the two appraisals from the expert witnesses
and “split the baby.” Instead, courts generally weigh the evidence offered
by each expert and come to their own conclusions regarding value. In a
battle of the appraisers, the credibility of the appraiser and the appraisal
report is of paramount importance, and extensive experience in the
relevant local market—“geographic competence”—can also be key.
b. In Boltar, the Tax Court granted the IRS’s motion in limine to exclude
from evidence the report and testimony of the donor’s valuation expert
as unreliable and irrelevant, citing to the Federal Rules of Evidence and
the decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993),
in which the United States Supreme Court stressed the “gatekeeper”
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function of a trial court. The court noted that the report was “so far
beyond the realm of usefulness that admission is inappropriate and
exclusion serves salutary purposes.”
c. In U.S. v. Richey, 632 F.3d 559 (9th Cir. 2011), the 9th Circuit held that
the attorney-client privilege did not extend to documents in a
conservation easement appraiser’s work file that were not made for the
purpose of providing legal advice. The work file was also not protected by
the work-product doctrine because it was not “prepared or obtained
because of the prospect of litigation.”
d. In U.S. v. Clower, No. 1:16-cv-651-TCB (N.D. Ga. April 29, 2016), a U.S.
District Judge granted the IRS’s petition to enforce a broad summons
served on an appraiser. The summons requested, among other things, all
documents reflecting the customers for whom the appraiser prepared or
approved conservation or historic easement appraisals during the period
beginning January 1, 2010, through the present, and all appraisal work
files for such appraisals (see Part I.W above).
3. Valuation Case Law. For a comprehensive discussion of conservation and
facade easement valuation rules and the relevant valuation case law through
2015, see Nancy A. McLaughlin, Conservation Easements and the Valuation
Conundrum.148
B. IRS Focus on Partnerships/Syndicated Deals. In Notice 2004-41, the IRS stated that it
intended to review promotions of transactions involving improper deductions for
conservation easement conveyances, and that promoters, appraisers, and other persons
involved in these transactions may be subject to penalties.149 The IRS has also informally
indicated that it intends to focus attention on “syndicated” conservation easement
donation transactions. The IRS has a number of weapons in its arsenal that can be used
to attack such syndicated transactions.
1. IRS Weapons.
a. Economic Substance Doctrine. Most syndicated tax deduction
transactions are arguably nothing more than the sale of income tax
deductions, with no economic substance and no economic risk to the
investors. Pursuant to IRC § 7701(o), a transaction generally is treated as
having economic substance only if (i) the transaction changes in a
meaningful way (apart from Federal income tax effects) the taxpayer’s
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Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2704576.
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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economic position and (ii) the taxpayer has a substantial purpose (apart
from Federal income tax effects) for entering into the transaction.
b. Partnership Allocation Rules. For partnership allocations to be
respected they must either (i) be made in accordance with the partners’
interests in the partnership or (ii) meet the requirements for the
“substantial economic effect” safe harbor. If allocations do not have
substantial economic effect, they will be reallocated according to the
partners’ interests in the partnership. These rules are intended to
prevent partners from allocating partnership items based on purely tax
rather than economic consequences.150
Many syndicated conservation easement donation transactions involve
“special allocations”—i.e., an investor purchases a small percentage
interest in a partnership or limited liability company (LLC), but is then
allocated a much larger percentage of the deduction (or, in some cases,
tax credits) generated by the partnership’s donation of a conservation
easement. For example, an investor might purchase a 10% interest in a
partnership, but then be allocated 50% of the deduction generated by
the partnership’s easement donation. This could be referred to as an
“explicit” special allocation; it occurs by virtue of specific terms in the
partnership or LLC agreement. In some syndicated conservation
easement donation transactions it could be argued that there is an
“implicit” special allocation. For example, assume the asset in the
partnership (or LLC) has a fair market value of $5 million, an investor
purchases a 10% interest in the partnership (with a pro rata value of
$500,000) for $100,000, and the investor is allocated 10% of the
conservation easement deduction. For the $100,000 purchase price, the
investor arguably purchased only a 2% interest in the partnership but was
nonetheless allocated 10% of the deduction. These types of special
allocations may be attacked on the ground that they lack “substantial
economic effect.”
c. Disguised Sales Rules. In each of SWF Real Estate, LLC, and Route 231,
LLC v. Comm’r, 810 F.3d 247 (4th Cir. 2016), the IRS successfully invoked a
different tax avoidance principle—the “disguised sales” rules under IRC §
707—to attack the special allocation of state income tax credits
generated by a partnership’s donation of a conservation easement. The
courts held that each partnership’s transfer to a 1% partner of more than
90% of the state income tax credits generated by the donation was a
taxable disguised sale. In Route 231, LLC, the 4th Circuit explained that
150

See IRS, Partnership Audit Techniques Guide, Chapter 6 – Partnership Allocations, available at
http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Partnerships/Partnership---Audit-Technique-Guide---Chapter-6---PartnershipAllocations-(Revised-12-2007).
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IRC § 707 “prevents use of the partnership provisions to render
nontaxable what would in substance have been a taxable exchange if it
had not been ‘run through’ the partnership.”
Most recently, in Bosque Canyon Ranch, the Tax Court held that two
partnerships’ transfers of 5-acre homesites on a shared-amenities ranch
to limited partners in exchange for purported “capital contributions”
were, in fact, taxable disguised sales. The court found that the
distributions of the 5-acre homesites to the limited partners were made
in exchange for the limited partners’ payments and were not subject to
the entrepreneurial risks of the partnerships’ operations. Accordingly, the
partnerships were required to recognize and include in their gross
income any gains relating to the disguised sales. The Tax Court also
denied the deductions claimed by the partnerships for the donation of
conservation easements with respect to the ranch for failure to satisfy
the perpetuity and baseline documentation requirements.
2. Land Trust Alliance on Syndicated Deals. The Land Trust Alliance distributed
an “Important Advisory” and other information and resources to its constituent
land trusts to help them identify and mitigate threats from abusive syndicated
transactions.151 The Alliance notes that “[f]ederal tax benefits resulting from the
donation of a conservation easement cannot be sold by one taxpayer to
another” and “[t]he Alliance stands against such tax schemes….” The Alliance
describes the abusive transactions as follows:
outside investors fund land acquisition through various partnerships or
limited liability companies. After a short holding period, the entities
donate conservation easements to land trusts and claim deductions
based on appraised values of the conservation easements that are
significantly in excess (often by three to ten times) of the original
acquisition prices.
This results in exaggerated tax benefits to the investors that are worth
significantly more than the investors’ initial investments. Typically,
promoters organize these transactions in return for high fees. Sometimes
promoters offer extraordinary stewardship donations to the participating
land trusts.152
The Alliance has recommended that “member land trusts evaluate their existing
easement acquisition policies and procedures and incorporate…Cautionary
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See Land Trust Alliance, For Land Trusts, Syndication, http://www.landtrustalliance.org/taxonomy/term/150.
Land Trust Alliance, Important Advisory: Syndication, http://www.landtrustalliance.org/node/590.
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Measures to assure that they do not facilitate or participate in abusive
transactions.”153
For a proposed legislative fix to the syndication problem, see Stephen J. Small, A
Modest Legislative Proposal to Shut Down Specific Tax Shelters, Tax Notes Special
Report (May 23, 2016).154
C. Date of Donation and Recordation Date. Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(1)
provides that
any interest in the property retained by the donor (and the donor’s successors in
interest) must be subject to legally enforceable restrictions (for example, by
recordation in the land records of the jurisdiction in which the property is
located) that will prevent uses of the retained interest inconsistent with the
conservation purposes of the donation.
The donor of a conservation easement should see to it that the easement is recorded in
the year in which the donor intends to claim the donation was made. Absent
recordation of an easement, a purchaser of the subject property who records the
purchase deed will generally take the property free of the easement. In addition, many
state conservation easement enabling statutes specifically require recordation for an
easement to be legally enforceable.155 Accordingly, absent recordation in the year of the
purported donation, the IRS can argue that the easement was not “granted in
perpetuity” and its conservation purpose was not “protected in perpetuity” in that year.
1. IRS’s Position on Recordation. The IRS’s position on recordation is set forth in
the Conservation Easement Audit Techniques Guide.156 The Guide instructs that
the complete deed of conservation easement (including all exhibits or
attachments, such as a description of the easement restrictions, diagrams, and
lender agreements) must be recorded in the appropriate recordation office in
the county where the property is located and, under state law, an easement is
not enforceable in perpetuity before it is recorded.157 The Guide further instructs
that the effective date of the gift is the recording date, and provides the
following as an example:
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Id. (emphasis in original).
Available at http://www.stevesmall.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/Small-05-23-2016.pdf.
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For example, the Uniform Conservation Easement Act provides that “[n]o right or duty in favor of or against a
holder and no right in favor of a person having a third-party right of enforcement arises under a conservation
easement before its acceptance by the holder and a recordation of the acceptance.” Uniform Conservation Easement
Act § 2(b) (Last Revised or Amended in 2007), available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/conservation_easement/ucea_final_81%20with%2007amends.pdf.
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A conservation easement was granted to a qualified organization on
December 20, 2007, as evidenced by the dated signatures on the
conservation easement deed. However, the easement was not recorded
in the public records until March 12, 2008. The year of donation is
2008.158
2. Case Law.
a. Gorra. Gorra involved a donation to the National Architectural Trust
(NAT) of a façade easement on a building in the Carnegie Hill Historic
District of New York City. NAT delivered the easement to the recorder’s
office on December 28, 2006, paid the recording fees and taxes, and
obtained a receipt for the delivery. Due to a cover sheet error, however,
the easement was not recorded until January 18, 2007. The IRS argued
that the deed was not recorded until 2007. The Tax Court disagreed,
holding that, under New York law, delivery of the deed to the recorder’s
office, with receipt acknowledged, constituted recordation, even though
there was a delay in the actual recording until the following year because
of the cover sheet error. The court cited N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 317, which
provides that every instrument entitled to be recorded is considered
recorded from the time of delivery to the recording officer.
b. Zarlengo. Zarlengo involved a donation to NAT of a façade easement
on a building in a Manhattan historic district. The easement donors and
NAT signed the easement in 2004, NAT sent the donors a letter thanking
them for the donation in 2004, and the donors claimed deductions for
the donation on their 2004 returns. For reasons not explained in the Tax
Court’s opinion, however, the easement was not recorded until January
26, 2005. The IRS argued that the taxpayers were not entitled to
deductions in 2004 because the façade easement was neither (i) a
“qualified real property interest” as defined in § 170(h)(2)(C) (i.e., “a
restriction (granted in perpetuity) on the use which may be made of the
real property”) nor (ii) donated exclusively for conservation purposes as
required under § 170(h)(5) (i.e., the conservation purpose of the
easement was not “protected in perpetuity”) in 2004.
In analyzing these issues, the Tax Court first reiterated the well settled
rule that, “[i]n a Federal tax controversy, State law controls the
determination of a taxpayer’s interest in property while the tax
consequences are determined under Federal law.” Accordingly, New York
law governed when the taxpayers’ donation of the façade easement was
regarded as complete, but Federal tax law determined the tax
158
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consequences. Because New York law provides that conservation
easements in the state have no legal effect unless they are recorded, the
court found that the façade easement was not effective until January 26,
2005.159 Unlike in Gorra, the façade easement in Zarlengo presumably
was not delivered to the recording office in 2004 and thus, was not
considered recorded in that year.
The Tax Court further explained that, even assuming the façade
easement had been legally enforceable by NAT against the donors in
2004 because both parties signed the easement that year, the easement
still would not have satisfied the perpetuity requirements in 2004
“because neither the use restriction nor the conservation purpose of the
conservation easement was protected in perpetuity until January 26,
2005.” The court explained that, if a buyer had purchased the subject
townhouse and recorded the purchase deed before January 26, 2005, the
buyer would have taken the townhouse free and clear of the
conservation easement. Moreover, the possibility that this could have
occurred was not so remote as to be negligible.
The Tax Court concluded that the donors in Zarlengo were not entitled to
deductions on their 2004 returns because the perpetuity requirements
were not satisfied in 2004, and it followed that the donors were also not
entitled to carryover deductions on subsequent years’ returns. However,
the IRS had acknowledged that the easement could be considered “made
in perpetuity” in 2005 for purposes of § 170(h)(2)(C) and (5)(A) because
the easement was recorded in that year, and the Tax Court determined
that “both the use restriction and the conservation purpose of the
conservation easement were protected in perpetuity as of January 26,
2005.” Accordingly, given that the other requirements of § 170(h) and the
substantiation requirements were satisfied, the donors’ tax liability for
2005, 2006, and 2007 could be redetermined assuming the donation had
been made in 2005.160
c. Mecox. Mecox involved a donation to NAT of a façade easement on a
building in New York’s Greenwich Village Historic District. The donor (the
Mecox partnership) and NAT signed the easement in December 2004 and
Mecox claimed a $2.21 million deduction for the donation on its 2004
partnership tax return. However, the easement was not recorded until
159

The Tax Court held similarly in Rothman I.
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November 17, 2005, almost one year later. The IRS disallowed the
claimed deduction in full, arguing that (i) the contribution was not made
until 2005, the year in which the easement was recorded, and (ii) the
appraisal was not timely because it was made more than 60 days before
the date of the contribution. The U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York held for the IRS on both counts.
As in Zarlengo and Rothman I, the District Court found that, as a matter
of law, Mecox had not made a charitable contribution of the façade
easement in 2004 because the easement was not effective under New
York law until it was recorded in November 2005. The District Court
further explained that, even if the court were to accept that the date the
easement was contributed was the date of the delivery of the deed to
NAT, the easement still did not satisfy § 170(h)’s definition of a “qualified
conservation contribution” until the easement was recorded in 2005 (i.e.,
the conservation purpose of the contribution was not “protected in
perpetuity” and the underlying property was not “subject to legally
enforceable restrictions” until 2005). Absent recordation, a purchaser of
the property who recorded the purchase deed would take the property
free of the easement.
Mecox argued that, because the easement did not specifically reference
the New York conservation easement enabling statute, that statute did
not apply and the easement was a common law restrictive covenant that
does not require recordation to be effective. The court dismissed that
argument, finding that there was “no question” that the easement fell
under the New York enabling statute’s definition of a conservation
easement.
Failure to record the easement until November 2005 also rendered
Mecox’s appraisal untimely. The appraisal was dated June 13, 2005, and
estimated the value of the easement as of November 1, 2004. The court
found that the appraisal was “conducted” on June 13, 2005, but the
easement was not “contributed” to the National Architectural Trust
(NAT) until it was recorded on November 17, 2005 (5 months later).
Accordingly, the appraisal “took place” more than 60 days before the
contribution date and thus, did not satisfy the timing requirement in
Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-13(c)(3)(i).
3. The Finer Points of Delivery and Recording. In many jurisdictions, where the
recording offices are backed up, a document may be delivered to the recording
office in December but not recorded by the office staff until January or even
later. As explained in the discussion of Gorra above, in some states, like New
York, delivery to the recording office constitutes recording, but that may not be
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the rule in all states. In addition, many conservation easement deeds have an
“effective date” provision that says the easement is effective when it is signed
and recorded. Legal counsel to donors should consider whether it would be
prudent to instead include a provision in an easement deed stating that the
easement is effective when the deed is signed and “delivered for recording.” In
addition, the person who delivers the signed easement deed to the recording
office should obtain a date-stamped copy indicating the delivery date. At the
very least, easement holders, donors, and their advisors should be aware of this
issue.
D. Quid Pro Quo. A charitable contribution is not deductible if it is structured as a quid
pro quo exchange.161 Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(i) provides:
•

If, as a result of the donation of a [conservation easement], the donor or a
related person receives, or can reasonably expect to receive, financial or
economic benefits that are greater than those that will inure to the general
public from the transfer, no deduction is allowable under this section.

•

However, if the donor or a related person receives, or can reasonably expect
to receive, a financial or economic benefit that is substantial, but it is clearly
shown that the benefit is less than the amount of the transfer, then a
deduction under this section is allowable for the excess of the amount
transferred over the amount of the financial or economic benefit received or
reasonably expected to be received by the donor or the related person.162

1. Pollard. In Pollard, the Tax Court sustained the IRS’s disallowance of a
deduction of more than $1 million claimed with respect to a conservation
easement conveyance because the conveyance was part of a quid pro quo
161

Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 681 (1989) (“The legislative history of the ‘contribution or gift’ limitation
reveals that Congress intended to differentiate between unrequited payments to qualified recipients, which are
deductible, and payments made to such recipients with some expectation of a quid pro quo in terms of goods or
services, which are not deductible.”).
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“payments made by the taxpayer for the restoration and maintenance of the historic mansion and its grounds are not
deductible as charitable contributions ... unless the taxpayer can establish that the payments exceed the monetary
value of all benefits received or expected to be received”). See also United States v. Amer. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S.
105 (1986) (“The sine qua non of a charitable contribution is a transfer of money or property without adequate
consideration. The taxpayer, therefore, must at a minimum demonstrate that he purposely contributed money or
property in excess of the value of any benefit he received in return.”); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(h)(1) (“No part of a
payment that a taxpayer makes to or for the use of an organization described in section 170(c) that is in consideration
for ... goods or services ... is a contribution or gift within the meaning of section 170(c) unless the taxpayer—(i)
Intends to make a payment in an amount that exceeds the fair market value of the goods or services; and (ii) Makes a
payment in an amount that exceeds the fair market value of the goods or services.”); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(h)(2)(i)
(“The charitable contribution deduction under section 170(a) for a payment a taxpayer makes partly in consideration
for goods or services may not exceed the excess of - (A) The amount of any cash paid and the fair market value of any
property (other than cash) transferred by the taxpayer to an organization described in section 170(c); over (B) The fair
market value of the goods or services the organization provides in return.”).
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exchange. The taxpayer had purchased a 67-acre parcel in Boulder County,
Colorado, and had to obtain approval from the county to increase the property’s
building density. After public hearings, the board of county commissioners
agreed to grant the taxpayer’s subdivision exemption request, which allowed the
property to be split into two residential lots, provided the taxpayer granted a
conservation easement encumbering the property to the county.
a. The taxpayer in Pollard maintained that no quid pro quo arrangement
existed, arguing, among other things, that approval of his subdivision
exemption request had been “virtually guaranteed,” that the land use code
sections governing his exemption request did not require the grant of a
conservation easement, and that all documents relating to the grant of the
easement referred to it as a “gift.” One of the county commissioners even
wrote a letter to the taxpayer (apparently at the taxpayer’s request in
preparation for the Tax Court trial) stating that, to the best of his
recollection, he did not require the taxpayer to grant the easement in
exchange for the subdivision exemption.
The Tax Court was not persuaded. Based on its examination of the “external
features of the transaction,” the court found that the subdivision exemption
request was far from being virtually guaranteed and, in fact, had little chance
of being granted without the taxpayer’s promise to grant the easement.163
The taxpayer also did not establish that the value of the easement he
conveyed to the county exceeded the value of the subdivision exemption
granted to him, or that he intended to make a charitable contribution.164
b. The Tax Court sustained the IRS’s imposition of an accuracy-related
penalty in Pollard, finding that the taxpayer did not act with reasonable
cause and in good faith in claiming the deduction. The evidence produced at
trial, said the court, demonstrated that all of the parties involved understood
that the easement was contributed for the express purpose of encouraging
the county to grant the taxpayer a subdivision exemption, and it would be
unreasonable for the court to believe that anyone involved in the transaction
(i.e., the taxpayer, his advisers, or the county commissioners) believed there
was an unrequited contribution.165
163

In ascertaining whether a given payment is a contribution or gift, or is made with the expectation of quid pro quo,
the IRS and the courts examine “the external features of the transaction,” thus avoiding the need to conduct an
imprecise inquiry into the motivations of individual taxpayers. Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 701–702 (1989).
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See supra note 162.
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See also Boone v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 2013-101 (conveyance of fill to city not a deductible charitable contribution
because taxpayer failed to meet its burden of proving that the fair market value of the fill exceeded the fair market
value of the consideration received in exchange); Perlmutter v. Comm’r, 45 T.C. 311 (1965) (transfers of land to school
districts and a recreation district in accordance with zoning regulations were not charitable contributions); Ottawa
Silica Co. v. U.S., (Ct. Cl. Trial Div.), 49 A.F.T.R.2d 82-1162, 82-1 USTC P 9308 (“It is ... quite apparent that plaintiff
conveyed the land to the school district fully expecting that as a consequence of the construction of public access
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2. Seventeen Seventy Sherman Street. In Seventeen Seventy Sherman Street, the
Tax Court sustained the IRS’s complete disallowance of an LLC's claimed $7.15
million deduction for the conveyance of interior and exterior easements
restricting the use of a shrine in Denver, Colorado, because the conveyance was
part of a quid pro quo exchange. The shrine is listed on the National Register of
Historic Places and as a historic landmark by the City and County of Denver. The
LLC owned two properties on Sherman Street—the shrine and a parking lot. Prior
to granting the easements, the LLC and the City of Denver entered into a
development agreement in which, among other things, the LLC agreed to convey
the easements to Historic Denver and rehabilitate the shrine in exchange for
certain zoning changes to the shrine and the parking lot.
a. The Tax Court’s opinion detailed the following elements of a quid pro quo
analysis in the charitable deduction context.
• A taxpayer's contribution is deductible ‘only if and to the extent it
exceeds the market value of the benefit received.’
• ‘[t]he sine qua non of a charitable contribution is a transfer of money
or property without adequate consideration.’
• ‘a charitable gift or contribution must be a payment made for
detached and disinterested motives. This formulation is designed to
ensure that the payor’s primary purpose is to assist the charity and
not to secure some benefit personal to the payor.’
• The consideration received by the taxpayer need not be financial.
Medical, educational, scientific, religious, or other benefits can be
consideration that vitiates charitable intent.
• In ascertaining whether a given payment was made with the
expectation of anything in return, courts examine the external
features of the transaction. This avoids the need to conduct an
imprecise inquiry into the motivations of individual taxpayers.
• The taxpayer claiming a deduction must, at a minimum, demonstrate
that “he purposely contributed money or property in excess of the
value of any benefit he received in return.”
• Thus, a taxpayer who receives goods or services in exchange for a
contribution of property may still be entitled to a charitable
deduction if the taxpayer (1) makes a contribution that exceeds the
fair market value of the benefits received in exchange and (2) makes
the excess payment with the intention of making a gift.166
• If the taxpayer satisfies these requirements, the taxpayer is entitled
to a deduction not to exceed the fair market value of the property the

roads through its property it would receive substantial benefits in return”); Small, Real Estate Developers and
Conservation Easements—Not as Simple as it Sounds, 19-JUN PROB. & PROP. 24 (2005).
166
See supra note 162.
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taxpayer transferred less the fair market value of the goods or
services received.167
b. The Tax Court explained that a quid pro quo analysis in the conservation
easement donation context ordinarily requires two parts—(1) valuation of
the contributed conservation easement and then (2) valuation of the
consideration received in exchange for the easement. The court explained,
however, that when a taxpayer grants a conservation easement as part of a
quid pro quo exchange and fails to identify or value all of the consideration
received, the taxpayer is not entitled to a deduction because he failed to
comply with IRC § 170 and the regulations. In such a case, it is unnecessary to
determine either the value of the easement or whether the taxpayer made
an excess payment with the intention of making a gift. The taxpayer’s failure
to identify or value all of the consideration received and, thus, to prove that
the value of the easement exceeded the value of the consideration is fatal to
the deduction.168
c. In Seventeen Seventy Sherman Street, the Tax Court found that the LLC had
received two types of consideration in exchange for its conveyance of the
interior and exterior easements:
•

•

a zoning change that eliminated authorization to develop residential
condominium units within the shrine but also permitted development
on the parking lot up to 650 feet, subject to a “view plane” restriction
of 155 feet (a view plane restriction limits the height of buildings from
a specified view point within Denver's city park and is meant to
preserve the view of the Rocky Mountain Skyline from that view
point), and
the Denver Community Planning and Development Agency’s
recommendation to the Denver Planning Board to approve a view
plane variance (which variance was ultimately approved).

On its 2003 tax return, however, the LLC claimed a $7.15 million charitable
deduction for its conveyance of the easements and made no adjustment for
the consideration it received in exchange. At trial, the LLC conceded that it
had received the zoning change in exchange for its conveyance of the
easements and argued that its deduction should be reduced by just over $2
167

See Id.
See also Cohan v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2012-8, in which the Tax Court upheld the IRS’s complete disallowance of a
charitable income tax deduction claimed with respect to a bargain sale transaction because the contemporaneous
written acknowledgment (CWA) the donee provided to the donor did not include a description or good faith estimate
of the total consideration provided to the donor, and the donor’s reliance on the CWA was therefore unreasonable.
The court explained that “the deterrence value of § 170(f)(8)’s total denial of a deduction comports with the effective
administration of a self-assessment and self-reporting system.”
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million as a result. The LLC also asserted that the Planning and Development
Agency’s recommendation to the Planning Board to approve a view plane
variance was either not consideration received in exchange for the grant of
the easements, or was consideration but had no real value. The Tax Court
disagreed, finding that the Agency’s view-plane-variance recommendation
was consideration and had substantial value. The court concluded that the
LLC’s failure to identify or value all of the consideration received, or to
provide any credible evidence to permit the court to accurately value all of
the consideration received, was fatal to the deduction.
d. Also notable is that the consideration the LLC received in exchange for its
conveyance of the easements did not come from the donee, Historic Denver,
but instead came from the City of Denver. The IRS argued that the LLC failed
to substantiate its claimed deduction because it failed to (i) obtain a
contemporaneous written acknowledgment (CWA) meeting the
requirements of IRC § 170(f)(8) or (ii) disclose that the contribution was part
of a bargain sale on Form 8283. The LLC argued that IRC § 170(f)(8) requires a
donor to obtain a CWA providing a good-faith estimate of the value of the
consideration received from the donee (i.e., Historic Denver), and it received
no consideration from Historic Denver. The LLC also argued that the grant of
the easements to Historic Denver was not a bargain sale because it received
no consideration from Historic Denver and, thus, it was not required to
report the conveyance as a bargain sale on the Form 8283. The Tax Court
found these contentions “dubious.” The court noted that the grant of the
easements was a complex negotiation among the LLC, the city, and Historic
Denver, and Historic Denver's role was largely as the city's designee to hold
the easements. The court thus generally found persuasive the IRS’s argument
that the consideration received should have been disclosed on the CWA and
the Form 8283. However, because the court denied the deduction in full on
quid pro quo grounds, it did not decide these substantiation issues.
e. The Tax Court also agreed with the IRS that the LLC was liable for the
accuracy-related penalty because it acted negligently or in disregard of the
requirements of § 170 and the regulations. “Negligence,” said the court, is
strongly indicated where a taxpayer fails to make a reasonable attempt to
ascertain the correctness of a deduction that would seem to a reasonable
and prudent person to be “too good to be true.” And a taxpayer acts with
“disregard” when, among other things, he does not exercise reasonable
diligence to determine the correctness of a return position. The LLC
conveyed the easements as part of a quid pro quo exchange but reported the
conveyance on its 2003 return as a charitable contribution without making
any adjustment for the consideration it received in exchange. The court
found that the LLC acted negligently or with disregard because it did not
make a reasonable attempt to ascertain the correctness of the deduction.
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The LLC argued that it was eligible for the reasonable cause and good faith
exception to the penalty because it relied on professional advice. The Tax
Court disagreed. Although the LLC had consulted with a tax attorney
regarding the conveyance, that attorney testified at trial that he had advised
the LLC that it had to reduce the value of its deduction by the consideration
received in the quid pro quo exchange. The Tax Court noted that it would be
unreasonable for the court to believe that at the time of the contribution or
at the time of filing the LLC’s return either the LLC or its advisers believed
that the contribution of the easements was an unrequited contribution or
that the consideration received had no value. Consequently, the LLC's
disregard of the attorney’s advice was not reasonable and in good faith, and
the LLC could not rely on the professional advice of the attorney to negate
the penalty.
3. Costello. In Costello, taxpayers conveyed a conservation easement to Howard
County, Maryland, in exchange for the right to sell 16 development rights to a
developer pursuant to the County’s transfer of development rights program. The
right to sell the development rights was conditioned on the conveyance of the
easement, which prohibited any future development of the subject property. In
filing their tax return and claiming a deduction for the conveyance of the
easement, the taxpayers failed to indicate that they had received the right to sell
the development rights (and $2.5 million on their sale) as a result of the
conveyance. The Tax Court held that, even if the taxpayers had complied with
the qualified appraisal and appraisal summary requirements (which they did
not), the court would nonetheless disallow the deduction because the easement
was conveyed as part of a quid pro quo exchange.
The taxpayers argued that easement’s value exceeded the $2.5 million of
consideration they received in exchange for its conveyance (in the form of
proceeds from their sale of the 16 development rights). The Tax Court dismissed
that argument because (i) the taxpayers failed to provide evidence that the
property could have been developed into more than 16 lots and (ii) the
taxpayers could not sell the 16 development rights until they had placed the
easement on the property and, once they did, all future development was
prohibited, so there was no “excess” development potential that they could have
contributed to the County in the form of a bargain sale.
The Tax Court sustained the IRS’s imposition of accuracy-related penalties in
Costello, explaining, in part, that the taxpayers “knew or reasonably should have
known” that the sale of the development rights for $2.5 million was relevant in
determining the deduction to which they would be entitled.
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4. Pesky. In Pesky, the IRS asserted not only that the taxpayer’s conveyance of a
conservation easement was made in exchange for a quid pro quo, but also that
the taxpayer was liable for a civil fraud penalty under IRC § 6663. IRC § 6663
imposes a 75% penalty on tax underpayments due to fraud. Fraud is defined as
an “intentional wrongdoing on the part of the taxpayer with the specific intent
to avoid a tax known to be owing.” The government must prove fraud by clear
and convincing evidence, but intent can be inferred from strong circumstantial
evidence.
After a review of the facts and circumstances surrounding the easement
conveyance, the District Court was unable to conclude that a reasonable jury
could find it “highly likely” that the taxpayer’s deduction was due to fraud.
Because the government did not produce sufficient evidence to meet its burden
of showing fraud by clear and convincing evidence, the court granted the
taxpayer’s motion for summary judgment on the issue. The court determined,
however, that other issues could not be resolved on summary judgment,
including whether the conveyance of the easement was made in exchange for
quid pro quo and whether the taxpayer obtained a contemporaneous written
acknowledgment accurately reflecting any goods and services provided by the
donee in exchange for the contribution. It is understood that the parties in Pesky
settled the case after the District Court rejected the fraud claim.
E. Side Agreements. In Graev, the Tax Court sustained the IRS’s disallowance of
deductions claimed with regard to the donation to the National Architectural Trust
(NAT) of both a façade easement valued at $990,000 and an accompanying $99,000
cash contribution. NAT had written a side letter to Mr. Graev, the donor, promising that,
if the deduction for the easement were disallowed, NAT would “promptly refund [Mr.
Graev’s] entire cash endowment contribution and join with [him] to immediately
remove the facade conservation easement from the property’s title.” The Tax Court
disallowed the deductions for both the easement and cash contributions because the
gifts were conditional and, at the time they were made, the possibility they would be
defeated was not so remote as to be negligible.
1. Section 170 and the corresponding Treasury Regulations provide instructions
and limitations that, at least in part, ensure that a donor will be able to deduct
no more than what the donee organization actually receives. Three such
limitations effectively provide that no deduction for a charitable contribution will
be allowed unless, on the date of the contribution, the possibility that the
donee’s interest in the contribution will be defeated is “so remote as to be
negligible.” Those limitations are found in regulation § 1.170A-1(e) (pertaining to
conditional gifts), regulation § 1.170A-7 (pertaining to partial interest gifts), and
regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(3) (pertaining to gifts of conservation easements).
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2. Based on the facts in Graev, the court found that, on the date of the
contributions, the possibility the IRS would disallow the easement deduction and
NAT would return the cash to Mr. Graev and remove the easement (i.e., the gifts
would be defeated) was not so remote as to be negligible. The facts the court
found persuasive included the IRS’s announced intention to scrutinize
deductions for facade easement donations; Mr. Graev’s insistence that NAT issue
the side letter; NAT’s practice of issuing side letters, the very essence of which
“implies a non-negligible risk;” the enforceability of the side letter under state
law; and NAT’s incentive to honor its promises in the side letter so as not to
impair its ability to obtain future contributions.
3. The possibility that a gift will be defeated will be considered so remote as to
be negligible only if it is “so highly improbable that one might ignore it with
reasonable safety in undertaking a serious business transaction” or “so highly
improbable and remote as to be lacking in reason and substance.”169 In Graev,
the court explained: “the mere fact that he required the side letter is strong
evidence that, at the time of Mr. Graev’s contribution, the risk that his
corresponding deductions might be disallowed could not be (and was not)
‘ignored with reasonable safety in undertaking a serious business transaction.’”
Obtaining the side letter also indicated that Mr. Graev did not think the chance
of disallowance was “so highly improbable and remote as to be lacking in reason
and substance.” Accordingly, the mere fact of obtaining a side letter such as that
at issue in Graev may be a tripwire that destroys deductibility.
F. Reserved Development Rights. Several regulatory requirements apply to retained
development rights.

169

•

Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(d)(4)(v) contains a specific limitation on
the reservation of rights in an open space easement—a deduction will
not be allowed “if the terms of the easement permit a degree of intrusion
or future development that would interfere with the essential scenic
quality of the land or the governmental conservation policy being
furthered by the donation.”

•

Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(1) provides that “any interest in the
property retained by the donor ... must be subject to legally enforceable
restrictions ... that will prevent uses of the retained interest inconsistent
with the conservation purposes of the donation” (the “general
enforceable in perpetuity” requirement).

•

Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(e)(2) provides that “a deduction will not
be allowed if the contribution would accomplish one of the enumerated

Briggs v. Comm’r, 72 T.C. 646, 656-57 (1979).
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conservation purposes but would permit destruction of other significant
conservation interests” (the “no inconsistent use” requirement).170
1. Examples 3 and 4. The Treasury Regulations provide two examples addressing
“future development” in an open space easement.171
Example 3 involves Greenacre, a 900-acre parcel of woodland, rolling
pasture, and orchards on the crest of a mountain, all of which is clearly
visible from a nearby national park. The highest and best use of
Greenacre is as a subdivision of 40-acre tracts (potentially twenty-two
residential lots). The landowner wishes to donate a scenic easement on
Greenacre and would like to reserve the right to subdivide Greenacre into
90-acre parcels with no more than one single-family home allowable on
each parcel. Example 3 provides that “[r]andom building on the property,
even as little as one home for each 90 acres [a total of only ten homes],
would destroy the scenic character of the view. Accordingly, no
deduction would be allowable.”
Example 4 assumes the same facts, except not all of Greenacre is visible
from the park and the deed of easement allows for limited cluster
development of no more than five nine-acre clusters with four houses on
each cluster (for a total of twenty homes) located in areas generally not
visible from the national park and subject to site and building plan
approval by the donee organization to preserve the scenic view from the
park. Example 4 further provides that the donor and the donee have
“already identified sites where limited cluster development would not be
visible from the park or would not impair the view,” and owners of
homes in the clusters will not have any rights with respect to the
surrounding Greenacre property that are not also available to the general
public. Example 4 concludes that the donation qualifies for a deduction.
Example 3 evidences the Treasury Department’s dislike of reserved “floating”
building sites, or rights to build that can be exercised anywhere on the property.
Such rights could (i) interfere with the essential scenic quality of the land or the
governmental conservation policy being furthered by the donation,172 (ii) permit
destruction of other significant conservation interests,173 and (iii) permit uses of
170

The regulations provide, as an example, that the preservation of farmland will not qualify for a deduction if, under
the terms of the easement, a significant naturally occurring ecosystem could be injured or destroyed by the use of
pesticides in the operation of the farm. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(e)(2). A use that is destructive of conservation
interests is permitted only if the use is necessary for the protection of the conservation interests that are the subject
of the contribution, such as allowing site excavation that may impair scenic values on property preserved as an
archaeological site. Id. § 1.170A-14(e)(3).
171
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(f), Examples 3 and 4.
172
See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d)(4)(v) (limitation on reserved rights in open space easements).
173
See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(e)(2) (no inconsistent use requirement).
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the retained interest inconsistent with the conservation purposes of the
donation.174
Example 4 suggests that, even if the number of permitted homes is increased
(from ten to twenty), if the homesites are clustered, located in areas generally
not visible from the nearby park, and subject to site and building plan approval
by the donee to preserve the scenic view, the donation will be deductible.
However, Example 4 provides that the donor and the donee had, at the time of
the donation, “already identified sites where limited cluster development would
not be visible from the park or would not impair the view”—i.e., it did not appear
that the donee was granted the discretion to, at some later time, approve sites
that, in its judgment, would preserve the scenic view. Rather, it appears that
sites were identified at the time of the donation, thus allowing the IRS (and, if
litigated, a court) to assess whether the reserved rights (i) interfered with the
essential scenic quality of the land or the governmental conservation policy
being furthered by the donation, (ii) would result in the destruction of other
significant conservation interests, or (iii) would involve uses of the retained
interest inconsistent with the conservation purposes of the donation.
Reserved rights to develop could be addressed in a number of ways:
•

the parties could identify the building sites in the conservation easement
deed,

•

the parties could identify more building sites in the conservation
easement deed than are permitted to be used (e.g., the easement may
reserve to the grantor the right to build two additional single-family
residences on the subject property, but four possible sites for the two
residences may be identified in the deed),

•

the parties could exclude the building sites from the legal description of
the property encumbered by the conservation easement (the drawback
to this approach is that the holder would have no ability to limit intensive
uses of the excluded land), or

•

the parties could designate all sensitive areas as “no-build” areas,” but
the no-build areas must be more than just token setbacks; they must be
sufficiently protective of the subject property’s conservation values.

It is not clear from Example 4 if having rights with respect to the surrounding
Greenacre property available to the general public was necessary to the
outcome.
174

See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(1) (general enforceable in perpetuity requirement).
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G. PLRs Recommending Revocation of Tax-Exempt Status.175 The IRS has issued a
number of Private Letter Rulings (PLRs) recommending revocation of the tax-exempt
status of organizations holding conservation easements based on fairly egregious
facts.176 These PLRs illustrate some of the issues the IRS has focused on when examining
organizations that accept and hold conservation easements.
1. Although the PLRs are impossible to accurately summarize in an outline
because of their highly fact specific nature, some of the problems noted in the
PLRs include:
•
•

•

•

•
•

the organization served as a vehicle for its founder, the founder’s family,
or other related parties to donate conservation easements and claim
deductions;
the easements donated to the organization did not satisfy the
conservation purpose test under § 170(h)(4) (e.g., the preservation was
not pursuant to a clearly delineated government conservation policy; the
easement encumbered ordinary farmland with no unique features like
native plants, trees, or animals; or the easement encumbered land in a
gated condominium tennis resort and contained a private miniature golf
course used for the pleasure of the residents only);
the organization did not take steps to ensure that the easements it
accepts serve a conservation purpose (e.g., the organization’s officers,
trustees, and employees did not have backgrounds or expertise in
botany, biology, ecological sciences, or other fields that would enable
them to credibly process or evaluate the property, or no baselines were
obtained or consisted of one page or one paragraph reports; or the
organization was unaware of the extensive retained rights in the
easements it accepted);
the organization did not monitor the easements it accepted on a regular
basis (or at all), did not have the commitment to protect the conservation
purposes (if any) of the donations, and did not have the resources to
enforce the easements should enforcement become necessary;
there was no one associated with the organization that had any formal
education, training, or expertise in conservation matters;
the organization allowed one of its easement-encumbered properties to
be damaged by illegal dumping and vehicles, and another, located in an
exclusive small waterfront residential development, to be encroached

175

A Private Letter Ruling (PLR) is a written statement issued to a taxpayer that interprets and applies tax laws to the
taxpayer's specific set of facts. A PLR may not be relied on as precedent by other taxpayers or IRS personnel. PLRs are
generally made public after all information has been removed that could identify the taxpayer to whom it was issued.
See IRS, Understanding IRS Guidance – A Brief Primer, available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/Understanding-IRSGuidance-A-Brief-Primer.
176
See, e.g., PLR 201044026; PLR 201048045; PLR 201109030; PLR 201110020; PLR 201405018. See also PLR
201234029 (organization created for the purpose of carrying on a for-profit hay farm on property that is not
ecologically significant or open to the public is not operated for an exempt purpose).

90

•
•
•
•

upon by the residents who constructed, among other things, large ponds
and a boat and recreational vehicle storage facility for the exclusive use
of the residents;
the organization amended a conservation easement to allow additional
development for a fee;
the easements the organization acquired violated the perpetuity
requirement under § 170(h) because the organization had the right to
terminate the easements;
the organization did not develop or sponsor any educational events,
solicit the general public for support, or appear to hold itself out to the
public as a charitable conservation organization; and
the organization was not operated in accordance with it bylaws (e.g.,
there were no meetings of officers or board members, no elections, and
no internal controls, and there was only the bare minimum with regard to
records and recordkeeping).

2. PLR 201048045 explains:
To establish that it operates exclusively for charitable conservation
purposes under section 501(c)(3), an organization must do more than
merely accept and hold easements for which donors are claiming
charitable contribution deductions under section 170(h). The
organization must establish that any accepted easements actually serve a
conservation purpose. The organization must also operate as an effective
steward to ensure that the easement continues to further a conservation
purpose. The easement is a set of legal rights. It can serve conservation
purposes only if enforced where necessary. The need for enforcement
can be determined only through monitoring. The extent of an
organization's due diligence and monitoring activities, combined with its
capacity for and commitment to enforcement when necessary, becomes
highly significant in determining whether accepting and holding
easements actually furthers a charitable conservation purpose and thus
whether an organization with the primary purpose of accepting and
holding easements qualifies for exemption under section 501(c)(3).
H. State Tax Credits. A number of states offer state income tax credits to donors of
conservation easements.
1. Tax Treatment of Sale of State Tax Credits. Esgar involved three taxpayers,
each of whom donated a conservation easement on land located in Colorado,
received transferable income tax credits from Colorado as a result of the
donation, and sold a portion of the credits to third parties within two weeks. The
taxpayers reported the proceeds from the credit sales as long-term capital gain,
short-term capital gain, and ordinary income, respectively. After an audit of the
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taxpayers’ income tax returns, the IRS determined that the proceeds from the
sales of the credits should have been reported as ordinary income.
In Tempel v. Comm’r, 136 T.C. 341 (2011), the Tax Court held that the taxpayers’
state tax credits were zero-basis capital assets and, given the short holding
periods, income from the sale of such credits was short-term capital gain.
Several months later, the IRS released Chief Counsel Advice 201147024, which
addresses the tax consequences of the sale of state tax credits to both the seller
and the buyer.177
The taxpayers appealed both Esgar I (in which the Tax Court held that the
taxpayers had substantially overvalued the conservation easements) and Tempel
to the 10th Circuit. In Esgar II, the taxpayers argued that their state tax credits,
which they held for only about two weeks, were nonetheless long-term capital
assets because they held the underlying real properties for longer than one year,
they relinquished development rights in those properties through the donation
of the easements, and they received the tax credits because of the donations.
The 10th Circuit disagreed, noting that the Tax Court correctly concluded in
Tempel that the taxpayers had no property rights in the tax credits until the
easement donations were complete and the credits were granted, and the
credits never were, nor did they become, part of the taxpayers' real property
rights. The 10th Circuit also agreed with the Tax Court that the taxpayers’
holding period in the credits began at the time the credits were granted and
ended when taxpayers sold them, and since the taxpayers sold the credits in the
same month in which they received them, the gains from the sale of the credits
were short-term capital gains.
The 10th Circuit also summarily rejected the argument that the transactions
amounted to some sort of like-kind exchange of conservation easements for tax
credits that might result in the “tacking” of holding periods. The court further
noted that if these were like-kind exchanges it would negate the charitable
nature of the taxpayers’ contributions of the easements.
2. Nonpro rata Allocation of State Tax Credits was Disguised Sale. As noted in
Part III.B.1 above, in each of SWF Real Estate, LLC, and Route 231, LLC v. Comm’r,
810 F.3d 247 (4th Cir. 2016), the IRS successfully invoked the “disguised sales”
rules under IRC § 707 to attack the nonpro rata allocation of state income tax
credits generated by a partnership’s donation of a conservation easement.

177

Chief Counsel Advice 201147024 is available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/1147024.pdf.
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Appendix A
Internal Revenue Code § 170(h)
(h) Qualified conservation contribution.
(1) In general. For purposes of subsection (f)(3)(B)(iii), the term "qualified
conservation contribution" means a contribution-(A) of a qualified real property interest,
(B) to a qualified organization,
(C) exclusively for conservation purposes.
(2) Qualified real property interest. For purposes of this subsection, the term
"qualified real property interest" means any of the following interests in real
property:
(A) the entire interest of the donor other than a qualified mineral
interest,
(B) a remainder interest, and
(C) a restriction (granted in perpetuity) on the use which may be made of
the real property.
(3) Qualified organization. For purposes of paragraph (1), the term "qualified
organization" means an organization which-(A) is described in clause (v) or (vi) of subsection (b)(1)(A), or
(B) is described in section 501(c)(3) [IRC Sec. 501(c)(3)] and-(i) meets the requirements of section 509(a)(2) [IRC Sec.
509(a)(2)], or
(ii) meets the requirements of section 509(a)(3) [IRC Sec.
509(a)(3)] and is controlled by an organization described in
subparagraph (A) or in clause (i) of this subparagraph.
(4) Conservation purpose defined.
(A) In general. For purposes of this subsection, the term "conservation
purpose" means-(i) the preservation of land areas for outdoor recreation by, or the
education of, the general public,
(ii) the protection of a relatively natural habitat of fish, wildlife, or
plants, or similar ecosystem,
(iii) the preservation of open space (including farmland and forest
land) where such preservation is-(I) for the scenic enjoyment of the general public, or
(II) pursuant to a clearly delineated Federal, State, or local
governmental conservation policy,
and will yield a significant public benefit, or
(iv) the preservation of an historically important land area or a
certified historic structure.
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(B) Special rules with respect to buildings in registered historic districts. In
the case of any contribution of a qualified real property interest which is
a restriction with respect to the exterior of a building described in
subparagraph (C)(ii), such contribution shall not be considered to be
exclusively for conservation purposes unless-(i) such interest-(I) includes a restriction which preserves the entire
exterior of the building (including the front, sides, rear,
and height of the building), and
(II) prohibits any change in the exterior of the building
which is inconsistent with the historical character of such
exterior,
(ii) the donor and donee enter into a written agreement
certifying, under penalty of perjury, that the donee-(I) is a qualified organization (as defined in paragraph (3))
with a purpose of environmental protection, land
conservation, open space preservation, or historic
preservation, and
(II) has the resources to manage and enforce the
restriction and a commitment to do so, and
(iii) in the case of any contribution made in a taxable year
beginning after the date of the enactment of this subparagraph
[Aug. 17, 2006], the taxpayer includes with the taxpayer's return
for the taxable year of the contribution-(I) a qualified appraisal (within the meaning of subsection
(f)(11)(E)) of the qualified property interest,
(II) photographs of the entire exterior of the building, and
(III) a description of all restrictions on the development of
the building.
(C) Certified historic structure. For purposes of subparagraph (A)(iv), the
term "certified historic structure" means-(i) any building, structure, or land area which is listed in the
National Register, or
(ii) any building which is located in a registered historic district (as
defined in section 47(c)(3)(B) and is certified by the Secretary of
the Interior to the Secretary as being of historic significance to the
district.
A building, structure, or land area satisfies the preceding sentence if it
satisfies such sentence either at the time of the transfer or on the due
date (including extensions) for filing the transferor's return under this
chapter for the taxable year in which the transfer is made.
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(5) Exclusively for conservation purposes. For purposes of this subsection-(A) Conservation purpose must be protected. A contribution shall not be
treated as exclusively for conservation purposes unless the conservation
purpose is protected in perpetuity.
(B) No surface mining permitted.
(i) In general. Except as provided in clause (ii), in the case of a
contribution of any interest where there is a retention of a
qualified mineral interest, subparagraph (A) shall not be treated
as met if at any time there may be extraction or removal of
minerals by any surface mining method.
(ii) Special rule. With respect to any contribution of property in
which the ownership of the surface estate and mineral interests
has been and remains separated, subparagraph (A) shall be
treated as met if the probability of surface mining occurring on
such property is so remote as to be negligible.
(6) Qualified mineral interest. For purposes of this subsection, the term
"qualified mineral interest" means-(A) subsurface oil, gas, or other minerals, and
(B) the right to access to such minerals
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§ 1.170A-14 Qualified conservation contributions.
(a) Qualified conservation contributions. A deduction under section 170 is generally not
allowed for a charitable contribution of any interest in property that consists of less than the
donor's entire interest in the property other than certain transfers in trust (see § 1.170A-6 relating
to charitable contributions in trust and § 1.170A-7 relating to contributions not in trust of partial
interests in property). However, a deduction may be allowed under section 170(f)(3)(B)(iii) for the
value of a qualified conservation contribution if the requirements of this section are met. A
qualified conservation contribution is the contribution of a qualified real property interest to a
qualified organization exclusively for conservation purposes. To be eligible for a deduction under
this section, the conservation purpose must be protected in perpetuity.
(b) Qualified real property interest -- (1) Entire interest of donor other than qualified mineral
interest. (i) The entire interest of the donor other than a qualified mineral interest is a qualified
real property interest. A qualified mineral interest is the donor's interest in subsurface oil, gas, or
other minerals and the right of access to such minerals.
(ii) A real property interest shall not be treated as an entire interest other than a qualified
mineral interest by reason of section 170(h)(2)(A) and this paragraph (b)(1) if the property in which
the donor's interest exists was divided prior to the contribution in order to enable the donor to
retain control of more than a qualified mineral interest or to reduce the real property interest
donated. See Treasury regulations § 1.170A-7(a)(2)(i). An entire interest in real property may
consist of an undivided interest in the property. But see section 170(h)(5)(A) and the regulations
thereunder (relating to the requirement that the conservation purpose which is the subject of the
donation must be protected in perpetuity). Minor interests, such as rights-of-way, that will not
interfere with the conservation purposes of the donation, may be transferred prior to the
conservation contribution without affecting the treatment of a property interest as a qualified real
property interest under this paragraph (b)(1).
(2) Perpetual conservation restriction. A "perpetual conservation restriction" is a qualified real
property interest. A "perpetual conservation restriction" is a restriction granted in perpetuity on
the use which may be made of real property -- including, an easement or other interest in real
property that under state law has attributes similar to an easement (e.g., a restrictive covenant or
equitable servitude). For purposes of this section, the terms easement, conservation restriction,
and perpetual conservation restriction have the same meaning. The definition of perpetual
conservation restriction under this paragraph (b)(2) is not intended to preclude the deductibility of
a donation of affirmative rights to use a land or water area under § 1.170A-13(d)(2). Any rights
reserved by the donor in the donation of a perpetual conservation restriction must conform to the
requirements of this section. See e.g., paragraph (d)(4)(ii), (d)(5)(i), (e)(3), and (g)(4) of this section.
(c) Qualified organization -- (1) Eligible donee. To be considered an eligible donee under this
section, an organization must be a qualified organization, have a commitment to protect the
conservation purposes of the donation, and have the resources to enforce the restrictions. A
conservation group organized or operated primarily or substantially for one of the conservation
purposes specified in section 170(h)(4)(A) will be considered to have the commitment required by
the preceding sentence. A qualified organization need not set aside funds to enforce the
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restrictions that are the subject of the contribution. For purposes of this section, the term
qualified organization means:
(i) A governmental unit described in section 170(b)(1)(A)(v);
(ii) An organization described in section 170(b)(1)(A)(vi);
(iii) A charitable organization described in section 501(c)(3) that meets the public support test
of section 509(a)(2);
(iv) A charitable organization described in section 501(c)(3) that meets the requirements of
section 509(a)(3) and is controlled by an organization described in paragraphs (c)(1) (i), (ii), or (iii)
of this section.
(2) Transfers by donee. A deduction shall be allowed for a contribution under this section only
if in the instrument of conveyance the donor prohibits the donee from subsequently transferring
the easement (or, in the case of a remainder interest or the reservation of a qualified mineral
interest, the property), whether or not for consideration, unless the donee organization, as a
condition of the subsequent transfer, requires that the conservation purposes which the
contribution was originally intended to advance continue to be carried out. Moreover, subsequent
transfers must be restricted to organizations qualifying, at the time of the subsequent transfer, as
an eligible donee under paragraph (c)(1) of this section. When a later unexpected change in the
conditions surrounding the property that is the subject of a donation under paragraph (b)(1), (2),
or (3) of this section makes impossible or impractical the continued use of the property for
conservation purposes, the requirement of this paragraph will be met if the property is sold or
exchanged and any proceeds are used by the donee organization in a manner consistent with the
conservation purposes of the original contribution. In the case of a donation under paragraph
(b)(3) of this section to which the preceding sentence applies, see also paragraph (g)(5)(ii) of this
section.
(d) Conservation purposes -- (1) In general. For purposes of section 170(h) and this section,
the term conservation purposes means -(i) The preservation of land areas for outdoor recreation by, or the education of, the general
public, within the meaning of paragraph (d)(2) of this section,
(ii) The protection of a relatively natural habitat of fish, wildlife, or plants, or similar
ecosystem, within the meaning of paragraph (d)(3) of this section,
(iii) The preservation of certain open space (including farmland and forest land) within the
meaning of paragraph (d)(4) of this section, or
(iv) The preservation of a historically important land area or a certified historic structure,
within the meaning of paragraph (d)(5) of this section.
(2) Recreation or education -- (i) In general. The donation of a qualified real property interest
to preserve land areas for the outdoor recreation of the general public or for the education of the
general public will meet the conservation purposes test of this section. Thus, conservation
purposes would include, for example, the preservation of a water area for the use of the public for
boating or fishing, or a nature or hiking trail for the use of the public.
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(ii) Access. The preservation of land areas for recreation or education will not meet the test of
this section unless the recreation or education is for the substantial and regular use of the general
public.
(3) Protection of environmental system -- (i) In general. The donation of a qualified real
property interest to protect a significant relatively natural habitat in which a fish, wildlife, or plant
community, or similar ecosystem normally lives will meet the conservation purposes test of this
section. The fact that the habitat or environment has been altered to some extent by human
activity will not result in a deduction being denied under this section if the fish, wildlife, or plants
continue to exist there in a relatively natural state. For example, the preservation of a lake formed
by a man-made dam or a salt pond formed by a man-made dike would meet the conservation
purposes test if the lake or pond were a nature feeding area for a wildlife community that included
rare, endangered, or threatened native species.
(ii) Significant habitat or ecosystem. Significant habitats and ecosystems include, but are not
limited to, habitats for rare, endangered, or threatened species of animal, fish, or plants; natural
areas that represent high quality examples of a terrestrial community or aquatic community, such
as islands that are undeveloped or not intensely developed where the coastal ecosystem is
relatively intact; and natural areas which are included in, or which contribute to, the ecological
viability of a local, state, or national park, nature preserve, wildlife refuge, wilderness area, or
other similar conservation area.
(iii) Access. Limitations on public access to property that is the subject of a donation under this
paragraph (d)(3) shall not render the donation nondeductible. For example, a restriction on all
public access to the habitat of a threatened native animal species protected by a donation under
this paragraph (d)(3) would not cause the donation to be nondeductible.
(4) Preservation of open space -- (i) In general. The donation of a qualified real property
interest to preserve open space (including farmland and forest land) will meet the conservation
purposes test of this section if such preservation is -(A) Pursuant to a clearly delineated Federal, state, or local governmental conservation policy
and will yield a significant public benefit, or
(B) For the scenic enjoyment of the general public and will yield a significant public benefit.
An open space easement donated on or after December 18, 1980, must meet the requirements of
section 170(h) in order to be deductible.
(ii) Scenic enjoyment -- (A) Factors. A contribution made for the preservation of open space
may be for the scenic enjoyment of the general public. Preservation of land may be for the scenic
enjoyment of the general public if development of the property would impair the scenic character
of the local rural or urban landscape or would interfere with a scenic panorama that can be
enjoyed from a park, nature preserve, road, waterbody, trail, or historic structure or land area, and
such area or transportation way is open to, or utilized by, the public. "Scenic enjoyment" will be
evaluated by considering all pertinent facts and circumstances germane to the contribution.
Regional variations in topography, geology, biology, and cultural and economic conditions require
flexibility in the application of this test, but do not lessen the burden on the taxpayer to
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demonstrate the scenic characteristics of a donation under this paragraph. The application of a
particular objective factor to help define a view as "scenic" in one setting may in fact be entirely
inappropriate in another setting. Among the factors to be considered are:
(1) The compatibility of the land use with other land in the vicinity;
(2) The degree of contrast and variety provided by the visual scene;
(3) The openness of the land (which would be a more significant factor in an urban or densely
populated setting or in a heavily wooded area);
(4) Relief from urban closeness;
(5) The harmonious variety of shapes and textures;
(6) The degree to which the land use maintains the scale and character of the urban landscape
to preserve open space, visual enjoyment, and sunlight for the surrounding area;
(7) The consistency of the proposed scenic view with a methodical state scenic identification
program, such as a state landscape inventory; and
(8) The consistency of the proposed scenic view with a regional or local landscape inventory
made pursuant to a sufficiently rigorous review process, especially if the donation is endorsed by
an appropriate state or local governmental agency.
(B) Access. To satisfy the requirement of scenic enjoyment by the general public, visual (rather
than physical) access to or across the property by the general public is sufficient. Under the terms
of an open space easement on scenic property, the entire property need not be visible to the
public for a donation to qualify under this section, although the public benefit from the donation
may be insufficient to qualify for a deduction if only a small portion of the property is visible to the
public.
(iii) Governmental conservation policy -- (A) In general. The requirement that the preservation
of open space be pursuant to a clearly delineated Federal, state, or local governmental policy is
intended to protect the types of property identified by representatives of the general public as
worthy of preservation or conservation. A general declaration of conservation goals by a single
official or legislative body is not sufficient. However, a governmental conservation policy need not
be a certification program that identifies particular lots or small parcels of individually owned
property. This requirement will be met by donations that further a specific, identified conservation
project, such as the preservation of land within a state or local landmark district that is locally
recognized as being significant to that district; the preservation of a wild or scenic river, the
preservation of farmland pursuant to a state program for flood prevention and control; or the
protection of the scenic, ecological, or historic character of land that is contiguous to, or an
integral part of, the surroundings of existing recreation or conservation sites. For example, the
donation of a perpetual conservation restriction to a qualified organization pursuant to a formal
resolution or certification by a local governmental agency established under state law specifically
identifying the subject property as worthy of protection for conservation purposes will meet the
requirement of this paragraph. A program need not be funded to satisfy this requirement, but the
program must involve a significant commitment by the government with respect to the
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conservation project. For example, a governmental program according preferential tax assessment
or preferential zoning for certain property deemed worthy of protection for conservation purposes
would constitute a significant commitment by the government.
(B) Effect of acceptance by governmental agency. Acceptance of an easement by an agency of
the Federal Government or by an agency of a state or local government (or by a commission,
authority, or similar body duly constituted by the state or local government and acting on behalf of
the state or local government) tends to establish the requisite clearly delineated governmental
policy, although such acceptance, without more, is not sufficient. The more rigorous the review
process by the governmental agency, the more the acceptance of the easement tends to establish
the requisite clearly delineated governmental policy. For example, in a state where the legislature
has established an Environmental Trust to accept gifts to the state which meet certain
conservation purposes and to submit the gifts to a review that requires the approval of the state's
highest officials, acceptance of a gift by the Trust tends to establish the requisite clearly delineated
governmental policy. However, if the Trust merely accepts such gifts without a review process, the
requisite clearly delineated governmental policy is not established.
(C) Access. A limitation on public access to property subject to a donation under this
paragraph (d)(4)(iii) shall not render the deduction nondeductible unless the conservation purpose
of the donation would be undermined or frustrated without public access. For example, a
donation pursuant to a governmental policy to protect the scenic character of land near a river
requires visual access to the same extent as would a donation under paragraph (d)(4)(ii) of this
section.
(iv) Significant public benefit -- (A) Factors. All contributions made for the preservation of open
space must yield a significant public benefit. Public benefit will be evaluated by considering all
pertinent facts and circumstances germane to the contribution. Factors germane to the evaluation
of public benefit from one contribution may be irrelevant in determining public benefit from
another contribution. No single factor will necessarily be determinative. Among the factors to be
considered are:
(1) The uniqueness of the property to the area;
(2) The intensity of land development in the vicinity of the property (both existing
development and foreseeable trends of development);
(3) The consistency of the proposed open space use with public programs (whether Federal,
state or local) for conservation in the region, including programs for outdoor recreation, irrigation
or water supply protection, water quality maintenance or enhancement, flood prevention and
control, erosion control, shoreline protection, and protection of land areas included in, or related
to, a government approved master plan or land management area;
(4) The consistency of the proposed open space use with existing private conservation
programs in the area, as evidenced by other land, protected by easement or fee ownership by
organizations referred to in § 1.170A-14(c)(1), in close proximity to the property;
(5) The likelihood that development of the property would lead to or contribute to
degradation of the scenic, natural, or historic character of the area;
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(6) The opportunity for the general public to use the property or to appreciate its scenic
values;
(7) The importance of the property in preserving a local or regional landscape or resource that
attracts tourism or commerce to the area;
(8) The likelihood that the donee will acquire equally desirable and valuable substitute
property or property rights;
(9) The cost to the donee of enforcing the terms of the conservation restriction;
(10) The population density in the area of the property; and
(11) The consistency of the proposed open space use with a legislatively mandated program
identifying particular parcels of land for future protection.
(B) Illustrations. The preservation of an ordinary tract of land would not in and of itself yield a
significant public benefit, but the preservation of ordinary land areas in conjunction with other
factors that demonstrate significant public benefit or the preservation of a unique land area for
public employment would yield a significant public benefit. For example, the preservation of a
vacant downtown lot would not by itself yield a significant public benefit, but the preservation of
the downtown lot as a public garden would, absent countervailing factors, yield a significant public
benefit. The following are other examples of contributions which would, absent countervailing
factors, yield a significant public benefit: The preservation of farmland pursuant to a state program
for flood prevention and control; the preservation of a unique natural land formation for the
enjoyment of the general public; the preservation of woodland along a public highway pursuant to
a government program to preserve the appearance of the area so as to maintain the scenic view
from the highway; and the preservation of a stretch of undeveloped property located between a
public highway and the ocean in order to maintain the scenic ocean view from the highway.
(v) Limitation. A deduction will not be allowed for the preservation of open space under
section 170(h)(4)(A)(iii), if the terms of the easement permit a degree of intrusion or future
development that would interfere with the essential scenic quality of the land or with the
governmental conservation policy that is being furthered by the donation. See § 1.170A-14(e)(2)
for rules relating to inconsistent use.
(vi) Relationship of requirements -- (A) Clearly delineated governmental policy and significant
public benefit. Although the requirements of "clearly delineated governmental policy" and
"significant public benefit" must be met independently, for purposes of this section the two
requirements may also be related. The more specific the governmental policy with respect to the
particular site to be protected, the more likely the governmental decision, by itself, will tend to
establish the significant public benefit associated with the donation. For example, while a statute
in State X permitting preferential assessment for farmland is, by definition, governmental policy, it
is distinguishable from a state statute, accompanied by appropriations, naming the X River as a
valuable resource and articulating the legislative policy that the X River and the relatively natural
quality of its surrounding be protected. On these facts, an open space easement on farmland in
State X would have to demonstrate additional factors to establish "significant public benefit." The
specificity of the legislative mandate to protect the X River, however, would by itself tend to
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establish the significant public benefit associated with an open space easement on land fronting
the X River.
(B) Scenic enjoyment and significant public benefit. With respect to the relationship between
the requirements of "scenic enjoyment" and "significant public benefit," since the degrees of
scenic enjoyment offered by a variety of open space easements are subjective and not as easily
delineated as are increasingly specific levels of governmental policy, the significant public benefit
of preserving a scenic view must be independently established in all cases.
(C) Donations may satisfy more than one test. In some cases, open space easements may be
both for scenic enjoyment and pursuant to a clearly delineated governmental policy. For example,
the preservation of a particular scenic view identified as part of a scenic landscape inventory by a
rigorous governmental review process will meet the tests of both paragraphs (d)(4)(i)(A) and
(d)(4)(i)(B) of this section.
(5) Historic preservation -- (i) In general. The donation of a qualified real property interest to
preserve an historically important land area or a certified historic structure will meet the
conservation purposes test of this section. When restrictions to preserve a building or land area
within a registered historic district permit future development on the site, a deduction will be
allowed under this section only if the terms of the restrictions require that such development
conform with appropriate local, state, or Federal standards for construction or rehabilitation
within the district. See also, § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(ii).
(ii) Historically important land area. The term historically important land area includes:
(A) An independently significant land area including any related historic resources (for
example, an archaeological site or a Civil War battlefield with related monuments, bridges,
cannons, or houses) that meets the National Register Criteria for Evaluation in 36 CFR 60.4 (Pub. L.
89-665, 80 Stat. 915);
(B) Any land area within a registered historic district including any buildings on the land area
that can reasonably be considered as contributing to the significance of the district; and
(C) Any land area (including related historic resources) adjacent to a property listed
individually in the National Register of Historic Places (but not within a registered historic district)
in a case where the physical or environmental features of the land area contribute to the historic
or cultural integrity of the property.
(iii) Certified historic structure. The term certified historic structure, for purposes of this
section, means any building, structure or land area which is -(A) Listed in the National Register, or
(B) Located in a registered historic district (as defined in section 48(g)(3)(B)) and is certified by
the Secretary of the Interior (pursuant to 36 CFR 67.4) to the Secretary of the Treasury as being of
historic significance to the district.
A structure for purposes of this section means any structure, whether or not it is depreciable.
Accordingly easements on private residences may qualify under this section. In addition, a
structure would be considered to be a certified historic structure if it were certified either at the
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time the transfer was made or at the due date (including extensions) for filing the donor's return
for the taxable year in which the contribution was made.
(iv) Access. (A) In order for a conservation contribution described in section 170(h)(4)(A)(iv)
and this paragraph (d)(5) to be deductible, some visual public access to the donated property is
required. In the case of an historically important land area, the entire property need not be visible
to the public for a donation to qualify under this section. However, the public benefit from the
donation may be insufficient to qualify for a deduction if only a small portion of the property is so
visible. Where the historic land area or certified historic structure which is the subject of the
donation is not visible from a public way (e.g., the structure is hidden from view by a wall or
shrubbery, the structure is too far from the public way, or interior characteristics and features of
the structure are the subject of the easement), the terms of the easement must be such that the
general public is given the opportunity on a regular basis to view the characteristics and features
of the property which are preserved by the easement to the extent consistent with the nature and
condition of the property.
(B) Factors to be considered in determining the type and amount of public access required
under paragraph (d)(5)(iv)(A) of this section include the historical significance of the donated
property, the nature of the features that are the subject of the easement, the remoteness or
accessibility of the site of the donated property, the possibility of physical hazards to the public
visiting the property (for example, an unoccupied structure in a dilapidated condition), the extent
to which public access would be an unreasonable intrusion on any privacy interests of individuals
living on the property, the degree to which public access would impair the preservation interests
which are the subject of the donation, and the availability of opportunities for the public to view
the property by means other than visits to the site.
(C) The amount of access afforded the public by the donation of an easement shall be
determined with reference to the amount of access permitted by the terms of the easement which
are established by the donor, rather than the amount of access actually provided by the donee
organization. However, if the donor is aware of any facts indicating that the amount of access that
the donee organization will provide is significantly less than the amount of access permitted under
the terms of the easement, then the amount of access afforded the public shall be determined
with reference to this lesser amount.
(v) Examples. The provisions of paragraph (d)(5)(iv) of this section may be illustrated by the
following examples:
Example 1. A and his family live in a house in a certified historic district in the State of X. The
entire house, including its interior, has architectural features representing classic Victorian period
architecture. A donates an exterior and interior easement on the property to a qualified
organization but continues to live in the house with his family. A's house is surrounded by a high
stone wall which obscures the public's view of it from the street. Pursuant to the terms of the
easement, the house may be opened to the public from 10:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. on one Sunday in
May and one Sunday in November each year for house and garden tours. These tours are to be
under the supervision of the donee and open to members of the general public upon payment of a
small fee. In addition, under the terms of the easement, the donee organization is given the right
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to photograph the interior and exterior of the house and distribute such photographs to
magazines, newsletters, or other publicly available publications. The terms of the easement also
permit persons affiliated with educational organizations, professional architectural associations,
and historical societies to make an appointment through the donee organization to study the
property. The donor is not aware of any facts indicating that the public access to be provided by
the donee organization will be significantly less than that permitted by the terms of the easement.
The 2 opportunities for public visits per year, when combined with the ability of the general public
to view the architectural characteristics and features that are the subject of the easement through
photographs, the opportunity for scholarly study of the property, and the fact that the house is
used as an occupied residence, will enable the donation to satisfy the requirement of public
access.
Example 2. B owns an unoccupied farmhouse built in the 1840's and located on a property
that is adjacent to a Civil War battlefield. During the Civil War the farmhouse was used as quarters
for Union troops. The battlefield is visited year round by the general public. The condition of the
farmhouse is such that the safety of visitors will not be jeopardized and opening it to the public
will not result in significant deterioration. The farmhouse is not visible from the battlefield or any
public way. It is accessible only by way of a private road owned by B. B donates a conservation
easement on the farmhouse to a qualified organization. The terms of the easement provide that
the donee organization may open the property (via B's road) to the general public on four
weekends each year from 8:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. The donation does not meet the public access
requirement because the farmhouse is safe, unoccupied, and easily accessible to the general
public who have come to the site to visit Civil War historic land areas (and related resources), but
will only be open to the public on four weekends each year. However, the donation would meet
the public access requirement if the terms of the easement permitted the donee organization to
open the property to the public every other weekend during the year and the donor is not aware
of any facts indicating that the donee organization will provide significantly less access than that
permitted.
(e) Exclusively for conservation purposes -- (1) In general. To meet the requirements of this
section, a donation must be exclusively for conservation purposes. See paragraphs (c)(1) and (g)(1)
through (g)(6)(ii) of this section. A deduction will not be denied under this section when incidental
benefit inures to the donor merely as a result of conservation restrictions limiting the uses to
which the donor's property may be put.
(2) Inconsistent use. Except as provided in paragraph (e)(4) of this section, a deduction will not
be allowed if the contribution would accomplish one of the enumerated conservation purposes
but would permit destruction of other significant conservation interests. For example, the
preservation of farmland pursuant to a State program for flood prevention and control would not
qualify under paragraph (d)(4) of this section if under the terms of the contribution a significant
naturally occurring ecosystem could be injured or destroyed by the use of pesticides in the
operation of the farm. However, this requirement is not intended to prohibit uses of the property,
such as selective timber harvesting or selective farming if, under the circumstances, those uses do
not impair significant conservation interests.
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(3) Inconsistent use permitted. A use that is destructive of conservation interests will be
permitted only if such use is necessary for the protection of the conservation interests that are the
subject of the contribution. For example, a deduction for the donation of an easement to preserve
an archaeological site that is listed on the National Register of Historic Places will not be
disallowed if site excavation consistent with sound archaeological practices may impair a scenic
view of which the land is a part. A donor may continue a pre-existing use of the property that does
not conflict with the conservation purposes of the gift.
(f) Examples. The provisions of this section relating to conservation purposes may be
illustrated by the following examples.
Example 1. State S contains many large tract forests that are desirable recreation and scenic
areas for the general public. The forests' scenic values attract millions of people to the State.
However, due to the increasing intensity of land development in State S, the continued existence
of forestland parcels greater than 45 acres is threatened. J grants a perpetual easement on a 100acre parcel of forestland that is part of one of the State's scenic areas to a qualifying organization.
The easement imposes restrictions on the use of the parcel for the purpose of maintaining its
scenic values. The restrictions include a requirement that the parcel be maintained forever as
open space devoted exclusively to conservation purposes and wildlife protection, and that there
be no commercial, industrial, residential, or other development use of such parcel. The law of
State S recognizes a limited public right to enter private land, particularly for recreational pursuits,
unless such land is posted or the landowner objects. The easement specifically restricts the
landowner from posting the parcel, or from objecting, thereby maintaining public access to the
parcel according to the custom of the State. J's parcel provides the opportunity for the public to
enjoy the use of the property and appreciate its scenic values. Accordingly, J's donation qualifies
for a deduction under this section.
Example 2. A qualified conservation organization owns Greenacre in fee as a nature preserve.
Greenacre contains a high quality example of a tall grass prairie ecosystem. Farmacre, an
operating farm, adjoins Greenacre and is a compatible buffer to the nature preserve. Conversion
of Farmacre to a more intense use, such as a housing development, would adversely affect the
continued use of Greenacre as a nature preserve because of human traffic generated by the
development. The owner of Farmacre donates an easement preventing any future development
on Farmacre to the qualified conservation organization for conservation purposes. Normal
agricultural uses will be allowed on Farmacre. Accordingly, the donation qualifies for a deduction
under this section.
Example 3. H owns Greenacre, a 900-acre parcel of woodland, rolling pasture, and orchards on
the crest of a mountain. All of Greenacre is clearly visible from a nearby national park. Because of
the strict enforcement of an applicable zoning plan, the highest and best use of Greenacre is as a
subdivision of 40-acre tracts. H wishes to donate a scenic easement on Greenacre to a qualifying
conservation organization, but H would like to reserve the right to subdivide Greenacre into 90acre parcels with no more than one single-family home allowable on each parcel. Random building
on the property, even as little as one home for each 90 acres, would destroy the scenic character
of the view. Accordingly, no deduction would be allowable under this section.
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Example 4. Assume the same facts as in example (3), except that not all of Greenacre is visible
from the park and the deed of easement allows for limited cluster development of no more than
five nine-acre clusters (with four houses on each cluster) located in areas generally not visible from
the national park and subject to site and building plan approval by the donee organization in order
to preserve the scenic view from the park. The donor and the donee have already identified sites
where limited cluster development would not be visible from the park or would not impair the
view. Owners of homes in the clusters will not have any rights with respect to the surrounding
Greenacre property that are not also available to the general public. Accordingly, the donation
qualifies for a deduction under this section.
Example 5. In order to protect State S's declining open space that is suited for agricultural use
from increasing development pressure that has led to a marked decline in such open space, the
Legislature of State S passed a statute authorizing the purchase of "agricultural land development
rights" on open acreage. Agricultural land development rights allow the State to place agricultural
preservation restrictions on land designated as worthy of protection in order to preserve open
space and farm resources. Agricultural preservation restrictions prohibit or limit construction or
placement of buildings except those used for agricultural purposes or dwellings used for family
living by the farmer and his family and employees; removal of mineral substances in any manner
that adversely affects the land's agricultural potential; or other uses detrimental to retention of
the land for agricultural use. Money has been appropriated for this program and some landowners
have in fact sold their "agricultural land development rights" to State S. K owns and operates a
small dairy farm in State S located in an area designated by the Legislature as worthy of
protection. K desires to preserve his farm for agricultural purposes in perpetuity. Rather than
selling the development rights to State S, K grants to a qualified organization an agricultural
preservation restriction on his property in the form of a conservation easement. K reserves to
himself, his heirs and assigns the right to manage the farm consistent with sound agricultural and
management practices. The preservation of K's land is pursuant to a clearly delineated
governmental policy of preserving open space available for agricultural use, and will yield a
significant public benefit by preserving open space against increasing development pressures.
(g) Enforceable in perpetuity -- (1) In general. In the case of any donation under this section,
any interest in the property retained by the donor (and the donor's successors in interest) must be
subject to legally enforceable restrictions (for example, by recordation in the land records of the
jurisdiction in which the property is located) that will prevent uses of the retained interest
inconsistent with the conservation purposes of the donation. In the case of a contribution of a
remainder interest, the contribution will not qualify if the tenants, whether they are tenants for
life or a term of years, can use the property in a manner that diminishes the conservation values
which are intended to be protected by the contribution.
(2) Protection of a conservation purpose in case of donation of property subject to a
mortgage. In the case of conservation contributions made after February 13, 1986, no deduction
will be permitted under this section for an interest in property which is subject to a mortgage
unless the mortgagee subordinates its rights in the property to the right of the qualified
organization to enforce the conservation purposes of the gift in perpetuity. For conservation
contributions made prior to February 14, 1986, the requirement of section 170 (h)(5)(A) is satisfied
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in the case of mortgaged property (with respect to which the mortgagee has not subordinated its
rights) only if the donor can demonstrate that the conservation purpose is protected in perpetuity
without subordination of the mortgagee's rights.
(3) Remote future event. A deduction shall not be disallowed under section 170(f)(3)(B)(iii)
and this section merely because the interest which passes to, or is vested in, the donee
organization may be defeated by the performance of some act or the happening of some event, if
on the date of the gift it appears that the possibility that such act or event will occur is so remote
as to be negligible. See paragraph (e) of § 1.170A-1. For example, a state's statutory requirement
that use restrictions must be rerecorded every 30 years to remain enforceable shall not, by itself,
render an easement nonperpetual.
(4) Retention of qualified mineral interest -- (i) In general. Except as otherwise provided in
paragraph (g)(4)(ii) of this section, the requirements of this section are not met and no deduction
shall be allowed in the case of a contribution of any interest when there is a retention by any
person of a qualified mineral interest (as defined in paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section) if at any
time there may be extractions or removal of minerals by any surface mining method. Moreover, in
the case of a qualified mineral interest gift, the requirement that the conservation purposes be
protected in perpetuity is not satisfied if any method of mining that is inconsistent with the
particular conservation purposes of a contribution is permitted at any time. See also § 1.170A14(e)(2). However, a deduction under this section will not be denied in the case of certain
methods of mining that may have limited, localized impact on the real property but that are not
irremediably destructive of significant conservation interests. For example, a deduction will not be
denied in a case where production facilities are concealed or compatible with existing topography
and landscape and when surface alteration is to be restored to its original state.
(ii) Exception for qualified conservation contributions after July 1984. (A) A contribution made
after July 18, 1984, of a qualified real property interest described in section 170(h)(2)(A) shall not
be disqualified under the first sentence of paragraph (g)(4)(i) of this section if the following
requirements are satisfied.
(1) The ownership of the surface estate and mineral interest were separated before June 13,
1976, and remain so separated up to and including the time of the contribution.
(2) The present owner of the mineral interest is not a person whose relationship to the owner
of the surface estate is described at the time of the contribution in section 267(b) or section
707(b), and
(3) The probability of extraction or removal of minerals by any surface mining method is so
remote as to be negligible.
Whether the probability of extraction or removal of minerals by surface mining is so remote as to
be negligible is a question of fact and is to be made on a case by case basis. Relevant factors to be
considered in determining if the probability of extraction or removal of minerals by surface mining
is so remote as to be negligible include: Geological, geophysical or economic data showing the
absence of mineral reserves on the property, or the lack of commercial feasibility at the time of
the contribution of surface mining the mineral interest.
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(B) If the ownership of the surface estate and mineral interest first became separated after
June 12, 1976, no deduction is permitted for a contribution under this section unless surface
mining on the property is completely prohibited.
(iii) Examples. The provisions of paragraph (g)(4)(i) and (ii) of this section may be illustrated by
the following examples:
Example 1. K owns 5,000 acres of bottomland hardwood property along a major watershed
system in the southern part of the United States. Agencies within the Department of the Interior
have determined that southern bottomland hardwoods are a rapidly diminishing resource and a
critical ecosystem in the south because of the intense pressure to cut the trees and convert the
land to agricultural use. These agencies have further determined (and have indicated in
correspondence with K) that bottomland hardwoods provide a superb habitat for numerous
species and play an important role in controlling floods and purifying rivers. K donates to a
qualified organization his entire interest in this property other than his interest in the gas and oil
deposits that have been identified under K's property. K covenants and can ensure that, although
drilling for gas and oil on the property may have some temporary localized impact on the real
property, the drilling will not interfere with the overall conservation purpose of the gift, which is to
protect the unique bottomland hardwood ecosystem. Accordingly, the donation qualifies for a
deduction under this section.
Example 2. Assume the same facts as in example (1), except that in 1979, K sells the mineral
interest to A, an unrelated person, in an arm's-length transaction, subject to a recorded
prohibition on the removal of any minerals by any surface mining method and a recorded
prohibition against any mining technique that will harm the bottomland hardwood ecosystem.
After the sale to A, K donates a qualified real property interest to a qualified organization to
protect the bottomland hardwood ecosystem. Since at the time of the transfer, surface mining and
any mining technique that will harm the bottomland hardwood ecosystem are completely
prohibited, the donation qualifies for a deduction under this section.
(5) Protection of conservation purpose where taxpayer reserves certain rights. (i)
Documentation. In the case of a donation made after February 13, 1986, of any qualified real
property interest when the donor reserves rights the exercise of which may impair the
conservation interests associated with the property, for a deduction to be allowable under this
section the donor must make available to the donee, prior to the time the donation is made,
documentation sufficient to establish the condition of the property at the time of the gift. Such
documentation is designed to protect the conservation interests associated with the property,
which although protected in perpetuity by the easement, could be adversely affected by the
exercise of the reserved rights. Such documentation may include:
(A) The appropriate survey maps from the United States Geological Survey, showing the
property line and other contiguous or nearby protected areas;
(B) A map of the area drawn to scale showing all existing man-made improvements or
incursions (such as roads, buildings, fences, or gravel pits), vegetation and identification of flora
and fauna (including, for example, rare species locations, animal breeding and roosting areas, and
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migration routes), land use history (including present uses and recent past disturbances), and
distinct natural features (such as large trees and aquatic areas);
(C) An aerial photograph of the property at an appropriate scale taken as close as possible to
the date the donation is made; and
(D) On-site photographs taken at appropriate locations on the property. If the terms of the
donation contain restrictions with regard to a particular natural resource to be protected, such as
water quality or air quality, the condition of the resource at or near the time of the gift must be
established. The documentation, including the maps and photographs, must be accompanied by a
statement signed by the donor and a representative of the donee clearly referencing the
documentation and in substance saying "This natural resources inventory is an accurate
representation of [the protected property] at the time of the transfer.".
(ii) Donee's right to inspection and legal remedies. In the case of any donation referred to in
paragraph (g)(5)(i) of this section, the donor must agree to notify the donee, in writing, before
exercising any reserved right, e.g. the right to extract certain minerals which may have an adverse
impact on the conservation interests associated with the qualified real property interest. The
terms of the donation must provide a right of the donee to enter the property at reasonable times
for the purpose of inspecting the property to determine if there is compliance with the terms of
the donation. Additionally, the terms of the donation must provide a right of the donee to enforce
the conservation restrictions by appropriate legal proceedings, including but not limited to, the
right to require the restoration of the property to its condition at the time of the donation.
(6) Extinguishment. (i) In general. If a subsequent unexpected change in the conditions
surrounding the property that is the subject of a donation under this paragraph can make
impossible or impractical the continued use of the property for conservation purposes, the
conservation purpose can nonetheless be treated as protected in perpetuity if the restrictions are
extinguished by judicial proceeding and all of the donee's proceeds (determined under paragraph
(g)(6)(ii) of this section) from a subsequent sale or exchange of the property are used by the donee
organization in a manner consistent with the conservation purposes of the original contribution.
(ii) Proceeds. In case of a donation made after February 13, 1986, for a deduction to be
allowed under this section, at the time of the gift the donor must agree that the donation of the
perpetual conservation restriction gives rise to a property right, immediately vested in the donee
organization, with a fair market value that is at least equal to the proportionate value that the
perpetual conservation restriction at the time of the gift, bears to the value of the property as a
whole at that time. See § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(iii) relating to the allocation of basis. For purposes of
this paragraph (g)(6)(ii), that proportionate value of the donee's property rights shall remain
constant. Accordingly, when a change in conditions give rise to the extinguishment of a perpetual
conservation restriction under paragraph (g)(6)(i) of this section, the donee organization, on a
subsequent sale, exchange, or involuntary conversion of the subject property, must be entitled to
a portion of the proceeds at least equal to that proportionate value of the perpetual conservation
restriction, unless state law provides that the donor is entitled to the full proceeds from the
conversion without regard to the terms of the prior perpetual conservation restriction.
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(h) Valuation -- (1) Entire interest of donor other than qualified mineral interest. The value of
the contribution under section 170 in the case of a contribution of a taxpayer's entire interest in
property other than a qualified mineral interest is the fair market value of the surface rights in the
property contributed. The value of the contribution shall be computed without regard to the
mineral rights. See paragraph (h)(4), example (1), of this section.
(2) Remainder interest in real property. In the case of a contribution of any remainder interest
in real property, section 170(f)(4) provides that in determining the value of such interest for
purposes of section 170, depreciation and depletion of such property shall be taken into account.
See § 1.170A-12. In the case of the contribution of a remainder interest for conservation
purposes, the current fair market value of the property (against which the limitations of § 1.170A12 are applied) must take into account any pre-existing or contemporaneously recorded rights
limiting, for conservation purposes, the use to which the subject property may be put.
(3) Perpetual conservation restriction -- (i) In general. The value of the contribution under
section 170 in the case of a charitable contribution of a perpetual conservation restriction is the
fair market value of the perpetual conservation restriction at the time of the contribution. See §
1.170A-7(c). If there is a substantial record of sales of easements comparable to the donated
easement (such as purchases pursuant to a governmental program), the fair market value of the
donated easement is based on the sales prices of such comparable easements. If no substantial
record of market-place sales is available to use as a meaningful or valid comparison, as a general
rule (but not necessarily in all cases) the fair market value of a perpetual conservation restriction is
equal to the difference between the fair market value of the property it encumbers before the
granting of the restriction and the fair market value of the encumbered property after the granting
of the restriction. The amount of the deduction in the case of a charitable contribution of a
perpetual conservation restriction covering a portion of the contiguous property owned by a
donor and the donor's family (as defined in section 267(c)(4)) is the difference between the fair
market value of the entire contiguous parcel of property before and after the granting of the
restriction. If the granting of a perpetual conservation restriction after January 14, 1986, has the
effect of increasing the value of any other property owned by the donor or a related person, the
amount of the deduction for the conservation contribution shall be reduced by the amount of the
increase in the value of the other property, whether or not such property is contiguous. If, as a
result of the donation of a perpetual conservation restriction, the donor or a related person
receives, or can reasonably expect to receive, financial or economic benefits that are greater than
those that will inure to the general public from the transfer, no deduction is allowable under this
section. However, if the donor or a related person receives, or can reasonably expect to receive, a
financial or economic benefit that is substantial, but it is clearly shown that the benefit is less than
the amount of the transfer, then a deduction under this section is allowable for the excess of the
amount transferred over the amount of the financial or economic benefit received or reasonably
expected to be received by the donor or the related person. For purposes of this paragraph
(h)(3)((i), related person shall have the same meaning as in either section 267(b) or section 707(b).
(See example (10) of paragraph (h)(4) of this section.)
(ii) Fair market value of property before and after restriction. If before and after valuation is
used, the fair market value of the property before contribution of the conservation restriction
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must take into account not only the current use of the property but also an objective assessment
of how immediate or remote the likelihood is that the property, absent the restriction, would in
fact be developed, as well as any effect from zoning, conservation, or historic preservation laws
that already restrict the property's potential highest and best use. Further, there may be instances
where the grant of a conservation restriction may have no material effect on the value of the
property or may in fact serve to enhance, rather than reduce, the value of property. In such
instances no deduction would be allowable. In the case of a conservation restriction that allows for
any development, however limited, on the property to be protected, the fair market value of the
property after contribution of the restriction must take into account the effect of the
development. In the case of a conservation easement such as an easement on a certified historic
structure, the fair market value of the property after contribution of the restriction must take into
account the amount of access permitted by the terms of the easement. Additionally, if before and
after valuation is used, an appraisal of the property after contribution of the restriction must take
into account the effect of restrictions that will result in a reduction of the potential fair market
value represented by highest and best use but will, nevertheless, permit uses of the property that
will increase its fair market value above that represented by the property's current use. The value
of a perpetual conservation restriction shall not be reduced by reason of the existence of
restrictions on transfer designed solely to ensure that the conservation restriction will be
dedicated to conservation purposes. See § 1.170A-14 (c)(3).
(iii) Allocation of basis. In the case of the donation of a qualified real property interest for
conservation purposes, the basis of the property retained by the donor must be adjusted by the
elimination of that part of the total basis of the property that is properly allocable to the qualified
real property interest granted. The amount of the basis that is allocable to the qualified real
property interest shall bear the same ratio to the total basis of the property as the fair market
value of the qualified real property interest bears to the fair market value of the property before
the granting of the qualified real property interest. When a taxpayer donates to a qualifying
conservation organization an easement on a structure with respect to which deductions are taken
for depreciation, the reduction required by this paragraph (h)(3)(ii) in the basis of the property
retained by the taxpayer must be allocated between the structure and the underlying land.
(4) Examples. The provisions of this section may be illustrated by the following examples. In
examples illustrating the value or deductibility of donations, the applicable restrictions and
limitations of § 1.170A-4, with respect to reduction in amount of charitable contributions of
certain appreciated property, and § 1.170A-8, with respect to limitations on charitable deductions
by individuals. must also be taken into account.
Example 1. A owns Goldacre, a property adjacent to a state park. A wants to donate Goldacre
to the state to be used as part of the park, but A wants to reserve a qualified mineral interest in
the property, to exploit currently and to devise at death. The fair market value of the surface rights
in Goldacre is $ 200,000 and the fair market value of the mineral rights in $ 100.000. In order to
ensure that the quality of the park will not be degraded, restrictions must be imposed on the right
to extract the minerals that reduce the fair market value of the mineral rights to $ 80,000. Under
this section, the value of the contribution is $ 200,000 (the value of the surface rights).

Appendix B

18

Example 2. In 1984 B, who is 62, donates a remainder interest in Greenacre to a qualifying
organization for conservation purposes. Greenacre is a tract of 200 acres of undeveloped
woodland that is valued at $ 200,000 at its highest and best use. Under § 1.170A-12(b), the value
of a remainder interest in real property following one life is determined under § 25.2512-5 of this
chapter (Gift Tax Regulations). (See § 25.2512-5A of this chapter with respect to the valuation of
annuities, interests for life or term of years, and remainder or reversionary interests transferred
before May 1, 1999.) Accordingly, the value of the remainder interest, and thus the amount
eligible for an income tax deduction under section 170(f), is $ 55,996 ($ 200,000 x .27998).
Example 3. Assume the same facts as in example (2), except that Greenacre is B's 200-acre
estate with a home built during the colonial period. Some of the acreage around the home is
cleared; the balance of Greenacre, except for access roads, is wooded and undeveloped. See
section 170(f)(3)(B)(i). However, B would like Greenacre to be maintained in its current state after
his death, so he donates a remainder interest in Greenacre to a qualifying organization for
conservation purposes pursuant to section 170 (f)(3)(B)(iii) and (h)(2)(B). At the time of the gift the
land has a value of $ 200,000 and the house has a value of $ 100,000. The value of the remainder
interest, and thus the amount eligible for an income tax deduction under section 170(f), is
computed pursuant to § 1.170A-12. See § 1.170A-12(b)(3).
Example 4. Assume the same facts as in example (2), except that at age 62 instead of donating
a remainder interest B donates an easement in Greenacre to a qualifying organization for
conservation purposes. The fair market value of Greenacre after the donation is reduced to $
110,000. Accordingly, the value of the easement, and thus the amount eligible for a deduction
under section 170(f), is $ 90,000 ($ 200,000 less $ 110,000).
Example 5. Assume the same facts as in example (4), and assume that three years later, at age
65, B decides to donate a remainder interest in Greenacre to a qualifying organization for
conservation purposes. Increasing real estate values in the area have raised the fair market value
of Greenacre (subject to the easement) to $ 130,000. Accordingly, the value of the remainder
interest, and thus the amount eligible for a deduction under section 170(f), is $ 41,639 ($ 130,000
x .32030).
Example 6. Assume the same facts as in example (2), except that at the time of the donation
of a remainder interest in Greenacre, B also donates an easement to a different qualifying
organization for conservation purposes. Based on all the facts and circumstances, the value of the
easement is determined to be $ 100,000. Therefore, the value of the property after the easement
is $ 100,000 and the value of the remainder interest, and thus the amount eligible for deduction
under section 170(f), is $ 27,998 ($ 100,000 x .27998).
Example 7. C owns Greenacre, a 200-acre estate containing a house built during the colonial
period. At its highest and best use, for home development, the fair market value of Greenacre is $
300,000. C donates an easement (to maintain the house and Green acre in their current state) to a
qualifying organization for conservation purposes. The fair market value of Greenacre after the
donation is reduced to $ 125,000. Accordingly, the value of the easement and the amount eligible
for a deduction under section 170(f) is $ 175.000 ($ 300,000 less $ 125,000).
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Example 8. Assume the same facts as in example (7) and assume that three years later, C
decides to donate a remainder interest in Greenacre to a qualifying organization for conservation
purposes. Increasing real estate values in the area have raised the fair market value of Greenacre
to $ 180.000. Assume that because of the perpetual easement prohibiting any development of the
land, the value of the house is $ 120,000 and the value of the land is $ 60,000. The value of the
remainder interest, and thus the amount eligible for an income tax deduction under section 170(f),
is computed pursuant to § 1.170A-12. See § 1.170A-12(b)(3).
Example 9. D owns property with a basis of $ 20,000 and a fair market value of $ 80,000. D
donates to a qualifying organization an easement for conservation purposes that is determined
under this section to have a fair market value of $ 60,000. The amount of basis allocable to the
easement is $ 15,000 ($ 60,000/$ 80,000 = $ 15,000/$ 20,000). Accordingly, the basis of the
property is reduced to $ 5,000 ($ 20,000 minus $ 15,000).
Example 10. E owns 10 one-acre lots that are currently woods and parkland. The fair market
value of each of E's lots is $ 15,000 and the basis of each lot is $ 3,000. E grants to the county a
perpetual easement for conservation purposes to use and maintain eight of the acres as a public
park and to restrict any future development on those eight acres. As a result of the restrictions,
the value of the eight acres is reduced to $ 1,000 an acre. However, by perpetually restricting
development on this portion of the land, E has ensured that the two remaining acres will always
be bordered by parkland, thus increasing their fair market value to $ 22,500 each. If the eight acres
represented all of E's land, the fair market value of the easement would be $ 112,000, an amount
equal to the fair market value of the land before the granting of the easement (8 x $ 15,000 = $
120,000) minus the fair market value of the encumbered land after the granting of the easement
(8 x $ 1,000 = $ 8,000). However, because the easement only covered a portion of the taxpayer's
contiguous land, the amount of the deduction under section 170 is reduced to $ 97,000 ($ 150,000
- $ 53,000), that is, the difference between the fair market value of the entire tract of land before
($ 150,000) and after ((8 x $ 1,000) + (2 x $ 22,500)) the granting of the easement.
Example 11. Assume the same facts as in example (10). Since the easement covers a portion of
E's land, only the basis of that portion is adjusted. Therefore, the amount of basis allocable to the
easement is $ 22,400 ((8 x $ 3,000) x ($ 112,000/$ 120,000)). Accordingly, the basis of the eight
acres encumbered by the easement is reduced to $ 1,600 ($ 24,000 - $ 22,400), or $ 200 for each
acre. The basis of the two remaining acres is not affected by the donation.
Example 12. F owns and uses as professional offices a two-story building that lies within a
registered historic district. F's building is an outstanding example of period architecture with a fair
market value of $ 125,000. Restricted to its current use, which is the highest and best use of the
property without making changes to the facade, the building and lot would have a fair market
value of $ 100,000, of which $ 80,000 would be allocable to the building and $ 20,000 would be
allocable to the lot. F's basis in the property is $ 50,000, of which $ 40,000 is allocable to the
building and $ 10,000 is allocable to the lot. F's neighborhood is a mix of residential and
commercial uses, and it is possible that F (or another owner) could enlarge the building for more
extensive commercial use, which is its highest and best use. However, this would require changes
to the facade. F would like to donate to a qualifying preservation organization an easement
restricting any changes to the facade and promising to maintain the facade in perpetuity. The
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donation would qualify for a deduction under this section. The fair market value of the easement
is $ 25,000 (the fair market value of the property before the easement, $ 125,000, minus the fair
market value of the property after the easement, $ 100,000). Pursuant to § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(iii),
the basis allocable to the easement is $ 10,000 and the basis of the underlying property (building
and lot) is reduced to $ 40,000.
(i) Substantiation requirement. If a taxpayer makes a qualified conservation contribution and
claims a deduction, the taxpayer must maintain written records of the fair market value of the
underlying property before and after the donation and the conservation purpose furthered by the
donation and such information shall be stated in the taxpayer's income tax return if required by
the return or its instructions. See also § 1.170A-13(c) (relating to substantiation requirements for
deductions in excess of $ 5,000 for charitable contributions made after 1984), and section 6659
(relating to additions to tax in the case of valuation overstatements).
(j) Effective date. Except as otherwise provided in § 1.170A-14(g)(4)(ii), this section applies
only to contributions made on or after December 18, 1980.
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Appendix C
Table of § 170(h) Deduction Cases
I. Table Structure
The Table below lists the cases involving challenges to charitable income tax deductions
claimed with respect to conservation easement donations. Given that § 170(h) and the
Treasury Regulations are effective only for transfers made on or after December 18,
1980,1 the cases are separated into two groups:
1. those involving donations made before the effective date of § 170(h) (pre-§
170(h) cases) and
2. those involving donations made on or after the effective date of § 170(h)
(post-§ 170(h) cases).
Substantial changes were made to the deduction provision with the enactment of
§ 170(h) in 1980. Accordingly, the law in effect on the date of the donation may be an
important factor in analyzing the relevance of an older case to a current controversy.2
II. Precedential Value of Tax Court Cases
The Tax Court issues several different types of opinions, the precedential value of which
differs.
1. Summary Opinions. Certain disputes (for example, disputes involving
deficiencies of $50,000 or less for each year at issue) qualify for simplified or “S
case” procedures. The Tax Court generally issues Summary Opinions in these
cases, and Summary Opinions cannot be relied on as precedent or appealed.
2. Regular Opinions and Memorandum Opinions. The Tax Court generally issues
two types of opinions in cases that are not “S” cases.
1

Pub. L. 96-541, 94 Stat. 3206, §6(d). Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(j). The mortgage subordination, division of
proceeds, baseline documentation, and donee notification, access, and enforcement rights requirements
apply only to donations made after February 13, 1986. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.170A-14(g)(2), -14(g)(6)(ii), 14(g)(5)(i), -14(g)(5)(ii). The provision requiring a reduction in amount of the donor’s deduction for any
increase in the value of certain property owned by the donor or a related person as a result of the
donation applies only to donations made after January 14, 1986. See id. § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(i).
2
For example, cases involving interpretation of the deduction provision in effect before § 170(h) was
enacted should not be relied upon in interpreting new requirements added to the deduction provision in
1980 to curb abuses and ensure protection of the federal investment, such as § 170(h)(5)(A)’s new
“protected-in-perpetuity” requirement. On the other, hand, some of the general rules governing valuation
discussed in the older cases are still relevant to current controversies.
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a. Opinions, sometimes referred to as “Regular Opinions,” (cited as
“T.C.”) are generally issued in cases that the Tax Court believes involve
sufficiently important legal issues or principles. Regular Opinions can be
cited as legal authority and appealed, and the Tax Court treats them as
binding precedent.
b. Memorandum Opinions (cited at “T.C. Memo.”) are generally issued in
cases that do not involve novel legal issues and, instead, address
situations where the law is settled or factually driven. Memorandum
Opinions can be cited as legal authority and appealed, but the Tax Court
does not treat them as binding precedent.
The Chief Judge of the Tax Court decides whether an opinion will be issued as a
Regular Opinion or a Memorandum Opinion.
3. Bench Opinions. A Tax Court judge is authorized to issue a Bench Opinion in
an S case or a regular case when the judge is “satisfied as to the factual
conclusions to be reached in the case and that the law to be applied thereto is
clear.” To issue a Bench Opinion, the judge orally states the findings of fact and
the opinion in court during the trial session and a transcript reflecting the
findings of fact and opinion is sent to the parties. Bench Opinions cannot be
relied upon as precedent.
III. Tax Court Opinions
T.C. and T.C. Memo. Opinions starting 09/25/95 and Summary Opinions starting
01/01/01 are available at https://www.ustaxcourt.gov/UstcInOp/OpinionSearch.aspx.
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Pre-§ 170(h) Cases (In Order of Final Opinion Date)
Thayer v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1977-370
Todd v. U.S., 617 F. Supp. 253 (W.D. Pa. 1985)
Hilborn v. Comm'r, 85 T.C. 677 (1985)
Stanley Works v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 389 (1986)
Akers v. Comm’r, 799 F.2d 243 (6th Cir. 1986),
aff’g T.C. Memo. 1984-490
Symington v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 892 (1986)
Stotler v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1987-275
Fannon v. Comm'r, 842 F.2d 1290 (4th Cir. 1988) (unpublished),
modifying T.C. Memo. 1986-572
Fannon v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1989-136
Dennis v. U.S., 70 A.F.T.R. 2d 92-5946 (E.D. Va. 1992)
McLennan v. U.S., 994 F.2d 839 (Fed. Cir. 1993),
aff’g 24 Cl. Ct. 102 (1991) and 23 Cl. Ct. 99 (1991)

Date of
Donation
1969
1979
1979
1977
1977
1979
1979
1979
1978
Nov. 8, 1980
Nov. 10, 1980

Post-§ 170(h) Cases (In Order of Final Opinion Date)
§ 170(h) and the Treasury Regulations are effective
only for transfers made on or after Dec. 18, 1980.3
1988 through 2000
Nicoladis v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1988-163
Losch v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1988-230
Richmond v. U.S., 699 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. La. 1988)
Higgins v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1990-103
Dorsey v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1990-242
Griffin v. Comm’r, 911 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1990),
aff’g T.C. Memo. 1989-130
Schapiro v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1991-128
Clemens v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1992-436
Schwab v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-232
Satullo v. Comm’r, 67 F.3d 314, 76 A.F.T.R.2d 6536 (11th Cir. 1995),
aff’g T.C. Memo. 1993-614
Great Northern Nekoosa v. U.S., 38 Fed. Cl. 645 (1997)
Johnston v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1997-475
Browning v. Comm'r, 109 T.C. 303 (1997)
Strasburg v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 2000-94
3

1981
Dec. 24, 1980
Dec. 29, 1980
1981
1981
1981
1981, 1984
1982
1983
1985
1981
1989
1990
1993, 1994

See supra note 1 for exceptions to the effective date for some of the Treasury Regulation provisions.
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2006
Turner v. Comm’r, 126 T.C. 299 (2006)
Ney v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2006-154 (2006)
Glass v. Comm’r, 471 F.3d 698 (6th Cir. 2006) (Glass II),
aff’g 124 T.C. 258 (2005) (Glass I)
Goldsby v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2006-274
2009
Bruzewicz v. U.S., 604 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (N.D. Ill. 2009)
Hughes v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2009-94
Kiva Dunes v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2009-145

1999
2001
1992, 1993
2000

2002
2000
2002

2010
Lord v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2010-196
Evans v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2010-207

1999
2004

2011
Schrimsher v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2011-71
Boltar v. Comm’r, 136 T.C. 326 (2011)
1982 East LLC v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2011-84
Comm’r v. Simmons, 646 F.3d 6 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Simmons II),
aff’g Simmons v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2009-208 (Simmons I)
Didonato v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2011-153
Herman v. Comm’r, T.C. Bench Op. (Sept. 22, 2011) (Herman II),
addressing remaining issues in T.C. Memo. 2009-205 (Herman I)

2004
2003
2004
2003, 2004
2004
2003

2012
Butler v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2012-72
Dunlap v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2012-126
Wall v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2012-169
Averyt v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2012-198
Rothman v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2012-218 (Rothman II),
vacating in part T.C. Memo. 2012-163 (Rothman I)
Trout Ranch v. Comm’r, 493 Fed. Appx. 944 (10th Cir. 2012)
(unpublished) (Trout Ranch II),
aff’g T.C. Memo. 2010-283 (Trout Ranch I)
Foster v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2012-90
Irby v. Comm’r, 139 T.C. 371 (2012)

2003, 2004
2003
2003
2004
2004
2003
2003
2003, 2004

2013
Pollard v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2013-38
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Graev v. Comm’r, 140 T.C. 377 (2013)
Pesky v. U.S., 2013 WL 3457691 (D. Idaho, July 8, 2013),
following 2013 WL 97752 (D. Idaho, Jan. 7, 2013)
Carpenter v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2013-172 (Carpenter II),
denying reconsideration of and supplementing T.C. Memo. 2012-1
(Carpenter I)
Friedberg v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2013-224 (Friedberg II),
reversing in part and supplementing T.C. Memo. 2011-238 (Friedberg
I)
Gorra v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2013-254
61 York Acquisition, LLC v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2013-266
2014
Esgar Corp. v. Comm’r, 744 F.3d 648 (10 Cir. 2014) (Esgar II),
aff’g T.C. Memo. 2012-35 (Esgar I) and Tempel v. Comm'r, 136 T.C.
341 (2011)
Wachter v. Comm’r, 142 T.C. 140 (2014)

2004
2002
2003
2003
2006
2006

th

Chandler v. Comm’r, 142 T.C. 279 (2014)
Whitehouse Hotel, LP v. Comm’r, 755 F.3d 236 (5th Cir. 2014)
(Whitehouse IV), aff’g in part and vacating in part 139 T.C. 304 (2012)
(Whitehouse III), on remand from 615 F.3d 321 (5th Cir. 2010)
(Whitehouse II), vacating and remanding 131 T.C. 112 (2008)
(Whitehouse I)
Scheidelman v. Comm’r, 755 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2014) (Scheidelman IV),
aff’g T.C. Memo. 2013-18 (Scheidelman III), on remand from 682 F.3d
189 (2d Cir. 2012) (Scheidelman II), vacating and remanding T.C.
Memo. 2010-151 (Scheidelman I)
Seventeen Seventy Sherman Street v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2014-124
Schmidt v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2014-159
Zarlengo v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2014-161
Reisner v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2014-230
Belk v. Comm’r, 774 F.3d 221 (4th Cir. 2014) (Belk III),
aff’g T.C. Memo 2013-154 (Belk II), denying reconsideration of and
supplementing 140 T.C. 1 (2013) (Belk I)
2015
Mitchell v. Comm’r, 775 F.3d 1243 (10 Cir. 2015) (Mitchell III),
aff’g T.C. Memo. 2013-204 (Mitchell II),
denying reconsideration and supplementing 138 T.C. 324 (2012)
(Mitchell I)
Balsam Mountain v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2015-43

2004
2004, 2005,
2006
2004, 2005
1997

2004
2003
2003
2005
2004
2004

th

Appendix C

2003
2003

5

SWF Real Estate LLC v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2015-63
Kaufman v. Comm’r, 784 F.3d. 56 (1st Cir. 2015) (Kaufman V),
aff’g T.C. Memo. 2014-52 (Kaufman IV), on remand from 687 F.3d. 21
(1st Cir. 2012) (Kaufman III), vacating and remanding in part 136 T.C.
294 (2011) (Kaufman II) and 134 T.C. 182 (2010) (Kaufman I)
Costello v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2015-87
Bosque Canyon Ranch v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 2015-130
Minnick v. Comm’r, 796 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 2015) (Minnick III) and 611
Fed. Appx. 477 (9th Cir. 2015) (unpub) (Minnick II), aff’g T.C. Memo.
2012-345 (Minnick I)
Legg v. Comm’r, 145 T.C. No. 13 (2015)
Atkinson v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2015-236
2016
Gemperle v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2016-1
Mecox v. U.S., _ F. Supp. _ (S.D.N.Y. 2016)
Palmer Ranch Holdings, Ltd. v. Comm’r, 812 F.3d 982 (11th Cir. 2016)
(Palmer Ranch II), aff’g in part and reversing and remanding in part,
T.C. Memo 2014-79 (Palmer Ranch I)
French v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2016-53
Carroll v. Comm’r, 146 T.C. No. 13 (2016)
RP Golf, LLC, T.C. Memo. 2016-80 and T.C. Memo. 2012-282
Mountanos v. Comm’r, No. 14-71580 (9th Cir., June 1, 2016)
(unpublished) (Mountanos III), aff’g T.C. Memo. 2013-138 (Mountanos
I), reconsideration denied and opinion supplemented in T.C. Memo.
2014-38 (Mountanos II).
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Appendix D
Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-13(c)
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(c). Deductions in excess of $5,000 for certain charitable
contributions of property made after December 31, 1984.
(1) General rule.
(i) In general. This paragraph applies to any charitable contribution made after
December 31, 1984, by an individual, closely held corporation, personal service
corporation, partnership, or S corporation of an item of property (other than
money and publicly traded securities to which § 1.170A-13(c)(7)(xi)(B) does not
apply) if the amount claimed or reported as a deduction under section 170 with
respect to such item exceeds $5,000. This paragraph also applies to charitable
contributions by C corporations (as defined in section 1361(a)(2) of the Code) to
the extent described in paragraph (c)(2)(ii) of this section. No deduction under
section 170 shall be allowed with respect to a charitable contribution to which
this paragraph applies unless the substantiation requirements described in
paragraph (c)(2) of this section are met. For purposes of this paragraph (c), the
amount claimed or reported as a deduction for an item of property is the
aggregate amount claimed or reported as a deduction for a charitable
contribution under section 170 for such items of property and all similar items of
property (as defined in paragraph (c)(7)(iii) of this section) by the same donor for
the same taxable year (whether or not donated to the same donee).
***
(2) Substantiation requirements.
(i) In general. Except as provided in paragraph (c)(2)(ii) of this section, a donor
who claims or reports a deduction with respect to a charitable contribution to
which this paragraph (c) applies must comply with the following three
requirements:
(A) Obtain a qualified appraisal (as defined in paragraph (c)(3) of this
section) for such property contributed. If the contributed property is a
partial interest, the appraisal shall be of the partial interest.
(B) Attach a fully completed appraisal summary (as defined in paragraph
(c)(4) of this section) to the tax return (or, in the case of a donor that is a
partnership or S corporation, the information return) on which the
deduction for the contribution is first claimed (or reported) by the donor.
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(C) Maintain records containing the information required by paragraph
(b)(2)(ii) of this section.
***
(3) Qualified appraisal.
(i) In general. For purposes of this paragraph (c), the term “qualified appraisal”
means an appraisal document that—
(A) Relates to an appraisal that is made not earlier than 60 days prior to
the date of contribution of the appraised property nor later than the date
specified in paragraph (c)(3)(iv)(B) of this section;
(B) Is prepared, signed, and dated by a qualified appraiser (within the
meaning of paragraph (c)(5) of this section);
(C) Includes the information required by paragraph (c)(3)(ii) of this
section; and
(D) Does not involve an appraisal fee prohibited by paragraph (c)(6) of
this section.
(ii) Information included in qualified appraisal. A qualified appraisal shall include
the following information:
(A) A description of the property in sufficient detail for a person who is
not generally familiar with the type of property to ascertain that the
property that was appraised is the property that was (or will be)
contributed;
(B) In the case of tangible property, the physical condition of the
property;
(C) The date (or expected date) of contribution to the donee;
(D) The terms of any agreement or understanding entered into (or
expected to be entered into) by or on behalf of the donor or donee that
relates to the use, sale, or other disposition of the property contributed,
including, for example, the terms of any agreement or understanding
that—
(1) Restricts temporarily or permanently a donee's right to use or
dispose of the donated property,
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(2) Reserves to, or confers upon, anyone (other than a donee
organization or an organization participating with a donee
organization in cooperative fundraising) any right to the income
from the contributed property or to the possession of the
property, including the right to vote donated securities, to acquire
the property by purchase or otherwise, or to designate the person
having such income, possession, or right to acquire, or
(3) Earmarks donated property for a particular use;
(E) The name, address, and (if a taxpayer identification number is
otherwise required by section 6109 and the regulations thereunder) the
identifying number of the qualified appraiser; and, if the qualified
appraiser is acting in his or her capacity as a partner in a partnership, an
employee of any person (whether an individual, corporation, or partnerships), or an independent contractor engaged by a person other than the
donor, the name, address, and taxpayer identification number (if a
number is otherwise required by section 6109 and the regulations
thereunder) of the partnership or the person who employs or engages
the qualified appraiser;
(F) The qualifications of the qualified appraiser who signs the appraisal,
including the appraiser's background, experience, education, and
membership, if any, in professional appraisal associations;
(G) A statement that the appraisal was prepared for income tax purposes;
(H) The date (or dates) on which the property was appraised;
(I) The appraised fair market value (within the meaning of §1.170A1(c)(2)) of the property on the date (or expected date) of contribution;
(J) The method of valuation used to determine the fair market value, such
as the income approach, the market-data approach, and the
replacement-cost-less-depreciation approach; and
(K) The specific basis for the valuation, such as specific comparable sales
transactions or statistical sampling, including a justification for using
sampling and an explanation of the sampling procedure employed.
(iii) Effect of signature of the qualified appraiser. Any appraiser who falsely or
fraudulently overstates the value of the contributed property referred to in a
qualified appraisal or appraisal summary (as defined in paragraphs (c)(3) and (4),
respectively, of this section) that the appraiser has signed may be subject to a
Appendix D
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civil penalty under section 6701 for aiding and abetting an understatement of tax
liability and, moreover, may have appraisals disregarded pursuant to 31 U.S.C.
330(c).
(iv) Special rules.
(A) Number of qualified appraisals. For purposes of paragraph (c)(2)(i)(A)
of this section, a separate qualified appraisal is required for each item of
property that is not included in a group of similar items of property. See
paragraph (c)(7)(iii) of this section for the definition of similar items of
property. Only one qualified appraisal is required for a group of similar
items of property contributed in the same taxable year of the donor,
although a donor may obtain separate qualified appraisals for each item
of property. A qualified appraisal prepared with respect to a group of
similar items of property shall provide all the information required by
paragraph (c)(3)(ii) of this section for each item of similar property,
except that the appraiser may select any items whose aggregate value is
appraised at $100 or less and provide a group description of such items.
(B) Time of receipt of qualified appraisal. The qualified appraisal must be
received by the donor before the due date (including extensions) of the
return on which a deduction is first claimed (or reported in the case of a
donor that is a partnership or S corporation) under section 170 with
respect to the donated property, or, in the case of a deduction first
claimed (or reported) on an amended return, the date on which the
return is filed.
(C) Retention of qualified appraisal. The donor must retain the qualified
appraisal in the donor's records for so long as it may be relevant in the
administration of any internal revenue law.
(D) Appraisal disregarded pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 330(c). If an appraisal is
disregarded pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 330(c) it shall have no probative effect
as to the value of the appraised property. Such appraisal will, however,
otherwise constitute a “qualified appraisal” for purposes of this
paragraph (c) if the appraisal summary includes the declaration described
in paragraph (c)(4)(ii)(L)(2) and the taxpayer had no knowledge that such
declaration was false as of the time described in paragraph (c)(4)(i)(B) of
this section.
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(4) Appraisal summary.
(i) In general. For purposes of this paragraph (c), except as provided in paragraph
(c)(4)(iv)(A) of this section, the term “appraisal summary” means a summary of a
qualified appraisal that—
(A) Is made on the form prescribed by the Internal Revenue Service;
(B) Is signed and dated (as described in paragraph (c)(4)(iii) of this
section) by the donee (or presented to the donee for signature in cases
described in paragraph (c)(4)(iv)(C)(2) of this section);
(C) Is signed and dated by the qualified appraiser (within the meaning of
paragraph (c)(5) of this section) who prepared the qualified appraisal
(within the meaning of paragraph (c)(3) of this section); and
(D) Includes the information required by paragraph (c)(4)(ii) of this
section.
(ii) Information included in an appraisal summary. An appraisal summary shall
include the following information:
(A) The name and taxpayer identification number of the donor (social
security number if the donor is an individual or, employer identification
number if the donor is a partnership or corporation);
(B) A description of the property in sufficient detail for a person who is
not generally familiar with the type of property to ascertain that the
property that was appraised is the property that was contributed;
(C) In the case of tangible property, a brief summary of the overall
physical condition of the property at the time of the contribution;
(D) The manner of acquisition (e.g., purchase, exchange, gift, or bequest)
and the date of acquisition of the property by the donor, or, if the
property was created, produced, or manufactured by or for the donor, a
statement to that effect and the approximate date the property was
substantially completed;
(E) The cost or other basis of the property adjusted as provided by
section 1016;
(F) The name, address, and taxpayer identification number of the donee;
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(G) The date the donee received the property;
(H) For charitable contributions made after June 6 1988, a statement
explaining whether or not the charitable contribution was made by
means of a bargain sale and the amount of any consideration received
from the donee for the contribution;
(I) The name, address, and (if a taxpayer identification number is
otherwise required by section 6109 and the regulations thereunder) the
identifying number of the qualified appraiser who signs the appraisal
summary and of other persons as required by paragraph (c)(3)(ii)(E) of
this section;
(J) The appraised fair market value of the property on the date of
contribution;
(K) The declaration by the appraiser described in paragraph (c)(5)(i) of
this section;
(L) A declaration by the appraiser stating that—
(1) The fee charged for the appraisal is not of a type prohibited by
paragraph (e)(6) of this section; and
(2) Appraisals prepared by the appraiser are not being
disregarded pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 330(c) on the date the appraisal
summary is signed by the appraiser; and
(M) Such other information as may be specified by the form.
(iii) Signature of the original donee. The person who signs the appraisal summary
for the donee shall be an official authorized to sign the tax or information
returns of the donee, or a person specifically authorized to sign appraisal
summaries by an official authorized to sign the tax or information returns of such
done. In the case of a donee that is a governmental unit, the person who signs
the appraisal summary for such donee shall be the official authorized by such
donee to sign appraisal summaries. The signature of the donee on the appraisal
summary does not represent concurrence in the appraised value of the
contributed property. Rather, it represents acknowledgment of receipt of the
property described in the appraisal summary on the date specified in the
appraisal summary and that the donee understands the information reporting
requirements imposed by section 6050L and §1.6050L-1. In general, §1.6050L-1
requires the donee to file an information return with the Internal Revenue
Service in the event the donee sells, exchanges, consumes, or otherwise disposes
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of the property (or any portion thereof) described in the appraisal summary
within 2 years after the date of the donor's contribution of such property.
(iv) Special rules.
***
(B) Number of appraisal summaries. A separate appraisal summary for
each item of property described in paragraph (c)(1) of this section must
be attached to the donor's return. If, during the donor's taxable year, the
donor contributes similar items of property described in paragraph (c)(1)
of this section to more than one donee, the donor shall attach to the
donor's return a separate appraisal summary for each donee. See
paragraph (c)(7)(iii) of this section for the definition of similar items of
property. If, however, during the donor's taxable year, a donor
contributes similar items of property described in paragraph (c)(1) of this
section to the same donee, the donor may attach to the donor's return a
single appraisal summary with respect to all similar items of property
contributed to the same donee. Such an appraisal summary shall provide
all the information required by paragraph (c)(4)(ii) of this section for each
item of property, except that the appraiser may select any items whose
aggregate value is appraised at $100 or less and provide a group
description for such items.
(C) Manner of acquisition, cost basis and donee's signature.
(1) If a taxpayer has reasonable cause for being unable to provide
the information required by paragraph (c)(4)(ii)(D) and (E) of this
section (relating to the manner of acquisition and basis of the
contributed property), an appropriate explanation should be
attached to the appraisal summary. The taxpayer's deduction will
not be disallowed simply because of the inability (for reasonable
cause) to provide these items of information.
(2) In rare and unusual circumstances in which it is impossible for
the taxpayer to obtain the signature of the donee on the appraisal
summary as required by paragraph (c)(4)(i)(B) of this section, the
taxpayer's deduction will not be disallowed for that reason
provided that the taxpayer attaches a statement to the appraisal
summary explaining, in detail, why it was not possible to obtain
the donee's signature. For example, if the donee ceases to exist as
an entity subsequent to the date of the contribution and prior to
the date when the appraisal summary must be signed, and the
donor acted reasonably in not obtaining the donee's signature at
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the time of the contribution, relief under this paragraph
(c)(4)(iv)(C)(2) would generally be appropriate.
(D) Information excluded from certain appraisal summaries. The
information required by paragraph (c)(4)(i)(C), paragraph (c)(4)(ii)(D), (E),
(H) through (M), and paragraph (c)(4)(iv)(A)(3), and the average trading
price referred to in paragraph (c)(4)(iv)(A)(4) of this section do not have
to be included on the appraisal summary at the time it is signed by the
donee or a copy is provided to the donee pursuant to paragraph
(c)(4)(iv)(E) of this section.
(E) Statement to be furnished by donors to donees. Every donor who
presents an appraisal summary to a donee for signature after June 6,
1988, in order to comply with paragraph (c)(4)(i)(B) of this section shall
furnish a copy of the appraisal summary to such donee.
(F) Appraisal summary required to be provided to partners and S
corporation shareholders. If the donor is a partnership or S corporation,
the donor shall provide a copy of the appraisal summary to every partner
or shareholder, respectively, who receives an allocation of a charitable
contribution deduction under section 170 with respect to the property
described in the appraisal summary.
(G) Partners and S corporation shareholders. A partner of a partnership
or shareholder of an S corporation who receives an allocation of a
deduction under section 170 for a charitable contribution of property to
which this paragraph (c) applies must attach a copy of the partnership's
or S corporation's appraisal summary to the tax return on which the
deduction for the contribution is first claimed. If such appraisal summary
is not attached, the partner's or shareholder's deduction shall not be
allowed except as provided for in paragraph (c)(4)(iv)(H) of this section.
(H) Failure to attach appraisal summary. In the event that a donor fails to
attach to the donor's return an appraisal summary as required by
paragraph (c)(2)(i)(B) of this section, the Internal Revenue Service may
request that the donor submit the appraisal summary within 90 days of
the request. If such a request is made and the donor complies with the
request within the 90-day period, the deduction under section 170 shall
not be disallowed for failure to attach the appraisal summary, provided
that the donor's failure to attach the appraisal summary was a good faith
omission and the requirements of paragraph (c)(3) and (4) of this section
are met (including the completion of the qualified appraisal prior to the
date specified in paragraph (c)(3)(iv)(B) of this section).
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(5) Qualified appraiser.
(i) In general. The term “qualified appraiser” means an individual (other than a
person described in paragraph (c)(5)(iv) of this section) who includes on the
appraisal summary (described in paragraph (c)(4) of this section), a declaration
that—
(A) The individual either holds himself or herself out to the public as an
appraiser or performs appraisals on a regular basis;
(B) Because of the appraiser's qualifications as described in the appraisal
(pursuant to paragraph (c)(3)(ii)(F) of this section), the appraiser is
qualified to make appraisals of the type of property being valued;
(C) The appraiser is not one of the persons described in paragraph
(c)(5)(iv) of this section; and
(D) The appraiser understands that an intentionally false or fraudulent
overstatement of the value of the property described in the qualified
appraisal or appraisal summary may subject the appraiser to a civil
penalty under section 6701 for aiding and abetting an understatement of
tax liability, and, moreover, the appraiser may have appraisals
disregarded pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 330(c) (see paragraph (c)(3)(iii) of this
section).
(ii) Exception. An individual is not a qualified appraiser with respect to a
particular donation, even if the declaration specified in paragraph (c)(5)(i) of this
section is provided in the appraisal summary, if the donor had knowledge of
facts that would cause a reasonable person to expect the appraiser falsely to
overstate the value of the donated property (e.g., the donor and the appraiser
make an agreement concerning the amount at which the property will be valued
and the donor knows that such amount exceeds the fair market value of the
property).
(iii) Numbers of appraisers. More than one appraiser may appraise the donated
property. If more than one appraiser appraises the property, the donor does not
have to use each appraiser's appraisal for purposes of substantiating the
charitable contribution deduction pursuant to this paragraph (c). If the donor
uses the appraisal of more than one appraiser, or if two or more appraisers
contribute to a single appraisal, each appraiser shall comply with the
requirements of this paragraph (c), including signing the qualified appraisal and
appraisal summary as required by paragraphs (c)(3)(i)(B) and (c)(4)(i)(C) of this
section, respectively.
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(iv) Qualified appraiser exclusions. The following persons cannot be qualified
appraisers with respect to particular property:
(A) The donor or the taxpayer who claims or reports a deductions under
section 170 for the contribution of the property that is being appraised.
(B) A party to the transaction in which the donor acquired the property
being appraised (i.e., the person who sold, exchanged, or gave the
property to the donor, or any person who acted as an agent for the
transferor or for the donor with respect to such sale, exchange, or gift),
unless the property is donated within 2 months of the date of acquisition
and its appraised value does not exceed its acquisition price.
(C) The donee of the property.
(D) Any person employed by any of the foregoing persons (e.g., if the
donor acquired a painting from an art dealer, neither the art dealer nor
persons employed by the dealer can be qualified appraisers with respect
to that painting).
(E) Any person related to any of the foregoing persons under section
267(b), or, with respect to appraisals made after June 6, 1988, married to
a person who is in a relationship described in section 267(b) with any of
the foregoing persons.
(F) An appraiser who is regularly used by any person described in
paragraph (c)(5)(iv)(A), (B), or (C) of this section and who does not
perform a majority of his or her appraisals made during his or her taxable
year for other persons.
(6) Appraisal fees.
(i) In general. Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (c)(6)(ii) of this section,
no part of the fee arrangement for a qualified appraisal can be based, in effect,
on a percentage (or set of percentages) of the appraised value of the property. If
a fee arrangement for an appraisal is based in whole or in part on the amount of
the appraised value of the property, if any, that is allowed as a deduction under
section 170, after Internal Revenue Service examination or otherwise, it shall be
treated as a fee based on a percentage of the appraised value of the property.
For example, an appraiser's fee that is subject to reduction by the same
percentage as the appraised value may be reduced by the Internal Revenue
Service would be treated as a fee that violates this paragraph (c)(6).
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(ii) Exception. Paragraph (c)(6)(i) of this section does not apply to a fee paid to a
generally recognized association that regulates appraisers provided all of the
following requirements are met:
(A) The association is not organized for profit and no part of the net
earnings of the association inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual (these terms have the same meaning as in
section 501(c)),
(B) The appraiser does not receive any compensation from the
association or any other persons for making the appraisal, and
(C) The fee arrangement is not based in whole or in part on the amount
of the appraised value of the donated property, if any, that is allowed as
a deduction under section 170 after Internal Revenue Service
examination or otherwise.
(7) Meaning of terms. For purposes of this paragraph(c)—
***

Appendix D

11

Appendix E
Internal Revenue Code § 170(f)(11)
IRC § 170 Charitable, etc., contributions and gifts.
...
(f) Disallowance of deduction in certain cases and special rules.
...
(11) Qualified appraisal and other documentation for certain contributions.
(A) In general.
(i) Denial of deduction. In the case of an individual, partnership, or
corporation, no deduction shall be allowed under subsection (a) for any
contribution of property for which a deduction of more than $500 is
claimed unless such person meets the requirements of subparagraphs
(B), (C), and (D), as the case may be, with respect to such contribution.
(ii) Exceptions.
(I) Readily valued property. Subparagraphs (C) and (D) shall not
apply to cash, property described in subsection (e)(1)(B)(iii) or
section 1221(a)(1), publicly traded securities (as defined in section
6050L(a)(2)(B)), and any qualified vehicle described in paragraph
(12)(A)(ii) for which an acknowledgement under paragraph
(12)(B)(iii) is provided.
(II) Reasonable cause. Clause (i) shall not apply if it is shown that
the failure to meet such requirements is due to reasonable cause
and not to willful neglect.
(B) Property description for contributions of more than $500. In the case of
contributions of property for which a deduction of more than $500 is claimed,
the requirements of this subparagraph are met if the individual, partnership or
corporation includes with the return for the taxable year in which the
contribution is made a description of such property and such other information
as the Secretary may require. The requirements of this subparagraph shall not
apply to a C corporation which is not a personal service corporation or a closely
held C corporation.
(C) Qualified appraisal for contributions of more than $5,000. In the case of
contributions of property for which a deduction of more than $5,000 is claimed,
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the requirements of this subparagraph are met if the individual, partnership, or
corporation obtains a qualified appraisal of such property and attaches to the
return for the taxable year in which such contribution is made such information
regarding such property and such appraisal as the Secretary may require.
(D) Substantiation for contributions of more than $500,000. In the case of
contributions of property for which a deduction of more than $500,000 is
claimed, the requirements of this subparagraph are met if the individual,
partnership, or corporation attaches to the return for the taxable year a qualified
appraisal of such property.
(E) Qualified appraisal and appraiser. For purposes of this paragraph(i) Qualified appraisal. The term ‘qualified appraisal‘ means, with respect
to any property, an appraisal of such property which(I) is treated for purposes of this paragraph as a qualified appraisal
under regulations or other guidance prescribed by the Secretary,
and
(II) is conducted by a qualified appraiser in accordance with
generally accepted appraisal standards and any regulations or
other guidance prescribed under subclause (I).
(ii) Qualified appraiser. Except as provided in clause (iii), the term
‘qualified appraiser‘ means an individual who(I) has earned an appraisal designation from a recognized
professional appraiser organization or has otherwise met
minimum education and experience requirements set forth in
regulations prescribed by the Secretary,
(II) regularly performs appraisals for which the individual receives
compensation, and
(III) meets such other requirements as may be prescribed by the
Secretary in regulations or other guidance.
(iii) Specific appraisals. An individual shall not be treated as a qualified
appraiser with respect to any specific appraisal unless(I) the individual demonstrates verifiable education and
experience in valuing the type of property subject to the
appraisal, and
(II) the individual has not been prohibited from practicing before
the Internal Revenue Service by the Secretary under section
330(c) of title 31, United States Code, at any time during the 3year period ending on the date of the appraisal.
(F) Aggregation of similar items of property. For purposes of determining
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thresholds under this paragraph, property and all similar items of property
donated to 1 or more donees shall be treated as 1 property.
(G) Special rule for pass-thru entities. In the case of a partnership or S
corporation, this paragraph shall be applied at the entity level, except that the
deduction shall be denied at the partner or shareholder level.
(H) Regulations. The Secretary may prescribe such regulations as may be
necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of this paragraph, including
regulations that may provide that some or all of the requirements of this
paragraph do not apply in appropriate cases.
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Appendix F
IRS Form 8283 (appraisal summary)
and Supplemental Statement

Appendix F

Rule 1: Contiguous Parcel
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(i) - 4 th sentence

If land contiguous to the land encumbered by the
easement is owned by the donor or a member of
the donor’s family, the deduction is equal to the
difference between the before-easement and aftereasement values of the entire contiguous parcel.

The family of an individual shall include only his
brothers and sisters (whether by the whole or half
blood), spouse, ancestors, and lineal descendants.
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Rule 2: Enhancement
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(i) - 5 th sentence.

If the easement enhances the value of any other
property owned by the donor or a “related person,”
the donor’s deduction must be reduced by an amount
equal to the value of any such enhancement, whether
or not such other property is contiguous.

“Related person” is defined to include family
members and certain entities
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IRS Form 8283
Noncash Charitable Contributions
Filling out the form correctly and
completely . . .
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Example 1: Simple Donation
CE Protected Land
Before easement value: $1,000,000
After easement value: $ 700,000
Easement value:
$ 300,000

Deduction is
$300,000
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Example 1: Simple Donation
Before easement value: $1,000,000
After easement value: $ 700,000
Easement value:
$ 300,000
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Example 2: Simple Bargain Sale
CE Protected Land
Before easement value: $1,000,000
After easement value: $ 700,000
Easement value:
$ 300,000

Landowner is paid
$150,000 for easement
Deduction is
$150,000
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Example 2: Simple Bargain Sale
Before easement value: $1,000,000
After easement value: $ 700,000
Easement value:
$ 300,000

Landowner is paid
$150,000 for easement

Appendix F

4

Example 3: Rule 1 Contiguous Parcel
Parcel 2
Contiguous Parcel

Parcel 1
CE Protected Land

Before-easement value of entire contiguous parcel: $1,500,000
After-easement value of entire contiguous parcel: $ 900,000
Easement value:
$ 600,000
Deduction is
$600,000
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Example 3: Rule 1 Contiguous Parcel
Before easement value of entire contiguous parcel: $1,500,000
After easement value of entire contiguous parcel: $ 900,000
Easement value:
$ 600,000
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IRS Chief Counsel
Memorandum 201334039
Footnote 1
“Whether the entire contiguous parcel is valued
as one large property or as separate properties
depends on the [HBU] of the entire contiguous
parcel.”
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Example 4: Rule 2 Enhancement
CE Protected Land
Before easement value: $1,000,000
After easement value: $ 700,000
Easement value:
$ 300,000

Noncontiguous
Parcel
value enhanced
$50,000 by
easement donation

Deduction is
$250,000
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Example 4: Rule 2 Enhancement
Before easement value: $1,000,000
After easement value: $ 700,000
Easement value:
$ 300,000

CE enhances value
of noncontiguous
parcel by $50,000

*Address $50,000
Enhancement in
Supplemental Statement

Appendix F

Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(c)(5)(iii)
If two or more appraisers contribute to a single appraisal, each appraiser must
comply with the [Treasury Regulation requirements] …, including signing the
qualified appraisal and appraisal summary.
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Appendix G
Name(s) shown on income tax return
Robert T. Landowner
Susan B. Landowner

Identifying Number
021-34-1234
083-23-5555

IRS FORM 8283
SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT
DONATION OF CONSERVATION EASEMENT
On November 12, 2010, the taxpayers/donors completed the donation of a
conservation easement (in Massachusetts, a “conservation restriction”) under the
provisions of Section 170(h) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, and the
regulations thereunder (the “Code”). The conservation restriction encumbers 55 acres,
more or less (the “Property”), of a larger parcel of 65 acres, more or less, owned by the
taxpayers in the Town of Barnstable, Barnstable County, Massachusetts.
Pursuant to the Treasury Regulations, the value of the conservation restriction
was determined by appraising all of the contiguous property owned by the donors
before and after the conservation restriction.
There are currently no residences or other habitable dwellings on the
encumbered Property. The conservation restriction prohibits any commercial or
industrial activities, or the construction of any new residence or habitable dwelling, on
the Property. The donation was made to the Barnstable Land Trust (the “donee”), a
“qualified organization” as defined at Section 170(h) of the Code.
The Property is within (i) the Barnstable Harbor/Sandy Neck Area of Critical
Environmental Concern; (ii) a Massachusetts Natural Heritage and Endangered Species
Program Priority Habitat for rare and endangered species; and (iii) a Massachusetts
Department of Fisheries, Wildlife and Environmental Law Enforcement BioMap Core
Habitat area and a BioMap Supporting Natural Landscape area, all as further described
below. Further, the Property is within areas declared by the Town of Barnstable and the
Cape Cod Regional Policy Plan as important and deserving of protection and
preservation, as further described below.
The donation will protect a number of important conservation values, including
the following:
according to the Baseline Documentation Report, certified by the donors and the
donee as accurate as of the effective date of the conservation restriction, the Property
encompasses salt marsh, tidal creek, coastal bank, cultural field, pine-oak woodland and
maple/blueberry swamp habitats; and
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the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, through the authority of the Secretary of
Energy and Environmental Affairs under General Law Chapter 21A, Section 2(7) may
designate Areas of Critical Environmental Concern (“ACEC”), which are places in
Massachusetts that receive special recognition because of the quality, uniqueness and
significance of their natural and cultural resources; and,
the 1997 Massachusetts Coastal Zone Management Plan promotes a Protected
Areas Policy #1 to preserve, restore, and enhance complexes of coastal resources of
regional or statewide significance through the Areas of Critical Environmental Concern
program; and,
in 1978, the Barnstable Harbor/Sandy Neck ecosystem in the Towns of
Barnstable and Sandwich was designated as an Area of Critical Environmental Concern
(ACEC); and,
the Property is located within the Barnstable Harbor/Sandy Neck ACEC, and a
copy of the Massachusetts Geographic Information System (MassGIS) map of such
ACEC, showing the location of the Property, is included in the Baseline Documentation;
and,
the Massachusetts Endangered Species Act, M.G.L. c. 131A, protects rare species
and their habitats, and the Massachusetts Natural Heritage and Endangered Species
Program (“MNHESP”) has designated as Priority Habitats the known geographical extent
of habitat for state-listed rare plant and animal species; and,
the Property is located within an MNHESP Priority Habitat for rare and
endangered species, and a copy of the MassGIS map of such Priority Habitats, showing
the location of the Property, is included in the Baseline Documentation; and,
in 2001 the Massachusetts Department of Fisheries, Wildlife and Environmental
Law Enforcement published a report entitled BioMap: Guiding Land Conservation for
Biodiversity in Massachusetts, which identified critical habitat “areas, that if protected,
would provide suitable habitat over the long term for the maximum number of
Massachusetts’ terrestrial and wetland plant, animal species, and natural communities;”
and developed a BioMap to identify the areas most in need of protection in order to
protect the native biodiversity of the Commonwealth; and,
the BioMap contains Core Habitat areas, which depict the most viable habitats
for rare species and natural communities in Massachusetts, and Supporting Natural
Landscape areas, which buffer and connect Core Habitat areas and which identify large,
naturally vegetated blocks that are relatively free from the impact of roads and other
development; and,
the Property is located within a BioMap Core Habitat area and a BioMap
Supporting Natural Landscape area, and a copy of the MassGIS map of such BioMap
areas, showing the location of the Property, is included in the Baseline Documentation;
and,
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in 1998, MNHESP published a report entitled Our Irreplaceable Heritage:
Protecting Biodiversity in Massachusetts, which stated, “We believe that [there are]
eight ecosystem types or natural community assemblages [that are] the most important
targets for biodiversity conservation. They represent the most threatened or
ecologically essential areas for rare plants and animals in Massachusetts,” (p. 29) and
specifically identified coastal natural communities as standing out “as some of the most
biologically diverse lands in the Commonwealth” and singled out salt marsh in particular
as important to conserve and restore (p. 30), and the Property contains approximately
4.49 acres of salt marsh habitat; and,
in 2003, a Statewide Land Conservation Plan was drafted, which identifies the
most significant available, undeveloped and unprotected open space lands needed to
protect, among other things, biodiversity habitats; and,
the Property is included in the Statewide Land Conservation Plan, and a copy of
the MassGIS map of such Statewide Land Conservation Plan, showing the location of the
Property, is included in the Baseline Documentation; and,
the 1997 Massachusetts Coastal Zone Management Plan promotes a Coastal
Hazards Policy#1 to preserve, protect, restore, and enhance the beneficial functions of
storm damage prevention and flood control provided by natural coastal landforms, such
as dunes, beaches, barrier beaches, coastal banks, land subject to coastal storm
flowage, salt marshes, and land under the ocean; and,
the Property consists of coastal banks, land subject to coastal storm flowage, salt
marshes and land under the ocean and lies partially within FEMA Zone A and Zone V
coastal floodplain, a high hazard area, and a copy of the official FEMA flood insurance
rate map, showing the location of the Property, is included in the Baseline
Documentation; and,
in August 2001, the Association for the Preservation of Cape Cod (APCC)
produced a map depicting, among other things, residential land of 2.5 acres or more on
which a potential conservation restriction could be placed, and the Property is identified
on APCC’s map as falling within this category; and,
in 2003, The Compact of Cape Cod Conservation Trusts, Inc. completed its Cape
Cod Wildlife Conservation Project (“Wildlife Project”), a wildlife habitat analysis and
parcel ranking for all vacant or underdeveloped parcels on Cape Cod, Massachusetts;
and,
the Property was included in the Wildlife Project, and was ranked “High” in
terms of its habitat protection priority, and “Maximum,” the highest possible ranking, in
terms of its wildlife habitat value; and,
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the Town of Barnstable developed a Local Comprehensive Plan, approved by the
Cape Cod Commission in 1998, which plan’s stated objectives included, among other
things:
•
•

•
•

•

•
•

To “preserve and improve the ecological integrity of fresh surface water bodies
and marine waters” (Goal 2.1.1; p.2-13);
To “minimize contamination of water resources with nitrogen, in order to
maintain…the ecological integrity of streams, ponds and coastal embayments”
(Goal 2.1.3; p. 2-23);
To “preserve and restore the area, quality and functions of Barnstable’s coastal
and inland wetlands” (Goal 2.3.1; p.2-86);
To “prevent loss or degradation of critical wildlife and plant habitat, to minimize
the impact of new development on wildlife and plant habitat, to maintain
existing populations and species diversity, and to maintain areas which will
support wildlife’s natural breeding, feeding and migration patterns” (Goal 2.4.1;
p.2-93);
To “protect and increase the wildlife population and habitats of Barnstable”
(Goal 6.5; p.6-22) and “preserve those wildlife corridors that foster diversity of
habitat and link known wildlife resource areas”(Policy 6.5.1; p. 6-22);
To “encourage the preservation of open space…through creative means of
conservation restrictions”(Goal 6.1.2; p. 6-13); and
To “identify, protect and preserve Barnstable’s historic…landscapes and
archaeological resources” (Goal 7.5; page 7-24); and,

the Local Comprehensive Plan included a Greenbelt and Fingerlinks Corridors
Map identifying potential parcels of vacant and underdeveloped land for its creation,
and a map identifying Archaeological Sensitivity Areas; and,
the Property is identified on the Greenbelt and Fingerlinks Corridors Map as one
of the potential parcels for the creation of such corridor within the Town of Barnstable;
and,
the Property is located within a Town of Barnstable primary area of
archaeological sensitivity, defined as an area within 1000 feet of a marine or marine
related ecosystem and which has a high probability of containing prehistoric
archaeological sites; and,
the Town of Barnstable developed an Open Space Plan (1984, amended 1987,
1998, and 2005) with a goal of preserving “quality open spaces throughout the Town
which protect and enhance its visual heritage...” and which identified, among other
things, the following community objectives:
•

To acquire, retain, preserve and protect a maximum amount of open space for
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•
•

•

the community and its natural and wildlife habitats (Goal 1, 2005), with priorities
focused on, among things, lands adjacent to designated protected or potential
open space, lands adjacent to wetlands, and lands providing wildlife corridors,
including areas within and abutting Core Habitats identified by the
Massachusetts Natural Heritage and Endangered Species Program, and
encourage the use of creative regulatory and non-regulatory land protection
tools such as conservation restrictions;
To protect the environmental health of Barnstable’s surface water resources
(Goal 2, 2005);
To protect and enhance Barnstable’s unique and fragile natural and cultural
resources including scenic beauty, historic areas and unique habitats (Goal 6,
2005);
To protect and increase wildlife population and habitats (Goal 10, 2005); and,

in 1981 the Town of Barnstable adopted a Conservation Restriction Program
consisting of policies and guidelines, in particular an Open Space Policy, approved by the
Board of Selectmen, Assessors and Conservation Commission, which encourages the use
of conservation restrictions in perpetuity to protect natural resources in accordance
with the purposes of the Open Space Plan, and which further specified that purposes of
a conservation restriction could include the following:
•
•
•
•
•

prevent disturbance of wetlands,
preserve open space,
preserve important natural habitats of fish, wildlife or plants,
protect marine water quality,
limit or prevent construction on land of natural resource value; and,

in July, 1991, the Barnstable Assembly of Delegates, pursuant to the Cape Cod
Commission Act (Chapter 716 of the Acts of 1989), adopted a Regional Policy Plan,
amended in 1996 and further amended in 2002 and 2009 , which provided, inter alia
(references are to the 2009 Plan):
•
•

a Wetlands Goal to “preserve and restore the quality and quantity of inland and
coastal wetlands and their buffers on Cape Cod” (p.52);
a Wildlife and Plant Habitat Goal to “prevent loss or degradation of critical
wildlife and plant habitat, to minimize the adverse impact of new development
on wildlife and plant habitat and to maintain existing populations and species
diversity” (p. 55), stating that “renewed commitment to protect the most
ecologically sensitive undeveloped lands through land acquisition and other
permanent conservation measures is also warranted”;
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•

•

an Open Space and Recreation Goal to “preserve and enhance the availability of
open space that provides wildlife habitat…and protects the region’s natural
resources and character” (p.57), with a recommended Town Action of working
with “local land conservation organizations to identify, acquire by fee simple or
conservation restriction, and manage open space to meet projected community
needs. Priority should be given “to the protection of significant natural and
fragile areas as identified on the Cape Cod Significant Natural Resources Areas
map.” (p.58); and,
a Heritage Preservation/Community Character Goal to “protect and preserve the
important historic and cultural features of Cape Cod’s landscape…that are critical
components of the region’s heritage and economy” (p. 80); and,

the Regional Policy Plan includes a Significant Natural Resources Areas Map,
which shows, among other things, rare species habitat, priority natural communities,
wetlands, and critical upland areas; and,
the Property is located within a Regional Policy Plan Significant Natural Resource
Area, and a copy of the map, showing the location of the Property, is included in the
Baseline Documentation; and,
the Great and General Court of Massachusetts established the Old Kings
Highway Regional Historic District on the northern shore of Barnstable County through
Chapter 740 of the Acts of 1973; and,
the Property is located on the north side of Route 6A within the Old Kings
Highway Regional Historic District; and,
the Property is visible from Barnstable Harbor, the Great Marsh and Sandy Neck,
and therefore is seen by Barnstable residents and tourists on a regular basis; and,
the Property is a substantial contributing element to the overall scenic and
cultural character of the area by maintaining the land predominantly in its natural
condition.
Therefore, the conservation purposes under Section 170(h) of the Code
furthered by the donation of the conservation restriction include the following: (i) the
preservation of significant relatively natural habitat of plants and similar ecosystems,
under Section 170(h)(4)(A)(ii); (ii) the preservation of open space for the scenic
enjoyment of the general public, which yields a significant public benefit, under Section
170(h)(4))(A)(iii)(I); and (iii) the preservation of open space pursuant to clearly
delineated local governmental policy, which yields a significant public benefit, under
Section 170(h)(4)(A)(iii)(II).
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The taxpayers acquired a portion of the property by purchase in 1996, and other
portions of the property by gift, beginning in the 1970s. Therefore, the taxpayers are
unable at this time to determine with accuracy the basis of the Property.
Applying the Direct Sales Comparison Approach combined with the Cost of
Development or “Subdivision” Approach, the appraisers concluded that the market
value of the conservation restriction was derived as follows:
a. Market value of the entire contiguous 65 acres before donation of the
conservation restriction: $____________
b. Market value of the entire contiguous 65 acres after donation of the
conservation restriction: $____________
c. Market value of the conservation restriction: $____________
A copy of the qualified appraisal that substantiates these values and verifies the
appraisal methodology is filed with this Form 8283 and the donor’s tax return. A copy of
the recorded conservation restriction is included in the appraisal report.
Neither the donors, related family members, nor related entities (as defined by
the Treasury Regulations) own any other contiguous property or nearby property the
value of which is enhanced by the donation of this conservation restriction, so no
further adjustment was required to the conclusion of value. The donation of the
conservation restriction was not made to obtain a permit or other approval from a local
or other governing authority, nor was the donation required by any contractual
obligation. The Property was not encumbered by a mortgage at the time of the
donation of the conservation restriction.
The condition of the Property was documented and established through
extensive baseline documentation acknowledged by the donors and the donee as an
accurate representation of the condition of the Property on the effective date of the
donation. The Baseline Documentation Report is filed with this Form 8283 and the
donor’s tax return, as is a copy of the letter from the donee to the taxpayers sent
pursuant to the provisions of Section 170(f)(8) of the Code.
The conservation restriction was recorded on November 12, 2010, at the
Barnstable County Registry of Deeds, Barnstable County, Massachusetts.
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Appendix H
McLaughlin Blog Posts on Case Law and Other Developments
(with live links to sources)
§ 170(h) Deduction Cases
Atkinson v. Comm’r—Golf Course Conservation Easements Not Deductible
http://bit.ly/1RHkbyN
Balsam Mountain v. Comm’r—Conservation Easement Authorizing Limited Swaps Not
Deductible
http://bit.ly/1VMeyyh
Belk v. Comm’r—4th Circuit Confirms Swappable Conservation Easements Are Not
Deductible
http://bit.ly/1SGLYPl
Bosque Canyon Ranch v. Comm’r—Partnerships Denied Deductions for Conservation
Easements Allowing Movable Homesites and Taxed on Disguised Sales of Homesites
http://bit.ly/1V3PVPb
Carroll v. Comm’r—Conservation Easement Deduction Denied for Noncompliant
“Proceeds” Clause
http://bit.ly/1QFURnr
Carpenter v. Comm’r Revisited—Federally-Deductible Conservation Easements
Extinguishable Only in a Judicial Proceeding
http://bit.ly/1mDKVDj
Chandler v. Comm’r—Façade Easements Had No Value and Strict Liability Penalty
Applied for 2006
http://bit.ly/1oi4L8n
Esgar v. Comm’r—10th Circuit Affirms Tax Court: Conservation Easements Were
Overvalued, Income From State Tax Credit Sales Was Short Term Capital Gain
http://bit.ly/1okBOZU
French v. Comm’r—Conservation Easement Deduction Denied for Lack of
Contemporaneous Written Acknowledgment
http://bit.ly/1RjMJxP
Friedberg v. Comm’r Revisited—Questionable Appraisal Can Be a “Qualified Appraisal”
http://bit.ly/1LqltHU
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Gemperle v. Comm’r—Tax Court Denies Deduction for Façade Easement Donation For
Failure to Include Appraisal In Tax Return Filing
http://bit.ly/1SPSPrR
Gorra v. Comm’r—Facade Easement Deductible but Gross Valuation Misstatement
Penalty Applied
http://bit.ly/1KSn7qO
Graev v. Comm’r—Side Letter Kills Deductions for a Façade Easement Donation
http://bit.ly/1QhD4sW
Kaufman v. Comm’r (Again)—Façade Easement Had No Value and Penalties Imposed
http://bit.ly/245TpoA
Legg v. Comm’r—Conservation Easement Donor Liable for Gross Valuation
Misstatement Penalties
http://bit.ly/1PXxj1t
Mecox v. U.S—District Court Denies Deduction for Façade Easement Donation; Deed
Recorded in Wrong Year and Appraisal Untimely
http://bit.ly/1PWHK7t
Minnick v. Comm’r – 9th Circuit Affirms Tax Court, Mortgages Must Be Subordinated
When Conservation Easement is Donated
http://bit.ly/1oOOrNa
Minnick v. Comm’r—9th Circuit’s Unpublished Holdings in Conservation Easement
Donation Case
http://bit.ly/24uler2
Mitchell v. Comm’r—10th Circuit Affirms Tax Court, Mortgages Must Be Subordinated
When Conservation Easement is Donated
http://bit.ly/1UqGae3
Mitchell v. Comm’r Revisited—170(h) Requires Perpetuation of Conservation Easement
Itself, Not Just Conservation Purposes
http://bit.ly/1Ralthg
Mountanos v. Comm’r—9th Circuit Affirmed Tax Court’s Denial of Conservation
Easement Donation Deductions and Imposition of Penalties
http://bit.ly/1Ultilv
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Palmer Ranch v. Comm’r—11th Circuit Remands Conservation Easement Valuation to
Tax Court
http://bit.ly/1U4cJOQ
Pesky v. U.S. —Deduction for Conservation Easement Donation Not Fraudulent
http://bit.ly/1Qk55OB
Pollard v. Comm’r—Conservation Easement Conveyed For Quid Pro Quo Not Deductible
http://bit.ly/21q7Dlx
Reisner v. Comm’r—Strict Liability Penalty for Facade Easement Deduction
http://bit.ly/1QNPV6y
RP Golf, LLC v. Comm’r—Conservation Easement Deduction Denied Because Mortgages
Not Subordinated at Time of Donation
http://bit.ly/1TlfzL3
Scheidelman v. Comm’r (Again)—Second Circuit Affirms Tax Court’s Holding that
Façade Easement Had No Value
http://bit.ly/1Qk5fpm
Scheidelman v. Comm’r—A Long Journey to the Denial of a Deduction for a Facade
Easement Donation
http://bit.ly/1pfAFDg
Schmidt v. Comm’r—Conservation Easement Overvalued But No Penalties Imposed
http://bit.ly/1n4TdUY
Seventeen Seventy Sherman Street, LLC v. Comm’r—Conservation Easement Conveyed
for Quid Pro Quo Not Deductible and Negligence Penalty Applied
http://bit.ly/1QmGQw3
SWF Real Estate v. Comm'r—Special Allocation of Tax Credit Generated by Conservation
Easement Donation was Disguised Sale, but Easement Valuation Largely Upheld
http://bit.ly/1ODrHEq
Wachter v. Comm’r—North Dakota Conservation Easements Not Deductible
http://bit.ly/1Qb3MR0
Whitehouse Hotel v. Comm’r (Again)—5th Circuit Affirms Tax Court’s Façade Easement
Valuation But Vacates on Penalties
http://bit.ly/1Ramk1n
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Zarlengo v. Comm’r—Conservation Easement Overvalued and Not Protected In
Perpetuity Until Recorded
http://bit.ly/1TJVUJO
61 York Acquisition, LLC v. Comm’r—$10.7m Facade Easement Deduction Denied for
Failure to Restrict Entire Exterior
http://bit.ly/21q8fHQ
Other Federal Tax-Related Issues
Conservation Easements and the Valuation Conundrum
http://bit.ly/1S8qThA
Enhanced Incentives for Easement Donations Made Permanent Without Reforms
http://bit.ly/1oOPJb1
IRS on Conservation Easement Appraisals
http://bit.ly/1UqHbTl
IRS Chief Counsel Memorandum Addresses Conservation Easement Valuation
http://bit.ly/1pfBQ5t
IRS Rules Tax-Exempt Status of Organization Accepting Conservation Easements
Should be Revoked
http://bit.ly/1XRv4ic
IRS Bars Appraisers from Valuing Facade Easements for Five Years
http://bit.ly/1Ran1rs
Façade Easement Appraiser Barred From Preparing Appraisal Reports and Ordered to
Turn Over List of Clients
http://bit.ly/1n4UDPt
Income From Charitable Organization’s Sale of Mitigation Bank Credits is not
Unrelated Business Taxable Income
http://bit.ly/1WQSF1g
Route 231, LLC v. Comm’r—4th Circuit Affirms Allocation of 97% of Tax Credits
Generated by Conservation Donations to 1% Partner Was Disguised Sale
http://bit.ly/1JZ0JvQ
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State Law Developments
Keeping the Perpetual in Perpetual Conservation Easements
http://bit.ly/1Qk6pB5
Montana Trial Court Upholds TNC’s Enforcement of a Conservation Easement
http://bit.ly/1KSE0SF
Conservation Easement Valid Despite Referencing Incorrect Grantor
http://bit.ly/1n4UZp9
Register v. TNC—$1 Million Donation Constituted a Restricted Charitable Gift
http://bit.ly/24umlad
Maryland Appellate Court Upholds Conservation Easement
http://bit.ly/1RanqKo
Maryland Land Trust and Attorney General Enforce a Conservation Easement
http://bit.ly/1RanvxJ
ME Supreme Court: Conservation Lands Open to Public Exempt from Property Tax
http://bit.ly/1Qb4dul
MA Supreme Court: Conservation Land Open to Public Exempt from Property Tax
http://bit.ly/1Rvro2T
Glass v. Van Lokeren—Conservation Easement Donors Sue Land Trust
http://bit.ly/1Qb4a1I
Growing Marijuana as “Agriculture” on Conservation-Easement Protected Land
http://bit.ly/1S8qH1O
Federally-Funded Conservation Easement Thwarts Marijuana Production
http://bit.ly/1Qk5KzR
Symposium
Perpetual Conservation Easements: What Have We Learned and Where Should We Go
From Here?
http://bit.ly/1KSDeVJ
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